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ABSTRACT 
 
Raza A. Mathematical maintenance models of vehicles’ equipment. – Qualifying scientific 
work on the rights of the manuscript. 
Dissertation for obtaining a scientific degree of Doctor of Philosophy within the 
specialty 05.22.20 «Maintenance and repair of vehicles». – National Aviation University, 
Kyiv, 2018. 
 
The thesis addresses the critical scientific problem of creating the appropriate 
maintenance models for digital avionics systems and degrading equipment of vehicles, 
which increases the operational effectiveness of such systems significantly. 
The thesis research includes the analysis of the current state and models of digital 
avionics maintenance. The study describes the necessity for developing the mathematical 
maintenance models for redundant digital avionics systems, considering the discontinuous 
nature of their operation, continuous nature of in-flight testing, possibility of both permanent 
and intermittent failures and organization of several maintenance levels using various 
diagnostic tools for detecting both failure types. 
Another focus of the thesis is the analysis of modern trends and mathematical models 
of condition-based maintenance (CBM) of vehicles’ equipment. The necessity of developing 
new CBM mathematical models for degrading equipment of vehicles, considering the 
probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions when checking system suitability for use in 
the upcoming operation interval, and the possibility of joint determination of the optimum 
inspection schedule and replacement thresholds for systems that affect and do not affect 
safety have been substantiated. 
The scientific novelty of the primary results obtained in the course of the thesis 
research is as follows: 
1. For the first time, mathematical models to evaluate the operational reliability 
indicators of continuously monitored line replaceable units/line replaceable modules 
(LRUs/LRMs) and redundant avionics systems over both finite and infinite time interval, 
which, unlike known models, consider the characteristics of both permanent and intermittent 
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failures, have been developed. These models allow evaluating the impact of intermittent 
failures on the availability and mean time between unscheduled removals (MTBUR) of 
LRU/LRM. 
2. For the first time, generalized expressions to calculate the average maintenance 
costs of redundant avionics systems, considering the impact of permanent and intermittent 
failures, have been developed for alternative maintenance options that differ by the number 
of maintenance levels (one, two or three), which allows choosing the optimal maintenance 
option during warranty and post-warranty periods. 
3. For the first time, a mathematical model of CBM, based on condition monitoring 
at scheduled times has been developed, which, unlike the known models, considers the 
probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made when checking system suitability. This 
model allows formulating the criteria of determining the optimal replacement threshold for 
each inspection time and substantially reduce the likelihood of system failure in the 
forthcoming interval of operation. 
4. For the first time, generalized mathematical expressions to calculate the 
effectiveness indicators of CBM over a finite time interval, as well as the criteria of joint 
optimization of the inspection schedule and replacement thresholds for systems that affect 
or do not affect the safety, have been developed. These results allow significantly improve 
the availability, reduce average maintenance costs and reduce the number of inspections. 
The practical value of the results obtained in the thesis is as follows: 
1. The techniques to calculate probabilistic and time-related indicators of 
maintenance effectiveness for digital avionics LRUs/LRMs over finite and infinite operating 
intervals have been developed. The proposed procedures allow to estimate the availability, 
operational reliability function (ORF), and mean time between unscheduled removals 
(MTBUR) of LRUs/LRMs during warranty and post-warranty maintenance periods for both 
federated avionics (FA) and integrated modular avionics (IMA) architectures; 
2. A technique for minimizing the warranty maintenance cost of the redundant digital 
avionics systems has been developed, demonstrating (through the example of the ADIRS 
system of the Airbus A380 aircraft) that in the case of the optimal option of warranty 
maintenance, the average maintenance cost per aircraft decreases by 28 %; 
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3. A technique for minimizing the post-warranty maintenance cost of the redundant 
digital avionics systems has been developed. It demonstrates (through the example of the 
ADIRS system of the Airbus A380 aircraft) that a three-level maintenance option with an 
intermittent fault detector (IFD) at I and D levels, is optimal as it reduces the total expected 
maintenance costs by 11 times compared to a one-level option, and by over 8.5 times 
compared to a two-level option without IFD; 
4. A technique for determining the optimal replacement thresholds when monitoring 
the condition of the degrading system at scheduled times has been developed, which allows 
to significantly reduce the system failure probability in the forthcoming interval of 
operation. 
5. A technique for joint determination of the optimal replacement threshold and 
periodicity of suitability checking when monitoring the system condition has been 
developed, which allows to substantially increase the availability of systems while 
significantly reducing the number of inspections. 
The results of the thesis research may be used in the development and maintenance of 
FA and IMA systems, as well as degrading equipment of vehicles. 
Keywords: digital avionics systems, federated avionics, integrated modular avionics, 
degrading systems, maintenance, condition-based maintenance, redundancy, mathematical 
model, regenerative process, probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions, availability, 
operational reliability function, average system operating costs, warranty maintenance, post-
warranty maintenance, built-in test equipment, intermittent fault detector, automated test 
equipment, permanent failure, intermittent failure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The relevance of the thesis topic. The relevance of the dissertation topic is due to the 
tendency of continuous growth of the functional complexity of vehicles’ equipment and, in 
particular, avionics systems of aircraft and as a consequence, a significant increase in 
maintenance costs. The cost of avionics maintenance is very high for modern aircraft. It can 
be as high as 30% of the aircraft maintenance cost. Therefore, the extremely crucial task is 
to reduce the cost of maintenance of vehicles’ equipment while ensuring a high level of 
operational reliability. Currently, the most frequently used maintenance strategies of 
vehicles equipment are run-to-failure and condition-based maintenance. For most modern 
avionics systems, the run-to-failure maintenance strategy is dominant. With this 
maintenance strategy, a high level of flight safety is ensured by using redundant avionics 
systems, while the flight regularity is provided by a sufficient number of spare LRUs in the 
airline warehouse. However, the run-to-failure maintenance strategy proves to be ineffective 
in the case of high rate of unconfirmed failures or so-called No Fault Found (NFF) events. 
International aviation data suggest that over 400,000 NFF events occur each year [1]. As 
shown in [2], the estimated NFF rates for avionics systems range from 20 % to 50 %. The 
study [3] indicates that the avionics system component failures account for 80.4 % of all 
NFF cases, which resulted in an additional 26.6 % of unscheduled removals of avionics 
LRUs. The main reason for NFF cases related to electronic LRUs is the occurrence of 
intermittent failures in flight [4]. The general-purpose automated test equipment (ATE) is 
not adapted for detecting intermittent failures, and they may repeatedly occur during next 
flights. The negative impact of NFF on airlines includes increased service times, disruption 
of flight regularity, and increased quantity of spare LRUs in the exchange fund, which 
ultimately leads to an increase in the avionics system lifecycle costs. 
Therefore, the modern aircraft operation practices confirm the relevance of assessing 
the impact of intermittent failures on the avionics system lifecycle costs and selection of a 
specific maintenance option to minimize the adverse effect of these failures. 
CBM is currently considered as a promising approach for improving operational 
reliability and reducing operating costs of various vehicles. Economic assessment of CBM 
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usage for different vehicles equipment has been discussed by many authors [5-15]. For 
instance, the economic effects from adopting CBM of 6TL electric batteries in the United 
States Department of Defence (DoD) amounted to USD 1,017 million over 25 years [5]. As 
indicated in [16], the use of CBM can prevent 80 % of all failures of A340-600 air-
conditioning system. At the same time, the airline’s financial losses can be reduced by 90 % 
due to a reduction of unplanned flight delays. CBM is a maintenance strategy that utilizes 
monitoring of the actual system condition to decide on performing the specific maintenance. 
Typically, this type of maintenance is necessary to perform when one or more parameters 
of system condition show signs of performance degradation or imminent failure. The 
primary activity of this maintenance type is condition monitoring, which can be continuous 
or periodic. In some cases, continuous condition monitoring is not feasible due to higher 
operating costs or physical impossibility to install the state sensors inside the system. In 
such cases, periodic condition monitoring is deemed more appropriate. For example, wet 
arc propagation resistance tests of the aircraft electric wiring interconnect systems are 
possible only with periodic condition monitoring [17, 18]. CBM is a preferred strategy in 
cases, where system degradation can be measured or when a system fails as a particular 
system state parameter exceeds the functional failure threshold. 
The most critical controlled variables for CBM optimization are inspection times and 
replacement thresholds, which correspond to the pre-failure condition of the system [19]. 
Therefore, the issues associated with determining the optimal replacement thresholds and 
inspection schedule of deteriorating equipment of vehicles are currently most essential. The 
most significant effect from using CBM is expected to achieve by combined optimization 
of inspection schedule and replacement thresholds. 
Aim and objectives of the study. The purpose of the dissertation work is the 
development of mathematical models of run-to-failure maintenance and CBM, which are 
intended to increase the maintenance effectiveness of digital avionics systems and degrading 
equipment of vehicles. 
To achieve this aim, the following tasks must be solved: 
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- To develop mathematical models for evaluating the operational reliability of 
continuously monitored LRUs/LRMs of avionics systems over a finite and an infinite time 
interval that would consider the impact of both permanent and intermittent failures. 
- To develop generalized relationships for calculation of average operating costs 
during warranty and post-warranty periods of operation of redundant avionics systems for 
alternative maintenance options that differ by the number of maintenance levels (one, two 
or three). 
- To develop a new decision rule for system condition monitoring at discrete time 
points and a corresponding mathematical model of maintenance that would significantly 
reduce the probability of system failure during operation between time points of condition 
monitoring by rejecting potentially unreliable systems. 
- To develop a new mathematical model of CBM for a finite time interval of system 
operation, considering the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions when checking 
system suitability for use in the forthcoming period of operation. 
- To develop CBM effectiveness indicators based on suitability checking, as well as 
criteria to determine the optimal inspection schedule and replacement thresholds for systems 
that affect or do not affect the safety. 
- To develop techniques that allow using the proposed mathematical models in 
solving problems of maintenance optimization of vehicles' equipment. 
The object of the research shall be the processes of maintenance of digital avionics 
systems and deteriorating equipment of vehicles. 
The subject of the research shall be the mathematical models of maintenance of 
vehicles’ equipment. 
Methods of the research. The methods of mathematical reliability theory, 
probability theory, and statistics, the theory of regenerative stochastic processes, as well as 
methods of numerical analysis and simulation modelling are used to address the objectives 
stated in the thesis. 
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Scientific novelty of the obtained results. 
1. For the first time, mathematical models have been developed to evaluate the 
operational reliability indicators of continuously monitored LRUs/LRMs and redundant 
avionics systems over both a finite and an infinite time interval, which, unlike known 
models, consider the characteristics of both permanent and intermittent failures, allowing to 
assess the influence of intermittent failures on the maintenance effectiveness. 
2. For the first time, generalized maintenance cost functions during warranty and 
post-warranty periods of operation of redundant avionics systems, considering the 
characteristics of permanent and intermittent failures, have been developed for alternative 
maintenance options that differ by the number of maintenance levels (one, two or three), 
allowing to choose the optimal maintenance option for each maintenance period. 
3. For the first time, a mathematical model of CBM, based on condition monitoring 
at scheduled time points has been developed, which, unlike the known models, takes into 
consideration the unconditional probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made when 
checking system suitability. The model allows formulating the criteria for determining the 
optimal replacement threshold for each inspection time and substantially reduce the 
likelihood of system failure in the forthcoming interval of operation. 
4. For the first time, generalized mathematical expressions to calculate the 
effectiveness indicators of CBM over a finite time interval, as well as the criteria of joint 
optimization of the inspection schedule and replacement thresholds for systems that affect 
or do not affect safety, have been developed. These results allow significantly improve the 
availability, reduce average maintenance costs and number of inspections. 
Validity and trustworthiness of the obtained research results have been confirmed 
by the sufficient and proper application of the mathematical apparatus of probability theory 
and reliability theory, consistency of the obtained theoretical results with operational data, 
as well as the results of simulation modelling. 
The practical significance of the obtained results. The thesis creates a scientific 
and technical basis for further improvement of maintenance of digital avionics and 
degrading equipment of vehicles. The following practical results of the thesis research have 
been achieved: 
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- The techniques to calculate the availability, ORF and MTBUR of avionics 
LRUs/LRMs during warranty and post-warranty period for both FA and IMA architectures 
have been developed, allowing to evaluate the impact of both permanent and intermittent 
failures. 
- A technique to minimize the cost of warranty maintenance for redundant digital 
avionics systems, considering the impact of both permanent and intermittent failures, has 
been developed. On the example of the ADIRS system of the Airbus A380, it has been 
shown that in the case of the optimal arrangement of the warranty maintenance, the average 
maintenance costs per aircraft may reduce by 28%. 
- A technique to minimize the costs of post-warranty maintenance for redundant 
digital avionics systems has been developed. It has demonstrated (through the example of 
the ADIRS system mounted in the Airbus A380) that a three-level maintenance option, with 
IFD at I- and D-level of maintenance, is optimal as it reduces the total expected maintenance 
costs by 11 times compared to a one-level maintenance option and by over 8.5 times 
compared to a two-level maintenance option without IFD. 
- A technique of determining the optimal replacement thresholds for the case of a 
known inspection schedule of the deteriorating system has been developed, which allows 
reducing the system failure probability between inspections significantly. 
- A technique for joint optimization of the replacement threshold and periodicity of 
suitability checking, when monitoring the system condition, has been developed. It allows 
to significantly increase the availability of systems that do not affect safety, as well as to 
reduce the maintenance costs for systems that affect safety while reducing the number of 
inspections significantly. 
Personal contribution of the candidate. The main results of the thesis research were 
obtained by the author independently. Studies [20-22] were conducted independently by the 
author. The candidate has made the following contributions in the articles published in co-
authorship: in [32, 35] — analytical expressions to calculate the probabilities of correct and 
incorrect decisions made when checking system suitability in the case of monotonically 
decreasing and increasing stochastic processes of degradation. In [30] — development of a 
new decision rule for one-time system condition monitoring based on the evaluation of the 
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system remaining operation-to-failure time, as well as analytical expressions to calculate the 
probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions. In [24, 31] — development of mathematical 
models to determine the optimal replacement thresholds in the case of multiple suitability 
checking. In [29] — a mathematical model to determine the optimal moments of condition 
monitoring. In [25] — analytical expressions to calculate the mean times spent by the system 
in various states in the case of CBM. In [27] — analytical expressions to calculate CBM 
effectiveness indicators for safety-critical systems. In [26] — a mathematical model to 
calculate the operational reliability of continuously monitored LRUs and redundant avionics 
systems over an infinite time interval. In [33] — mathematical expressions to evaluate the 
reliability and maintenance costs in the case of arbitrary distribution of operating time to 
intermittent or permanent failure over a finite time interval. In [34] — mathematical 
formulas to calculate the ORF, MTBUR and average cost of unscheduled repairs of LRUs 
over an infinite time interval of operation. In [23] — a mathematical model of the LRU 
operational reliability in the case of arbitrary distribution of operating time to permanent 
and intermittent failure over a finite time interval. In [28] — development of analytical 
expressions to calculate the average maintenance costs of redundant avionics systems during 
warranty and post-warranty periods for alternative maintenance options that differ by the 
number of maintenance levels (one, two or three), considering the impact of permanent and 
intermittent failures. 
Approbation of the results of the dissertation work. The research results have been 
discussed at 14 international congresses, symposiums and conferences: 1) 2014 IEEE 
Microwaves, Radar and Remote Sensing Symposium (Kyiv, 2014); 2) 2014 Asia-Pacific 
Conference on Electronics and Electrical Engineering (Shanghai, China, 2014); 3) World 
Conference on Control, Electronics and Electrical Engineering (Shanghai, China, 2015); 4) 
World Congress on Engineering (London, UK, 2015); 5) World Congress on Engineering 
and Computer Science (San Francisco, USA, 2015); 6) 4th International Conference on 
Through-life Engineering Services (Cranfield, UK, 2015); 7) 2016 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference (Big Sky, USA, 2016); 8) International Symposium on No Fault Found 
(Cranfield, UK, 2016); 9) 9th IMA International Conference on Modelling in Industrial 
Maintenance and Reliability (London, UK, 2016); 10) 19th World Conference on Non-
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Destructive Testing (Munich, Germany, 2016); 11) 5th International Conference on 
Through-life Engineering Services (Cranfield, UK, 2016); 12) 2017 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference (Big Sky, USA, 2017); 13) First World Congress on Condition Monitoring — 
WCCM 2017 (London, UK, 2017); 14) 2018 IEEE Aerospace Conference (Big Sky, USA, 
2018). 
Publications. The main contents of the thesis have been published in 16 printed 
publications, including three periodicals, two collective monographs, 11 proceedings of 
international congresses, symposiums, and conferences. All publications indexed in 
international scientometric databases, including 10 in the Scopus database and 4 in the Web 
of Science database. 
Structure and content of the thesis. The thesis consists of an introduction, four 
chapters, conclusions, list of used references represented after each chapter, and three 
appendices. The total number of pages is 196. In the thesis, there are 36 figures (including 
14 figures on seven separate pages), 17 tables (including seven tables on six separate pages), 
204 references on 28 pages and seven pages of appendices. 
REFERENCES 
1. Roadmap to self-serving assets in civil aerospace/A. M. Brintrup, 
D. C. Ranasinghe, S. Kwan et al.//1st CIRP Industrial product-service systems (IPS2) 
conference, 1-2 April 2009, Cranfield, UK. – Conference proceedings, 2009. - P. 323-331. 
2. Soderholm, P. A system view of the no-fault-found (nff) 
phenomenon/P. Soderholm//Reliability engineering and system safety. - 2007. – V. 92, 
No. 1. – P. 1-14. 
3. Hockley, C. The impact of no fault found on through-life engineering 
services/C. Hockley, P. Phillips//Journal of quality in maintenance engineering. – 2012. –
V. 18, No. 2. – P. 141–153. 
4. No Fault Found events in maintenance engineering Part 1: Current trends, 
implications and organizational practices/S. Khan, P. Phillips, I. Jennions, 
C. Hockley//Reliability engineering and system safety. – 2014. – V. 123. – P. 183-195. 
19 
 
5. How engineers can conduct a cost-benefit analysis for PHM systems/J. Banks, 
K. Reichard, E. Crow, K. Nickell//2005 IEEE Aerospace conference, 5-12 March 2005, Big 
Sky, MT, USA. – Aerospace conference proceedings, 2005. – P. 1-10. 
6. Feldman, K. A methodology for determining the return on investment associated 
with prognostics and health management/K. Feldman, T. Jazouli, P. Sandborn//IEEE 
Transactions on reliability. - 2009. - V. 58, No. 2. - P. 305-316. 
7. Hölzell, N. B. Cost-benefit analysis of prognostics and condition-based 
maintenance concepts for commercial aircraft considering prognostic errors/N. B. Hölzell, 
V. Gollnick//2015 Annual conference of the prognostics and health management society, 
19-24 October, 2015, San Diego, California. – Conference proceedings, 2015. – P. 1-16. 
8. Cost-benefit analysis methodology for PHM applied to legacy commercial 
aircraft/B. P. Leao, K. T. Fitzgibbon, L. C. Puttini, G. P. B. Melo//2008 IEEE Aerospace 
conference, 1-8 March 2008, Big Sky, MT, USA. – Aerospace conference proceedings, 
2008. – P. 1-13. 
9. Sandborn, P. A. A maintenance planning and business case development model 
for the application of prognostics and health management (PHM) to electronic 
systems/P. A. Sandborn, C. Wilkinson//Microelectronics reliability. – 2007. - V. 47, 
No. 12. - P. 1889-1901. 
10. Scanff, E. Lifecycle cost impact using prognostic health management (PHM) for 
helicopter avionics/E. Scanff, K. L. Feldman, S. Ghelam et al.//Microelectronics 
reliability. – 2007. - V. 47. - P. 1857-1864. 
11. Feldman, K. The analysis of return on investment for PHM applied to electronic 
systems/K. Feldman, P. Sandborn, T. Jazouli//2008 IEEE International conference on 
prognostics and health management (PHM), 6-9 October, 2008, Denver, CO, 
USA. - Conference proceedings, 2008. – P. 1-9. 
12. Kahlert, A. Cost-benefit analysis and specification of component-level PHM 
systems in aircraft/A. Kahlert, S. Giljohann, U. Klingauf//Universal journal of mechanical 
engineering. 2016. – V. 4, No. 4. – P. 88-98. 
13. Hölzell, N B. An aircraft lifecycle approach for the cost-benefit analysis of 
prognostics and condition-based maintenance based on discrete-event 
20 
 
simulation/N. B. Hölzell, T. Schilling, V. Gollnick//2014 Annual conference of the 
prognostics and health management society, September 27 – 3 October 2014, Fort Worth, 
Texas, USA. – Conference proceedings, 2014. – P. 1-16. 
14. Lasch, R. Condition-based maintenance planning within the aviation 
industry/R. Lasch, R. Fritzsche//Logistics Management. Lecture Notes in Logistics: col. 
monogr. – Cham: Springer, 2016. – P. 
15. Li, J. Condition based maintenance optimization of an aircraft assembly process 
considering multiple objectives/J. Li, T. Sreenuch, A. Tsourdos//ISRN Aerospace 
engineering. – 2014. – V. 2014. – P. 1-13. 
16. Gerdes, M. Effects of condition-based maintenance on costs caused by 
unscheduled maintenance of aircraft/M. Gerdes, D. Galar, D. Scholz//Journal of quality in 
maintenance engineering. - 2016. - V. 22, No. 4. - P. 394-417. 
17. Bui, H. T. Evaluation of deterioration of the aircraft electrical wiring system due 
to undetected arcing events: thesis for a Master’s of Engineering degree/ Hau T. Bui; 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. - Hartford, USA, 2006. – 45 p. 
18. Aging aircraft wiring fault detection survey/K. R. Wheeler, D. A. Timucin, 
I. X. Twombly et al.//NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA. – Available at: 
http://ti.arc.nasa.gov/m/pub-archive/1342h/1342%20%28Wheeler%29.pdf/ -1.06.2006. 
19. Grall, A. A condition-based maintenance policy for stochastically deteriorating 
systems/A. Grall, C. B´erenguer, L. Dieulle//Reliability engineering and system safety. – 
2002. - V. 76, No. 2. – P. 167–180. 
20. Раза, А. Математическая модель обслуживания цифровых систем 
авионики с учетом перемежающихся отказов/ А. Раза// Математические машины и 
системы. – 2018. - № 1. – С. 138-147. 
21. Raza, A. Mathematical model of corrective maintenance based on operability 
checks for safety critical systems/ A. Raza// American journal of applied mathematics. – 
2018. – V. 6(1). – P. 8-15. 
22. Raza, A. Maintenance model of digital avionics/ A. Raza// Aerospace. – 2018. – 
V. 5(2). – P. 1-16. 
21 
 
23. Raza, A. Cost model for assessing losses to avionics suppliers during warranty 
period/ A. Raza, V. Ulansky// Advances in through-life engineering services. Decision 
Engineering: a collective monograph. – Springer, 2017. – P. 291-307. 
24. Raza, A. Optimal policies of condition-based maintenance under multiple 
imperfect inspections/ A. Raza, V. Ulansky// Transactions on engineering technologies: a 
collective monograph. – Springer, 2016. – P. 285-299. 
25. Raza, A. Modelling of predictive maintenance for a periodically inspected 
system/ A. Raza, V. Ulansky// Procedia CIRP. – 2017. – V. 59. – P. 95-101. 
26. Raza, A. Minimizing total lifecycle expected costs of digital avionics’ 
maintenance/ A. Raza, V. Ulansky// Procedia CIRP. – 2015. – V. 38. - P. 118-123. 
27. Ulansky, V. Determination of the optimal maintenance threshold and periodicity 
of condition monitoring/ V. Ulansky, A. Raza// First world congress on condition 
monitoring (WCCM), 13-16 June 2017, London, UK. – WCCM proceedings, 2017. – P. 1-
12. 
28. Raza, A. Generalized cost functions of avionics breakdown maintenance 
strategy/ A. Raza, V. Ulansky, K. Augustynek, K. Warwas// 2017 IEEE Aerospace 
conference, 4-11 March, 2017, Big Sky, Montana, USA. – Conference proceedings, 2017. - 
P. 1-15. 
29. Raza, A. Modelling condition monitoring inspection intervals/ A. Raza, 
V. Ulansky// Electronics and electrical engineering: Proceedings of the 2014 Asia-Pacific 
Electronics and Electrical Engineering Conference (EEEC 2014), December 27-28, 2014, 
Shanghai, China. — London: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015. - P. 45-51. 
30.  Raza, A. A Probabilistic model of periodic condition monitoring with imperfect 
inspections/ A. Raza, V. Ulansky// Lecture notes in engineering and computer science: 
Proceedings of the World congress on engineering 2015, WCE 2015, 1-3 July, 2015, 
London, UK. – V. II. – P. 999-1005. 
31.  Raza, A. Optimal thresholds for stochastically deteriorating systems/ A. Raza, 
V. Ulansky// Lecture notes in engineering and computer science: Proceedings of the World 
congress on engineering and computer science 2015, WCECS 2015, 21-23 October, 2015, 
San Francisco, USA. – V. II. – P. 934-939. 
22 
 
32.  Ulansky, V. Modelling of condition monitoring with imperfect inspections/ 
V. Ulansky, A. Raza// Proceedings of the 19th World conf. on nondestructive testing 2016, 
WCNDT 2016, 13-17 June, 2016, Munich, Germany. – P. 1-9. 
33.  Raza, A. Assessing the impact of intermittent failures on the cost of digital 
avionics’ maintenance/ A. Raza, V. Ulansky// 2016 IEEE Aerospace conference, 5-12 
March, 2016, Big Sky, Montana, USA. – Conference proceedings, 2016. – P. 1-16. 
34.  Raza, A. Modelling of operational reliability and maintenance cost for avionics 
systems with permanent and intermittent failures/ A. Raza, V. Ulansky// Proceedings of the 
9th IMA international conference on modelling in industrial maintenance and reliability, 12-
14 July, 2016, London, UK. – P. 186-192. 
35.  Raza, A. Modeling of discrete condition monitoring for radar equipment/ 
A. Raza, V. Ulansky// 2014 IEEE Microwaves, radar and remote sensing symp., 23-25 
September 2014, Kyiv, Ukraine. – MRRS proceedings, 2014. – P. 88-91. 
  
23 
 
CHAPTER 1: 
ANALYSIS OF BREAKDOWN AND CONDITION-BASED MAINTENANCE 
STRATEGIES FOR MODERN AVIATION EQUIPMENT AND STATEMENT OF 
THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
1.1. Analysis of the current state of digital avionics maintenance 
Until the late 1990s, digital avionics of most civilian aircraft, including Boeing (B757, 
B767) and Airbus (A320, A330, and A340) series, was based on FA architecture with each 
avionics system consisting of several LRUs. Each LRU has built-in test equipment (BITE), 
which continuously monitors LRU operation in flight. Dedicated applications perform most 
of the functions of conventional LRUs of IMA architecture used in B777 and A380. Generic 
IMA modules called Core Processing Input/Output Modules (CPIOMs) run these dedicated 
applications. The IMA structure also includes I/O modules (IOMs). CPIOMs and IOMs are 
LRMs, which are linked via the avionics data communication network (ADCN). Avionics 
of A380 includes 30 LRMs, 50 LRUs with an Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet 
(AFDX) interface and approximately 30 LRUs with an ARINC 429 interface. LRUs/LRMs 
operate until failure (permanent or intermittent), which is registered in flight or after landing. 
RUs/LRMs, rejected in flight, are removed from the aircraft and may be repaired either by 
the manufacturer or at the airport maintenance facility. 
Modern digital avionics systems are designed as modular units with high 
requirements to testability and maintainability. A non-redundant avionics system usually 
consists of one or several LRUs/LRMs. In turn, an LRU/LRM comprises a set of shop 
replaceable units (SRUs), each being a printed circuit board (PCB) assembly with non-
repairable electronic components. According to the structural classification of avionics 
systems, the following three levels of maintenance are usually considered: organizational 
maintenance (O-level), intermediate maintenance (I-level) and depot maintenance (D-level). 
O-level maintenance is performed at an aircraft parking and is used for the rapid turnover 
of LRUs/LRMs where these LRUs/LRMs can be removed and replaced with spare 
LRUs/LRMs from the warehouse within a short period if they are rejected by BITE during 
the pre-flight test or in-flight monitoring. LRUs/LRMs represent the spare parts at this 
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maintenance level. Specialized airport workshops, located usually at the base airports, 
perform I-level maintenance. The I-level maintenance is more skilled and allows testing and 
repairing the LRUs/LRMs removed from the aircraft at the O-level maintenance. Ground 
ATE allow automating most test procedures at this maintenance level. Inoperable 
LRUs/LRMs are repaired by replacing the faulty SRUs. Therefore, SRUs are the spare parts 
at the I-level maintenance. The depot maintenance is more an opportunity than a location. 
D-level maintenance supports O-level and I-level maintenance by providing engineering 
and technical assistance that exceeds the scope of O- and I-levels. D-level maintenance is 
usually performed in specialized repair centres or at original equipment manufacturing 
facilities. The standard spare parts used at D-level within a three-level maintenance system 
are non-repairable electronic components. The maintenance system may consist of two 
levels if the only O- and D-levels are applicable. In this case, the spare parts at the D-level 
maintenance include SRUs and non-repairable electronic components. 
Many airlines currently dismiss the third level and sometimes the second maintenance 
level to outsource work to specialized companies, which are called “repair stations” [1]. 
Major U.S. air carriers now use outsourced repair stations for up to 47 % of their 
maintenance costs [2]. However, one of the largest U.S. airlines, American Airlines, 
conducts most of its maintenance operations in-house [3]. Thus, there are many options for 
avionics maintenance using one-, two- or three-level maintenance systems. 
Unconfirmed failures, commonly called NFF events, significantly impact aviation 
equipment operating costs [4]. By ARINC 672 [5], an NFF is the result of testing when a 
unit removed as inoperable at a certain maintenance level is judged as operable by the results 
of checking at the lower maintenance level. According to [6], the average financial losses 
due to NFF per aircraft in U.S. civil aviation amounted to approximately $ 200,000 in 2013. 
Similar losses exist in military aviation [7, 8]. For instance, according to the U.S. 
Department of Defence, 3 out of 4 (75 %) weapon systems are subject to NFF-type failures 
[8]. The U.S. DoD loses from $ 2 billion to $ 10 billion annually due to NFF events [9]. The 
study [10] provides statistics on NFF events of avionics of F-16 aircraft of the Turkish Air 
Force for 2013-2014. According to this study, NFF events amount to 45 % of the total 
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number of failures. It should be specially noted that the problems of avionics account for up 
to 75 % of all cases of NFF in the aviation industry [11]. 
Some of the terms used to describe NFF phenomenon include “trouble not identified” 
(TNI), “no trouble found” (NTF), “cannot duplicate” (CND), and “re-test OK” (RTOK) [12, 
13]. NFF is a chain of events, which usually starts with symptoms of a fault registered in-
flight, and later, after ground diagnostics and repair, the same symptoms are repeatedly 
recorded in one of the subsequent flights. Financial losses due to NFF include additional 
maintenance costs, costs for extra spare parts, losses due to the irregularity of flights, costs 
for more technical diagnostics, etc. 
The study [14] outlines the main NFF causes in civil and military aviation: 
1) Intermittent failures. 
2) Experience of technicians in failure diagnostics. 
3) Experience of technicians in intermittent failure diagnostics. 
4) Experience of technicians related to NFF. 
5) Fault diagnostics guide. 
6) Training of technicians in NFF diagnostics. 
7) Environment factors (heat, vibration, etc.). 
8) Component integrity (wiring). 
9) Component integrity (connectors). 
10) Experience of technicians with diagnostics equipment. 
As seen from this list, intermittent failures (item 1) are the leading NFF cause, and 
they are also present in the “experience of technicians in intermittent failure diagnostics” 
cause factor (item 3). An intermittent failure usually implies a multiple-occurrence of self-
eliminating failure of the same nature. Intermittent failures in avionics systems may be 
software-induced or hardware-induced. Intermittent failures of hardware, such as electronic 
assemblies, are divided into four categories: printed circuit boards; connectors; components; 
interconnections [15]. Intermittent failures are mechanical by nature. They occur due to 
faults of electrical wiring, solder joints, screening braid, connectors, metal lines of integrated 
circuits, etc. Modern electronic components are reliable, so the intermittent discontinuity 
between printed circuit board components is becoming the main cost driver [9]. 
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Conventional ATEs cannot detect the locations of intermittent failures that cause the 
appearance of NFF, for the following reasons: [9, 16]: 
1) The parameter of the monitoring object is usually tested only once for a short 
period, which generally does not coincide with the time of occurrence of the intermittent 
failure; 
2) Digital averaging, scanning and sampling of the test signal miss out intermittent 
failures. 
3) The removed LRUs/LRMs are tested in the laboratory rather than in the operating 
environment where failures occur; the electrical wiring interconnect system is also tested in 
a static environment. 
4) Conventional ATE are designed to detect functional failures, faulty components, 
as well as short circuits and breaks in electrical circuits and, is not capable of intermittent 
failure diagnostics. 
5) Intermittent failures that cause NFF do not correspond to any particular failure 
pattern. 
The second reason for ATE failing to detect intermittent failures requires some 
clarification. Under the operating principle, digital multimeters take sample readings and 
average them over a specified period before presenting to the operator. Most digital 
multimeters take samples at millisecond intervals. Therefore, even if a high ohmic resistance 
is detected in one or more readings, they would be entirely averaged out over a thousand 
readings. Thus, digital multimeters are incapable of detecting intermittent ohmic faults of 
Category 3 or shorter. According to the standard [17], Category 3 includes durations of 
intermittent failures ranging from 501 microseconds to 5 milliseconds. Finally, let us 
consider the fourth reason. Conventional ATE may not be used to test intermittent failures 
for the following reasons [18]: 
- ATE does not check all circuits or functional paths of the LRU/LRM, including 
all connection paths to SRUs, simultaneously. 
- Conventional ATE does not test the LRUs/LRMs in the appropriate operating 
environment. 
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- Conventional ATE is incapable of detecting short-duration intermittent failures that 
cause NFF. 
Given the conventional ATE disadvantages, as stated above, specific specialized tools 
for intermittent failure diagnostics are currently in development. For instance, Universal 
Synaptics Corporation (USA) produces a Voyager Intermittent Fault Detector (VIFD) [19] 
and an Intermittent Fault Detection and Isolation System (IFDS) [20]. 
VIFD is capable of connecting up to 256 or 512 electrical test points. VIFD is a 
diagnostic tool that simultaneously and continuously monitors all devices tested in the 
object, at the same time detecting intermittent faults with the duration as short as 50 ns. 
IFDIS presents a modern intermittent fault diagnosis system that simultaneously and 
continuously monitors each electrical path in the chassis, at the same time subjecting the 
diagnosed object to a simulated operating environment. The hardware circuit of the neural 
network detects and isolates intermittent faults of up to 50 ns occurring in any circuit of the 
object during the test. The graphical test results indicate the exact location of the intermittent 
fault for rapid repairs. 
The U.S. Air Force used the IFDIS to diagnose one of its least reliable LRUs — 
modular low-power radio frequency system (MLPRF) of F-16 AN/APG-68 [18]. 400 LRUs 
were tested to detect intermittent faults, with the results showing that over 60 % of LRUs 
had such faults. These LRUs had been tested earlier using ground ATE and were found to 
be operable. All LRUs were returned to operation after repairs. Furthermore, MTBUR of 
the repaired LRUs increased more than three-fold, and the economic effect amounted to 
approximately $ 60 million. It should be noted that the cost of a single IFDS system is 
$ 2.2 million, which limits its use by airlines. Therefore, the adoption of IFDIS or VIFD by 
airlines may occur only after a feasibility study on the applicability of these systems. 
1.2. Analysis of mathematical maintenance models of digital avionics systems 
Avionics system performance indicators can be roughly divided into probabilistic and 
cost-related indicators [21]. Probabilistic indicators include the availability, the operational 
readiness coefficient, the coefficient of technical use, and the operational reliability 
function. The cost-related performance indicators include the average maintenance cost and 
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the average maintenance cost per unit time. Definitions of these indicators of maintenance 
effectiveness are given in many studies, for example [22-27]. 
One of the most important indicators of the operational reliability of aviation 
equipment, which is used by most airlines for inventory management, is the MTBUR [28]. 
Statistically, MTBUR is calculated as follows [28, 29]: 
 
FH R
MTBUR mt N= , (1.1) 
where 𝑡𝐹𝐻 is the number of flying hours for a fleet of aircraft over a period; m is the number 
of identical-type LRUs in the aircraft fleet; 𝑁𝑅 is the number of unscheduled removals of 
LRUs over the same period. Calculation of MTBUR by formula (1.1) is possible only after 
the accumulation of a significant amount of statistical information. 
The following analytical expression was proposed in [21, 30-32] to calculate MTBUR 
of digitally monitored avionics systems over an infinite time interval: 
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where λ is the LRU unrevealed failure rate; τ is the periodicity of LRU checking; α is the 
conditional probability of a “false alarm” when checking the operability of LRU. 
A similar expression was proposed in [33] for the case of a finite time interval: 
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where N is the number of LRU operability checks over the finite time interval T. 
Expressions (1.2) and (1.3) may not be used to evaluate the MTBUR of digital 
avionics LRUs/LRMs, since, firstly, modern avionics systems are monitored continuously 
in flight, rather than periodically and secondly, these expressions do not consider the rate of 
LRU intermittent failures. 
A decision model of avionics system maintenance strategy is considered in [34]. The 
ranking of maintenance strategies is based on the cognitive uncertainty information 
processing. The example given in the study shows that a reliability-centred maintenance 
strategy is the most suitable for avionics systems. However, it should be noted that the study 
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does not consider the differentiation of avionics system failures into permanent and 
intermittent ones. Also, the number of maintenance levels and ATE cost at different levels, 
is not considered at all. 
A mathematical model is proposed in [35] to calculate the maintenance cost per LRU 
socket in the aircraft. 
 ( ) ( ), , , , ,1 1socket i LRU i LRU repair i replace i repair iC fC f C fT V f T V= + − + + − , (1.4) 
where f is the probability of replacing the LRU with a new one as a result of maintenance; 
𝐶𝐿𝑅𝑈,𝑖 is the cost of the i-th type LRU; 𝐶𝐿𝑅𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟,𝑖 is the i-th type LRU repair cost; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒,𝑖 
is the i-th type LRU replacement time; V is the unit cost of losses due to non-use of the LRU; 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟,𝑖 is the i-th type LRU repair time. Stochastic simulation modelling is used to 
determine the parameters of expression (1.4). A multifunctional display of Boeing 737 was 
used as a tested object. This model disregards intermittent failures. 
The study [36] uses a simulation model to compare the lifecycle cost of helicopter 
avionics systems concerning various maintenance strategies, including unscheduled 
maintenance (after failure registration), fixed-interval scheduled maintenance and 
condition-based maintenance. The simulation model disregards intermittent failures. 
In [37] a hierarchical simulation model was developed to assess the aircraft reliability. 
The model considers system specifics and flight mission approaches. The proposed model 
consists of submodules that correspond to components involved in carrying out a specified 
flight task. The model is used to estimate the operational probability of mission execution 
in cases with various combinations of system failures. The effect of intermittent failures on 
the likelihood of performing a flight task is disregarded. 
A simple mathematical model was proposed in [38] to evaluate the cost of 
maintenance of an air data computer, which is a part of aircraft avionics: 
 
( ) 1000ac uTMC AMC m= , (1.5) 
where 𝑇𝑀𝐶𝑎𝑐 is the total cost of airborne computer maintenance; m is the number of years 
in operation; 𝐴𝑀𝐶𝑢 is the annual maintenance cost of the airborne computer. Expression 
(1.5) disregards the reliability characteristics of the airborne computer. 
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The study [39] analyses the FMECA method (Failure Mode Effect and Criticality 
Analysis) which specifies the maintenance scope and procedure for each of the analysed 
aircraft systems. Reliability modelling is conducted under the function performed by each 
part of the system, and then the entire system is divided into many subsystems, and each of 
the subsystems is further divided into separate parts and components. The described method 
does not divide failures into permanent and intermittent. 
In [40], a two-level and three-level maintenance system of the F-117A stealth fighter 
avionics are compared. The following formulas are used to determine the required number 
of spare LRUs: 
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where 𝑆𝑟
2𝐿𝑀 and 𝑆𝑟
3𝐿𝑀 is the number of spare LRUs for a two-level and three-level 
maintenance system, respectively; 𝑇𝑇 is the expected time of transportation of the 
dismantled LRU to the repair site and back; 𝐷𝐹𝐻 is the daily flying hours; 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 is the 
mean time between LRU failures. Formulas (1.6) and (1.7) can only be used to compare 
two-level and three-level maintenance systems regarding the number of spare LRUs. 
The study [41] also compares a two-level and three-level maintenance systems of 
dismantled avionics LRUs. Cost savings granted by the transition from a three-level to a 
two-level maintenance system are calculated using the following formula: 
Total cost savings = (labour savings) - (increase in labour costs at the D-level 
maintenance) - (increase in transportation costs) + or - (increase or decrease in spare parts 
cost) + or - (change in the LRU cost by the manufacturer). 
Simulation modelling determines each of the cost components. It should be noted that 
the study does not differentiate between permanent and intermittent failures. 
The study [42] considers a mathematical maintenance model for a continuously tested 
single-unit digital electronic system that is subject to the revealed, unrevealed and 
intermittent failures. In the case of an exponential distribution of time to failure, the 
availability is determined by the following formula: 
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where μ is the revealed system failure rate; λ and θ are, respectively, the unrevealed and 
intermittent failure rate. It should be noted that formula (1.8) is valid only for systems with 
a continuous mode of operation. Avionics systems have an intermittent operation due to the 
alternation of flights and landings. Therefore, expression (1.8) may not be used to evaluate 
the avionics system availability. 
The following generalized expression for operational costs determination was 
proposed in [43]: 
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where m is the number of single-type LRUs installed on board an aircraft; 𝑇0 is the average 
aircraft flying hours per year; 𝑇𝐾 is the total LRU maintenance time, expressed in the number 
of years in operation; 𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑡 is the expected airline costs per one LRU repair in year t; 𝐾𝑡 is 
the airline capital investments over the year t; ε is the time discount rate, expressed in 
fractions or percent per year; 𝑁𝐴,𝑡 is the number of aircraft in operation over the year t. The 
formula (1.9) is of a generic nature. The parameters included in (1.9) shall be determined 
for each of the maintenance options. For example, MTBUR is calculated in [43] using (1.3), 
which does not consider the possibility of intermittent failures in flight. 
The study [44] proposes an empirical model to estimate the maintenance unit cost per 
hour depending on the total flight hours (flhours), aircraft size (assize), load factor (lf), 
average flight duration (avst), exchange rate (ers), number of passengers per airline 
(airl_rpax) and gross domestic production (gdp): 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 72 _cmainhU flhours asize lf avst ers airl rpax gdp       = + + + + + + + ,   (1.10) 
where 𝛽0, 𝛽7̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are empirical coefficients. Expression (1.10) can be used for purely economic 
estimations, but not for the selection of an optimal avionics system maintenance option. 
The study [45] considers several NFF-related maintenance strategies. The authors 
give statistics on NFF events, according to which NFF events make approximately 70 % of 
all avionics failures in military aviation. The following three maintenance strategies are 
considered: 
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1) It is assumed that after rechecking by ground ATE all dismantled LRUs with NFF 
are mounted back on board the aircraft. 
2) It is assumed that all dismantled LRUs with NFF are defective, so such LRUs are 
re-tested in conditions close to flight conditions to identify and remove all defects that cause 
the appearance of NFF in flight. 
3) Only those LRUs with NFF are repaired, which have been selected by the 
technicians based on their experience. 
The average maintenance cost for the first strategy is: 
 CNFF,G= CT+55.125 %CG+14.875 %CB, (1.11) 
where 𝐶𝑁𝐹𝐹,𝐺 is the cost of testing LRU with NFF using ground ATE; 𝐶𝐺 is the cost of 
handling and administering each LRU in an operable state; 𝐶𝐵 is the cost of handling and 
administering each LRU with NFF. 
The average maintenance cost for the second strategy is determined as follows: 
 CNFF,E= 174.4625 %CT+ CCE+ 4.4625 %CR2+55.26 %CG+12.57 %CB, (1.12) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐸  is the cost of testing the LRU with NFF in conditions close to flight; 𝐶𝑅2 is the 
cost of repairing the LRU with NFF. 
The average cost of maintenance when using the third strategy is 
 CNFF,T= CT+17.5 %CR1+59.281 %CG+14.9 %CB, (1.13) 
where 𝐶𝑅1 is the average cost of repairing the LRU dismantled from the aircraft (4,375% of 
repairs correspond to the LRU with NFF and 13,125% of repairs correspond to operable 
LRUs). It should be noted that expressions (1.11)–(1.13) are empirical and can only be used 
with the specified percentage distributions of confirmed and unconfirmed failures. 
The following mathematical formula is proposed in [21, 27] to calculate the ORF 
𝑃э(𝑘𝑡П, 𝑡) of a periodically checked avionics system: 
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where 𝑘𝑡П < 𝑡 ≤ (𝑘 + 1)𝑡П; 𝑃𝑐(𝑗𝑡П) is the probability of removing the LRU from the 
aircraft board by the results of the j-th pre-flight check of the LRU with the help of the BITE; 
𝑡П is the aircraft flight time; λ is the LRU unrevealed failure rate; α is the conditional 
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probability of the BITE “false alarm”. Expression (1.14) applies to the case of a periodically 
checked LRU and absence of intermittent failures. 
The following expression is proposed in [46] to evaluate the costs of aircraft 
equipment maintenance: 
 s m p tl f d
CMT C C C C C C= + + + + + , (1.15A) 
where 𝐶𝑠 is the cost of spare parts; 𝐶𝑚 is the cost of necessary materials; 𝐶𝑝 is the 
maintenance personnel costs; 𝐶𝑡𝑒 is the cost of tools and supporting equipment; 𝐶𝑓 is the 
cost of renting premises; 𝐶𝑑 is the cost of technical data. 
The study [47] considers a logical model of the primary cost drivers of the total cost 
of NFF consequences. The analysis shows how to choose the most suitable drivers to 
represent the total losses due to NFF. The generic framework for NFF cost estimation 
demonstrates how both qualitative and quantitative information can be used to achieve the 
maintenance goals. This article outlines the relevance of NFF consequences cost estimation 
problem, but no mathematical or other models are proposed to solve it. 
The following references are not related to the models of avionics maintenance which 
are the subject of this study. However, these references are essential for understanding the 
proposed mathematical model of operational reliability assessment of avionics LRUs. 
The study [48] analyses an intermittent fault detection strategy which incorporates 
testing at regular intervals. The exponential distribution of time to permanent and 
intermittent failures is assumed. The optimal testing periodicity is determined, which 
maximizes the probability of detecting an intermittent failure upon its first appearance: 
 
logθ logλ
τ
θ λopt
−
=
−
, (1.15) 
where θ and λ are, respectively, the intermittent and permanent failure rate. 
It should be noted that this model is not suitable for assessing the operational 
reliability of avionics systems for two reasons. Firstly, avionics systems have continuous in-
flight monitoring rather than a periodical. Secondly, the duration of intermittent failures is 
tens of nanoseconds to hundreds of microseconds, and the testing periodicity determined by 
formula (1.15) may be hundreds of hours. 
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The study [49] considers a telecommunication system with intermittent faults. The 
time to a fault has an exponential distribution. Faults become permanent when the 
unrevealed state duration exceeds the upper time limit. This model is not appropriate for 
assessing the reliability of avionics systems because the operating mode of 
telecommunication systems is continuous, while avionics systems operate in a discontinuous 
mode. 
The study [50] presents a Markov model of general-purpose reliability with three 
states for systems with both permanent and intermittent faults. A comparison is made 
between the reliability of duplex and redundant systems. As in [49], the proposed model can 
be used for systems of continuous operation only. 
The study [51] considers a reliability model to determine the optimal intermittent 
fault-testing periodicity for pipelined embedded processors regarding the minimum testing 
cost. The continuous-time two-state Markov model is used for probabilistic modelling of 
intermittent faults. The cost function has the following form:
 
( ) ( )  1C T q N D q E R= −   +  , (1.16) 
where T is the testing periodicity; q is the probability that the existing fault becomes active 
(any number of times) during the time interval [0, B] required to complete one task; N = B/T 
is the number of tests within [0, B] time interval; D is the single test duration; E{R} is the 
mathematical expectation of the time required to detect the intermittent fault in the 
processor. As in [49, 50], this model can only be used for continuously-operated systems 
with periodic condition monitoring. 
A model for assessing the reliability of digital systems that are subject to both 
permanent and intermittent faults is considered in [52]. The digital system reliability 
assessment is based on a three-state Markov model. The following formula determines the 
probability of failure-free operation: 
 
( ) ( )μ υ λλ
μ υ
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, (1.17) 
where υ is the transition rate from an operable state to an intermittent failure state; μ is the 
transition rate from an intermittent failure state to an operable state; λ is the permanent 
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failure rate. This model is intended for continuously-operated digital systems, therefore may 
not be used to assess the operational reliability of avionics systems. 
A Bayesian network based on the method for diagnosing transient and intermittent 
faults was proposed in [53]. This Markov model may not be used to model avionics system 
faults since transient faults usually occur in electrical power systems. 
The study [54] assesses the impact of various scenarios of restoring the processor 
after occurring intermittent faults on its performance. The operation of a fault-tolerant multi-
core processor is simulated in the presence of intermittent faults, subjected to exponential 
and Weibull distribution. The study shows that 40 % of processor faults are intermittent and 
60 % are permanent. The results of the study may be used to select the law of time 
distribution until an intermittent fault occurrence in digital modules of avionics systems. 
In the study [55], a strategy of imperfect checks is investigated to detect intermittent 
faults in a computer system. The system is tested periodically, and its failure is detected with 
a certain probability at the next test time. The expected cost of detection of an intermittent 
fault is determined. In the case of exponential distribution of time to failure, the optimal 
testing interval 𝑇∗ is determined by solving the following equation: 
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where p and q = 1 - p are, respectively, the probability of detection and non-detection of an 
intermittent fault; λ is the intermittent fault rate; 𝑐𝐷 is the expenses per unit time due to the 
faulty state of the computer; 𝐶𝑝 is the total expected costs for the computer operation. This 
model can be used only for systems with periodic testing and continuous operation. 
1.3. Analysis of current trends in the condition-based maintenance of vehicles’ 
equipment 
The US military standard ADS-79D-HDBK [56] describes the CBM system in the 
US Army and defines the general guidance needed to achieve the CBM goals of the Air 
Force and unmanned aerial vehicles. The standard contains specific proven methods to 
achieve the CBM functional objectives while stating that these methods should not be 
considered as the only means for achieving the set goals. The ADS-79D-HDBK standard 
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gives the following definition to the CBM: CBM is a set of maintenance processes and 
capabilities derived primarily from real-time system condition assessment obtained from 
embedded sensors and external measurements using portable equipment. CBM depends on 
the collection of data from sensors and the processing, analysis, and correlation of these data 
with the material conditions that require maintenance actions. The system condition 
assessment is conducted through continuous or periodic condition monitoring. Condition 
monitoring provides data for the equipment “health” assessment and maintenance is 
performed only when necessary. 
As explained in ADS-79D-HDBK, the goals of the CBM system are to minimize the 
volume of heavy forms of maintenance, increase aircraft availability, improve flight safety 
and reduce maintenance costs. 
The following objectives shall be addressed to achieve these goals: 
- Determine the time intervals after which specific maintenance or replacement of 
equipment components is required; 
- Accumulate the statistical data on the use of each piece of equipment or aircraft. 
- Determine the equipment component degradation rate and estimate the remaining 
useful life. 
- Utilize data to support a balanced approach in establishing repair limits. 
- Accumulate data required for effective risk management of the aircraft fleet. 
The ADS-79D-HDBK standard pays particular attention to setting the task of 
determining the optimal inspection schedule of equipment components that are subject to 
wear and degradation. At a qualitative level, the problems of determining the inspection 
times and the threshold for replacement of equipment components are considered to prevent 
its failure. Figure 1.1 illustrates the concept of a widely used inspection planning 
methodology for detecting damage and defects in equipment during operation. To include 
the failure mitigation effect, the replacement threshold 𝑎𝑁𝐷𝐸  is considered. In general, the 
𝑎𝑁𝐷𝐸  threshold provides a high probability of failure mitigation. 
If there is a probabilistic defect detection model, the replacement threshold 𝑎𝑁𝐷𝐸  is 
selected from the condition that a 90% probability of defect detection is provided with 95% 
certainty. By analogy with the concept of the P-F interval [57-59], the remaining useful life 
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presents the period during which the value of the degradation parameter changes from the 
𝑎𝑁𝐷𝐸  to the failure threshold of the equipment component, as shown in Fig. 1.1. 
 
Fig. 1.1. The current approach to determine inspection interval [56] 
 
Due to the random nature of the degradation process, the remaining useful life is also 
a random variable. To eliminate the effect of this randomness, the evaluated average residual 
lifetime is further divided by the tolerance coefficient of the inspection interval to damage, 
SF. The SF value is usually in the range of 3 ~ 4. In this manner, the following formula 
determines the inspection interval value for 𝑡 > 𝑇: 
 
.inspectionT T SF=  (1.19) 
Theoretically, the first inspection shall be carried out at the time which corresponds 
to the intersection of the degradation parameter curve with the threshold 𝑎𝑁𝐷𝐸 . In practice, 
the first inspection is carried out after the equipment has been in operation for 1/4 or 1/2 of 
the mean time of failure-free operation. 
From the above description of the existing methodology to determine the inspection 
schedule of the equipment degrading components, it can be seen that in fact, this technique 
is heuristic, and not mathematically justified. The standard ADS-79D-HDBK specifies the 
relevance and necessity of solving the task of achieving the most effective inspection 
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schedule within the limits of the target reliability constraints, which should ensure a 
minimum number of inspections, while the risk of failure should not exceed the maximum 
allowable level. 
At present, CBM is widely introduced into the operating practice of ground and on-
board equipment of vehicles. For instance, Boeing and GE Aviation have jointly developed 
a standard for introducing CBM in civil aviation and other industries [60, 61]. The standard 
defines the Open System Architecture for CBM (OSA-CBM). The OSA-CBM standard 
enables and presents ways to reduce maintenance costs, improve communication between 
different departments and incorporate changes in system design and further cooperation in 
the field of aircraft systems CBM. 
ISO standards for condition monitoring and diagnostics of machines offer a 
trustworthy guide for establishing a typical CBM procedure. For example, ISO 17359 [62] 
presents an overview of a generic method recommended for use when a condition 
monitoring programme is being implemented and provides further detail on the critical steps 
to follow. The standard presents the concept of activity by condition monitoring to identify 
the root causes of failure and describes a general approach to the definition of alarm criteria 
associated with the forthcoming of failure, carrying out diagnosis and prognostics, as well 
as increasing the trustworthiness of diagnostic and prediction results that are further 
developed in other international standards. 
ISO 13379-1 [63] presents the main aspects of the data interpretation and diagnostics 
methods. This standard considers the Failure Modes Symptoms Analysis (FMSA) method 
in detail. The task of the FMSA method is to select a technology and a condition monitoring 
strategy that maximizes the trustworthiness of the diagnosis and the prediction of this type 
of failure. The FMSA method is a further modification of the FMECA method [64-67], 
aimed at selecting diagnostic parameters by which it is possible to determine the type of 
defect or failure and to formulate the strategies of condition monitoring. 
Another standard that serves as a guide for the maintenance systems development is 
Maintenance Steering Group-3 (MSG-3) [68]. The title of this document is 
“Operator/Manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance Development”. MSG-3 was developed by 
the maintenance steering group of the U.S. Aviation Transport Association (ATA). The 
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MSG-3 standard is used for the development of maintenance plans for aircraft engines and 
systems before the aircraft goes into service. MSG-3 is a top-down approach to determine 
the consequences (safety, timeliness, and economy) of failure, from the system level and 
down to the component level. The failure effects are divided into five categories, and if the 
effects fail to be mitigated, then the system must be redesigned. For example, the use of 
MSG-3 led to necessary design changes for control and lightning protection systems of 
Boeing 787-8. Besides, the MSG-3 methodology has helped to increase safety while 
reducing maintenance costs by up to 30 percent [69]. MSG-3 is currently the only 
methodology for commercial aircraft manufacturers. According to Advisory Circular AC-
121-22C [70], the Federal Aviation Association (FAA) policy states that the latest MSG-3 
analysis procedures should be used to develop routine scheduled maintenance tasks for all 
new aircraft. This is the only methodology adopted by the U.S. airworthiness authorities. 
Most major manufacturers of business aircraft also adopted the MSG-3 standard with the 
support of the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA). 
In 2012, the U.S. DoD approved Instruction 4151.22 “Condition Based Maintenance 
Plus (CBM+) for Materiel Maintenance” [71]. CBM+ is the application and integration of 
appropriate processes, technologies, and knowledge-based capabilities to achieve the 
targeted availability, reliability, operational and support costs of the DoD systems and 
components throughout their life cycle. At its core, CBM+ is the maintenance performed by 
identifying the most efficient approach to maintenance, integrating technologies and CBM 
capabilities with other maintenance strategies that enhance the availability and efficiency of 
the systems and components of the US DoD. 
The International Association of Aerospace, Automotive and Commercial Engineers 
(SAE International) has issued the standard JA6268 “Design & Run-Time Information 
Exchange for Health-Ready Components” [72]. The purpose of this document is to clearly 
define the best methods by which the IVHM functionality relating to components and 
subsystems should be integrated into applications at the vehicle or platform level. 
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1.4. Analysis of CBM mathematical models of vehicles’ equipment 
A growing interest in CBM is manifested by a large number of studies devoted to 
various mathematical models and methods of optimization. The majority of the existing 
CBM models with scheduled inspections can be conditionally divided into two groups: 
CBM models with perfect inspections and CBM models with imperfect inspections. First, 
let us consider CBM models with perfect checks. 
An optimal replacement strategy for CBM with optimal inspection intervals is 
considered in [73] for the case when degradation corresponds to an inverse Gaussian process 
with random effects. According to the proposed model, inspections are carried out at regular 
intervals {0, δ, 2δ, … , 𝑘δ, … }, where δ is the inspection periodicity. The following formula 
calculates the total cost of inspections: 
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, (1.20) 
where 𝑐𝑖 is the cost of a single system inspection; r is the discount factor. 
The corrective and preventive maintenance costs as well as the cost of idle time, are 
added to the total cost of inspections to get a target optimization function for determining 
the optimal inspection periodicity. 
The studies [74, 75] present a model of optimal periodic inspections based on the 
class of increasing Markov processes: 
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where 𝑋0 is the initial process value; 𝑋𝑠 − 𝑋𝑠−1 is the process increment at the s-th step of 
its development. A stochastic gamma process, which belongs to this class of Markov 
processes, is used as a degradation model. The inspection periodicity and preventive 
maintenance threshold are considered as controlled variables. Failure can be detected only 
through inspection. The system is renewed when the check indicates that the preventive 
maintenance threshold or failure threshold has been exceeded. The optimal values of the 
inspection periodicity and preventive maintenance threshold are determined by minimizing 
the expected average maintenance cost per unit time. 
The study [76] discusses the problem of functional checks in reliability centered 
maintenance (RCM). A general cost model is developed under the assumption of a non-
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decreasing system degradation process. Joint optimization of the potential failure threshold 
and inspection intervals is considered to minimize the expected operating cost per unit time. 
A gamma process describes a stochastic process of degradation. 
The study [77] considered a system that is subjected to stochastic degradation and 
monitored using perfect inspections. When the system condition exceeds the failure 
threshold L, the system goes into a failed state, and a corrective replacement is immediately 
performed, after which the system becomes as good as new. When the system condition 
upon inspection is found to exceed the given critical threshold λ, the system is still 
functioning but considered as “worn-out,” and a preventive replacement is carried out. N (N 
> 1) thresholds ξ1, ξ𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are set in the range of system states (ξ0 = 0) in order to distinguish the 
N intervals of possible decisions (0 <ξ1 <... < ξN < L). The last threshold ξN denotes the 
critical threshold λ. The measurement error of the monitored parameter is considered 
negligible. The system operating costs per unit are minimized. The following formula 
presents the cost function per unit time: 
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where ci, cp, and cc are the cost of an inspection, a preventive replacement cost and a 
corrective replacement cost, respectively; co is the income per unit time when the system is 
in operating state; g1(x) is the density function of the system stationary state equal to x with 
an inspection scheduled; g2(x) is the density function of the system stationary state equal to 
x with no inspection scheduled; g(x) = g1(x) + g2(x). The selection of the inspection schedule 
and the critical threshold λ affect the cost-effectiveness of the maintenance strategy. 
The study [78] proposes a mathematical model to investigate the joint influence of the 
preventive replacement threshold and inspection schedule on the total costs of the system 
maintenance. The gamma process describes the stochastic process of degradation of the 
system, and the inspection schedule can be any positive and decreasing function that must 
be optimized. The global cumulative cost function over the interval [0, t] is determined as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i p p c c dC t C N t C N t C N t C d t= + + + ,                             (1.23) 
where 𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑝, 𝐶𝑐 are, respectively, the costs for inspection, preventive repair and corrective 
repair; 𝐶𝑑 is the cost of idle per unit time; d(t) is the system downtime over interval [0, t]. 
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The study [79] considered a decision-making model that allows determining the 
schedule of inspections, depending on the failure characteristics of the equipment to be 
inspected. The model considers the maintainability of the system and the preferences of the 
decision-maker related to costs and idle time. 
A model proposed in [80], considered preventive and corrective maintenance cost, as 
well as inspection cost to determine the optimal inspection and replacement policies, to 
minimize the total average cost of replacements and inspections. 
The study [81] considered an approach to the construction and optimization of CBM 
policy for an accumulative degradation system. It is assumed that the system condition 
inspections are perfect. The optimization target function is the total cost of various 
inspections, replacements, and idle time, which is determined by the following formula: 
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where 𝜏0, 𝜏1, and 𝜏2 are inspection periodicities, which correspond to different durations of 
the system in a stressed state; ξ is the preventive replacement threshold; 𝑐𝑝 and 𝑐𝑐 are, 
respectively, the preventive and corrective replacement cost; 𝑁𝑖𝑥(𝑇1) is the number of 
scheduled inspections until time 𝑇1; 𝐷𝑢(𝑇1) is the system idle time in the interval (0, 𝑇1); 
𝑇1is the duration of the semi-renewal cycle ; Επ is the mathematical expectation symbol; Ρπ 
is the event probability symbol. 
The study [82] presented a CBM structure for a gradually degrading single-unit 
system. The proposed decision-making model is used to determine the optimal inspection 
schedule and if necessary, the replacement times as well, to balance the system failure costs 
and the losses due to the idle time over an infinite time interval. The controlled variables are 
the replacement threshold and inspection schedule. Inspections are assumed to be perfect. 
The study [83] considered CBM of a single-unit system subject to dependent failures 
due to deterioration and traumatic shock events. A periodic inspection (replacement) 
strategy is proposed based on the results of condition monitoring, which minimizes the 
following cost function: 
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where 𝐸[𝜏𝑟], 𝑃𝑝(𝑇, 𝑀), 𝐸[𝑊𝑟], and 𝐸[𝑁𝑖] are, respectively, expected time to replace the 
system, the probability of preventive replacement during a regeneration cycle, the expected 
system idle time and the expected number of inspections during the regeneration cycle; T is 
the system inspection periodicity; M is the preventive replacement threshold. 
The study [84] introduced the maintenance scheduling threshold for organizing the 
maintenance resources according to the system state. The maintenance scheduling threshold 
is used as a controlled variable in combination with the preventive maintenance threshold 
and failure threshold. The formula determines the expected maintenance cost for one 
regeneration cycle 
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where 𝑋𝑆 is the maintenance scheduling threshold; 𝑋𝑀 is the preventive maintenance 
threshold; j is the time index for the period from (𝑗 − 1)Δ𝑡 to 𝑗Δ𝑡; 𝑃1(𝑗), 𝑃2(𝑗), and 𝑃3(𝑗) 
are the probabilities that at time 𝑗Δ𝑡 the system state parameter is less than the preventive 
maintenance threshold, greater than the preventive maintenance threshold and less than the 
failure threshold, and greater than the failure threshold, respectively; 𝐶1, 𝐶2, and 𝐶3 are cost 
values, which correspond to the three system states; 𝑇𝑊𝑆 is the delay in the supply of spare 
parts; 𝑇𝑊С is the operator delay; 𝐶𝑊𝑆 is the spare parts supplier delay’s cost per unit time; 
𝐶𝑊𝐶  is the cost of waiting for the operator per unit time; 𝐸 is the mathematical expectation 
symbol; 𝑇𝐿 is the lead time of the order. 
The study [85] considered a redundant dual-unit configuration typically used in 
avionics systems. Simulation of the system operation is carried out by a Markov process 
with a finite number of states and continuous time. The study does not consider the 
replacement threshold and the probability of incorrect decisions made during a periodic 
inspection of the second unit. 
The study [86] considers a CBM strategy with three possible actions: periodic 
inspection, preventive replacement, and corrective replacement, respectively. A preventive 
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or corrective replacement renews the system state. It is assumed that the system's periodical 
inspections are perfect. The study considers two maintenance policies about the change 
point of the degradation process 𝑇𝑐: maintenance policy for 𝑡 < 𝑇𝑐 and maintenance policy 
for 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇𝑐. Each policy has its preventive maintenance threshold, where 𝐴2 < 𝐴1. The 
adaptive maintenance optimization task comes down to finding values Δ𝑡, 𝐴1 and 𝐴2, which 
minimize the expected long-term costs 𝐸[𝐶(𝑇)]: 
The study [86] considers a CBM strategy with three possible actions: periodic 
inspection, preventive replacement, and corrective replacement, respectively. A preventive 
or corrective repair renews the system state. It is assumed that the system’s periodical 
inspections are perfect. The study considers two maintenance policies concerning the 
change point of the degradation process 𝑇𝑐: maintenance policy for 𝑡 < 𝑇𝑐 and maintenance 
policy for 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇𝑐. Each policy has its preventive maintenance threshold, where 𝐴2 < 𝐴1. 
The adaptive maintenance optimization task comes down to finding values Δ𝑡, 𝐴1 and 𝐴2, 
which minimize the expected long-term costs 𝐸[𝐶(𝑇): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2, , , , ,I I P P C C DE C T C E N T C P t A A C P t A A C E W T          = +  +  +  (1.27) 
where T is the regeneration cycle duration; 𝐶𝐼 is the cost per inspection; 𝐸[𝑁𝐼(𝑇)] is the 
expected number of inspections during the regeneration cycle; 𝑃𝑃(Δ𝑡, 𝐴1, 𝐴2) is the 
probability that the regeneration cycle will end due to preventive maintenance; 
𝑃𝐶(Δ𝑡, 𝐴1, 𝐴2) is the probability that the regeneration cycle will end due to corrective 
maintenance; 𝐶𝑃 and 𝐶𝐶 are the preventive and corrective maintenance costs, respectively; 
𝐸[𝑊(𝑇)] is the average system idle time during the regeneration cycle; 𝐶𝐷 is the system 
idle time cost per unit time. 
The study [87] proposes a maintenance policy for degrading systems with state-
dependent operating costs. The system is replaced when the level of its degradation exceeds 
the replacement threshold. By denoting the minimum total maintenance cost as 𝑉(𝑘, 𝑋𝑘) 
over an infinite time interval with the initial state (𝑘, 𝑋𝑘), the optimality equation satisfies 
the Bellman equation, expressed as 
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where τ is the inspection periodicity; 𝑋𝑘 is the system state during the k-th inspection; 𝑐𝑝 is 
the preventive maintenance cost; 𝑙 is the system functional failure threshold; r is the discount 
factor; 𝑐𝑐 is the corrective maintenance cost; 𝑈(𝑘, 𝑋𝑘) is the expected cost of transition to 
(k+1)-th inspection. 
The study [88] presents a CBM optimization method for series-parallel systems aimed 
at minimizing the maintenance costs. The target function in this study represents a sum of 
average maintenance costs per unit time and system installation costs. The constraint in the 
optimization task is imposed on the availability. The theory of semi-regenerating processes 
and the universal generating function [89] are used to evaluate the target cost function and 
availability. The formulation of the optimization problem is as follows: 
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where 𝐶𝑆 is the target cost function; 𝐶𝐼𝑁 is the system installation cost; 𝐶𝑀 is the system 
maintenance cost; 𝐴𝑆 is the system availability; 𝐴0 is the required value of system 
availability. The controlled variables in (1.29) are the reliability structure of the system and 
periodicity of condition monitoring. 
The tasks of joint optimization of the preventive maintenance threshold and schedule 
of perfect inspections when using CBM strategy were also considered in [90-101]. 
Let us now analyse CBM models with imperfect inspections. The study [102] 
examined a maintenance model with periodic inspections. Imperfect periodic inspections 
occur with a periodicity t within the selected time interval [0, (𝑛 + 1)𝑡]. When inspecting 
the system its failure is detected with the probability 𝑝 ∈ (0.1). After failure detection, a 
corrective repair of the system is performed. If no failure occurred over [0, (𝑛 + 1)𝑡] or it 
was not detected, then the system is replaced with a new one at the time point (𝑛 + 1)𝑡. The 
goal is to determine the optimal frequency of imperfect inspections between preventive 
maintenance, which minimizes the cost of maintenance. The following formula determines 
the expected maintenance cost: 
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where 𝑐1 is the cost of system repair; 𝑐2 is the system inspection cost; 𝜁 is the instantaneous 
cost of unrevealed failure; 𝛾𝑖 is the probability of unrevealed failure, which occurs after 
preventive maintenance when i inspections remain until the next scheduled preventive 
maintenance; 𝐷𝑖 is the time until unrevealed failure detection when an unrevealed failure 
occurs between (𝑛 − 𝑖) and (𝑛 − 𝑖 + 1) inspections; 𝑐3(𝑢) are the losses due to an 
unrevealed failure when the time duration in the unrevealed failure state is equal to u; 𝐹𝑋(𝑥) 
is the distribution function of the time to unrevealed failure. 
The remarks concerning this paper are as follows: 
1) Only two probabilities associated with imperfect inspections are considered, 
namely the conditional probability of true negative (𝑝) and the conditional probability of 
missed detection (1 − 𝑝). The conditional probability of false alarm and the conditional 
probability of true positive are disregarded. 
2) A preventive maintenance threshold for system inspection is disregarded. 
3) The conditional probability of true negative (𝑝) is constant at each check and does 
not depend on the system degradation process parameters. 
It should be noted that the majority of maintenance models with imperfect inspections 
typically consider two types of errors: “false alarms” with probability α and “missed 
detection” with probability β and, accordingly, correct decisions with probabilities 1 – α and 
1 – β. Examples of such maintenance models are presented in [103-107]. As an example, 
we will analyse the maintenance model proposed in [107]. A periodically inspected system 
can be in one of the following states: good, defective, and failed. The system in a defective 
state enters a wear state but still functions. 
Failure of the system is detected immediately since the system ceases to function. 
However, the inspection only can identify the defective state. In the case the system failure 
has significant consequences, then it is desirable to replace the system if the defective state 
is detected during the inspection, rather than to allow operation until failure. The system 
becomes as good as new after replacement. The following formula determines the expected 
cost of system maintenance during one regeneration cycle: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1p p f pC c K c P c c P c       =  + + − , (1.31) 
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where 𝑐0 and τ are, respectively, the cost and periodicity of inspection; 𝑐𝑓 is the cost incurred 
due to failure; 𝑐𝑝 is the cost of preventive maintenance; Ε(𝐾) is the mathematical 
expectation of the number of inspections during one regeneration cycle; 𝑃(𝑐𝑝) is the 
probability that the regeneration cycle will end with preventive maintenance. 
As in [102], the threshold of preventive maintenance is not considered when checking 
the system and the conditional probabilities of incorrect decisions α and β are constant and 
do not depend on the parameters of the system degradation process. Strictly speaking, the 
maintenance models proposed in [102-107] are not CBM models, since in reality the error 
probabilities when checking the system condition are not constant coefficients, but depend 
on the time and parameters of the degradation process. Moreover, as shown in [108, 109], 
such models also depend on the results of the previous checks. Therefore, in the further 
analysis, we will consider only those studies in which the observed process at the condition 
monitoring includes either a measurement error or the probabilities of correct and incorrect 
decisions that are functions of the system degradation model. 
The study [110] considered a decision-making model for the case of periodic 
inspections of the system condition, which minimizes the expected average cost per year. 
After repair, the system becomes as good as new. The observed stochastic process Y(t) 
includes the original process X(t) and a normally distributed measurement error ε: 
 ε( ) ( ) ε, ε (0,σ )Y t X t N= + → , (1.32) 
The convolution determines the likelihood function of measurement y at a given 
system parameter degradation rate μ 
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= = −  (1.33) 
where fX(t)(y − ε) = Ga(y − ε|at, b) is the likelihood function of increment X(t); a and b are 
the parameters of a stochastic process with a gamma distribution. The average cost per unit 
time is described by the relation of the expected cost per regeneration cycle to the expected 
regeneration cycle duration: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1, , / ,C p m k C I =Ε Ε  (1.34) 
where Δk is the interval between inspections. The expected cost per regeneration cycle is 
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where c1, cp, and cF are the costs for inspection, preventive and corrective replacement due 
to a failure, respectively. 
The study [111] considered a CBM model, in which the measurement result included 
the initial process of system degradation along with a normally distributed measurement 
error. Probabilities of incorrect decisions made during inspections are disregarded. 
A CBM model, which utilizes a stochastic Wiener process X(t) to model degradation 
with measurement errors ε, is studied in [112]: 
 ( ) ( ) εY t X t= + , (1.36) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )β σX t t t  =  +   , (1.37) 
where Y(t) is the measurement result of the system state parameter; β is the drift rate 
parameter; Λ(t) is the drift function; σ is the volatility parameter; B(t) is the standard 
Brownian motion. Within this model, the distribution of the remaining useful life is 
calculated, which is used to make decisions about restoring or using the system. 
A novel approach to the evaluation of the remaining useful lifetime of lithium-ion 
batteries is proposed in [113] based on the Wiener process with measurement error: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )β σX t t t
 
 =  +   , (1.38) 
where λ is the drift parameter; σ𝐵 is the diffusion parameter. The remaining notations have 
the same meaning as in (1.37). The inspection schedule is assumed to be known. 
The studies [114-123] considered the degradation process models related to CBM for 
objects of different physical nature. 
1.5. Statement of research objectives 
The analysis of the current state of digital avionics systems maintenance shows that 
three maintenance levels (O, I and D) are practiced in civil and military aviation, which 
differ by the place of maintenance performing and depth of fault detection by the available 
diagnostic equipment. Besides, many potential maintenance options of avionics systems are 
possible that differ by the number of maintenance levels and the use of outsourcing. No 
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Fault Found events have a significant impact on the maintenance cost of removed 
LRUs/LRMs, with their main cause being intermittent failures that occur in flight. 
Conventional ATE cannot diagnose intermittent failures in removed LRUs/LRMs for 
various reasons. Therefore, specialized types of diagnostics equipment are used to detect the 
intermittent failures, which are capable of simulating flight conditions with simultaneous 
and continuous monitoring of all tested devices of the diagnosed object. The cost of such 
diagnostic equipment is high; therefore, before its use in multilevel maintenance systems, it 
is necessary to conduct a feasibility study. 
The analysis of the mathematical models of digital avionics maintenance shows that 
currently no mathematical models exist to calculate MTBUR, availability, ORF and average 
maintenance costs of continuously monitored redundant avionics systems that differ by the 
number of maintenance levels (O-, I- and D-levels), and consider maintainability and fault-
tolerance to permanent and intermittent failures. Moreover, no mathematical models exist 
to evaluate the applicability of IFDs at the D-level maintenance of avionics LRUs/LRMs. 
The analysis of the latest international standards, instructions, and guidelines for 
vehicles’ equipment maintenance shows that CBM is based on the condition monitoring, 
which determines the equipment health to provide maintenance only when it is needed. The 
goals of CBM are to minimize a heavy volume maintenance checks, increase aircraft 
availability, improve flight safety, and reduce maintenance costs. To achieve the set goals, 
it is necessary to address a number of tasks among which the most relevant are the tasks 
related to determining optimal time intervals at the end of which specific actions are required 
to maintain or replace equipment components subjected to wear and degradation, 
determination of the equipment component degradation rate and evaluation of the remaining 
useful life. CBM effectiveness largely depends on solving the problem of determining the 
optimal schedule of condition monitoring within the limits of the target reliability 
thresholds, which must ensure a minimum number of inspections, while maintaining the 
failure risk below the maximum allowable level. 
The analysis of CBM mathematical models shows that a large number of research 
papers published in top-tier scientific journals and proceedings of prestigious scientific 
conferences are devoted to mathematical modelling of various CBM problems. The 
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published studies pay particular attention to the determination of the optimal preventive 
replacement threshold, optimal inspection schedule, the trustworthiness of inspections, 
optimization criteria, as well as degradation process models. The majority of published 
CBM mathematical models consider perfect inspections, in which the system condition is 
determined accurately. The mathematical models of maintenance with imperfect inspections 
are based on the decision rule, aimed at rejecting only systems that are inoperable at the time 
of condition monitoring. The drawback of this decision rule is the impossibility of 
discarding the systems that may fail within the period before the next time point of 
inspection. Also, these mathematical models assume that the probabilities of incorrect 
decisions are constants and do not depend on the time and degradation process parameters, 
which does not reflect the real conditions. The reviewed studies do not include any statement 
of joint optimization tasks of the inspection schedule and preventive replacement threshold 
for each time of inspection. The publications pay little attention to the development of 
mathematical models and criteria for optimizing CBM of systems that affect safety. 
Thus, the purpose of the thesis is to develop mathematical models of run-to-failure 
maintenance of digital avionics systems, considering permanent and intermittent failures, as 
well as the CBM models of vehicles’ degrading equipment based on imperfect inspections. 
From the conducted analysis it follows that to achieve this goal it is necessary to solve 
the following tasks: 
- To develop mathematical models for evaluating the operational reliability of 
continuously monitored avionics LRUs/LRMs over finite and infinite time intervals that 
would consider the impact of both permanent and intermittent failures. 
- To develop generalized relationships for calculation of average maintenance costs 
during warranty and post-warranty periods of redundant avionics systems operation for 
alternative maintenance options that differ by the number of maintenance levels (1, 2 or 3). 
- To develop a new decision rule for system condition monitoring at discrete times 
and a corresponding mathematical model of CBM. As well as to formulate the tasks of 
determining the optimal replacement threshold for each inspection based on the cost and 
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probabilistic optimization criteria, that would significantly reduce the probability of system 
failure during the forthcoming interval of operation. 
- To develop generalized mathematical expressions to calculate CBM performance 
indicators that consider the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made when 
checking the system suitability in the forthcoming interval of operation, as well as the 
criteria for joint optimization of inspection time-moments and replacement thresholds for 
systems that affect and do not affect safety. 
- To develop techniques and programs that make it possible to use the proposed 
mathematical models in solving tasks of optimizing maintenance of vehicles’ equipment. 
1.6. Conclusions 
1. The analysis of the current state of digital avionics maintenance allows us to 
conclude that: 
- Modern avionics systems are redundant systems, each including several 
LRUs/LRMs that are continuously monitored in flight by BITE and have a modular design 
that provides easy access to PCBs for ground diagnostics and maintenance. 
- Three maintenance levels (O, I and D) are practiced in civil and military aviation, 
differing in the place of maintenance performing and depth of fault detection in the 
dismantled LRUs / LRMs by available diagnostic equipment, what is more, the third and 
sometimes the second level of maintenance often outsourced to repair stations; 
- NFF events have a significant impact on the maintenance cost of dismantled 
LRUs/LRMs, with their main cause being intermittent failures that occur in flight. 
- Conventional ATE is incapable of diagnosing intermittent failures in dismantled 
LRUs/LRMs for a variety of reasons, therefore specialized diagnostic equipment is 
developed that is capable of simulating flight conditions with simultaneous and continuous 
monitoring of all tested devices of the diagnosed object to detect intermittent failures with 
the duration as short as 50 ns. 
- The cost of specialized equipment for diagnosing intermittent failures is quite 
high, so they have not found broad application in practice because of the lack of economic 
justification for the expediency of their use. 
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2. Based on the analysis of mathematical maintenance models of digital avionics 
systems the following is shown: 
- No mathematical models exist to calculate the MBTUR, availability and average 
operating costs over finite and infinite intervals of operation of continuously monitored 
redundant avionics systems for alternative maintenance options that differ by the number of 
maintenance levels (O-, I- and D-levels), which would consider the characteristics of 
maintainability and failure-free operation to permanent and intermittent failures. 
- No mathematical models exist to evaluate the application expediency of 
intermittent failure detectors at D-level maintenance of avionics LRUs/LRMs. 
3. The following may be concluded based on the analysis of the latest international 
standards, instructions, and guidelines for the CBM of vehicles’ equipment: 
- The goals of the CBM are to minimize a heavy volume of maintenance checks, 
increase aircraft availability, improve flight safety and reduce maintenance cost. 
- To achieve the set goals, a number of tasks must be addressed, among which the 
most relevant are the tasks of determining the optimal time intervals after which specific 
actions are required to maintain or replace equipment components that are subject to wear 
and degradation, determination of the equipment component degradation rate and evaluation 
of the remaining useful life. 
- CBM effectiveness largely depends on solving the problem of determining the 
optimal schedule of condition monitoring within the limits of the target reliability 
thresholds, which must ensure a minimum number of inspections, while maintaining the 
failure risk below the maximum allowable level. 
4. The analysis of CBM mathematical models shows that: 
- A significant number of publications are devoted to various problems of CBM 
mathematical modelling, and particular attention is paid to the determination of the optimal 
preventive replacement threshold, optimal inspection schedule, inspection trustworthiness 
(perfect, imperfect), optimization criteria as well as degradation process models. 
- The majority of CBM mathematical models consider perfect inspections, in which 
the system condition is assumed to be determined error-free. 
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- The CBM mathematical models with imperfect inspections incorporate a decision 
rule that is incapable of rejecting at least part of the systems that may fail before the next 
inspection time. Also, these mathematical models assume that the probabilities of incorrect 
decisions are constants and do not depend on the time and parameters of the degradation 
process, which does not reflect the real conditions. 
- No mathematical models of CBM with imperfect inspections and an arbitrary 
degradation process exist that consider the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions 
as functions of time and parameters of the degradation process. 
- There are no statements of tasks for joint optimization of inspection schedule and 
preventive replacement thresholds, as well as CBM mathematical models and optimization 
criteria for systems that affect safety. 
REFERENCES 
1. Air carriers’ outsourcing of aircraft maintenance. FAA Report Number:  
AV-2008-090, Sept. 30, 2008. 
2. Review of air carriers’ use of aircraft repair stations. FAA Report Number:  
AV-2003-047, July 8, 2003. 
3. Hurst, N. Congress wary of outsourcing aircraft maintenance. - Available: 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/congress_wary_of_outsourcing_aircraft_maintenance-
222830-1.html – 4.03.2013. 
4. No fault found: The search for the root cause: monograph/ I. K. Jennions, 
S. Khan, C. Hockley, P. Phillips. – London: SAE International, 2015. – 202 p. 
5. ARINC Report 672. Guidelines for the reduction of no fault found (NFF). – 2008. 
6. NFF – no fault found. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. – 
Available:https://info.aiaa.org/tac/AASG/PSTC/Lists/Calendar/Attachments/1/NFF%20Su
bcommittee.pdf - 22.04.2013. 
7. Hockley, C. A research study of no fault found (NFF) in the Royal Air 
Force/ C. Hockley, L. Laceya//Procedia CIRP. – 2017. - V. 59. – P. 263-267. 
8. Hockley, C. J. Report for air command on the impact of no fault found (NFF) on 
a selection of RAF aircraft fleets/C. J. Hockley, L. Lacey, J. G. Pelham//Technical report 
54 
 
TES 02-01-2015. – 2015. - EPSRC through-life engineering services centre, Cranfield 
University, UK. 
9. Anderson, K. Intermittent fault detection and isolation reduces NFF and enables 
cost effective readiness/K. Anderson//USC. – Available at: http://www.ncms.org/wp-
content/uploads/3-Steadman-CTMA-Briefing-2017. pdf – 4.04.2017. 
10. Ilarslan, M. Mitigating the impact of false alarms and no fault found events in 
military systems/M. Ilarslan, L. Y. Ungar//IEEE Instrumentation & measurement 
magazine. – 2016. – V. 19, No. 4. – P. 16-22. 
11. Burchell, B. No fault found/B. Burchell//Aviation week. – Available at: 
http://aviationweek.com/awin/no-fault-found - 1.02.2007. 
12. No fault found events in maintenance engineering Part 1: Current trends, 
implications and organizational practices/S. Khan, P. Phillips, I. Jennions, 
C. Hockley//Reliability engineering and system safety. – 2014. – V. 123. – P. 183-195. 
13. Thomas, D. A. The trouble not-identified in automotive electronics/ 
D. A. Thomas, K. Ayers, M. Pecht// Microelectron. reliab. – 2002. – V. 42. – P. 641–651. 
14. No fault found. Aerospace survey results//Copernicus technology 
Ltd. - Available:https://connect.innovateuk.org/documents/3329929/3676148/Aerospace+
Survey+on+No+Fault+Found+Impacts+-+Copernicus+Technologies+Ltd.pdf/a20b7a42-
9430-410c-a6f9 edc022f4388b – 1.03.2012. 
15. Qi, H. No-fault-found and intermittent failures in electronic products/H. Qi, 
S. Ganesan, M. Pecht//Microelectronics reliability. – 2008. – V. 48. – P. 663–674. 
16. Steadman, B. Intermittent fault detection and isolation system/B. Steadman, 
F. Berghout, N. Olsen//2008 IEEE AUTOTESCON, 8-11 September, 2008, Salt Lake City, 
UT, USA. – AUTOTESCON proceedings, 2008. – P. 37-40. 
17. Performance specification. Electronic test equipment, intermittent fault 
detection and isolation for chassis and backplane conductive paths: MIL-PRF-32516. – [Put 
into operation 23.03.2015]. - Washington: USA, 2015. – 26 p. - (Military standard of USA). 
18. Anderson, K. Intermittent fault detection & isolation system  
(IFDIS)/ K. Anderson//Aerospace & defense. – Available at: 
https://contest.techbriefs.com/2014/entries/aerospace-and-defense/4014 - 5.03.2014. 
55 
 
19. Voyager intermittent fault detector - VIFD/Universal Synaptics Corporation. – 
Available at: http://www.usynaptics.com/index.php/products/ncompass voyager - 1.1.2017 
20. Intermittent fault detection & isolation system - IFDS/Universal Synaptics 
Corporation. – Available at: http://www.usynaptics.com/ index.php/products/ ifdis 
 - 01.01.2017. 
21. Уланский, В. В. Организация системы технического обслуживания и 
ремонта радиоэлектронного комплекса Ту-204: учебное пособие/В. В. Уланский, 
Г. Ф. Конахович, И. А. Мачалин. – К.: КИИГА, 1992. – 110 c. 
22. Надійність техніки. Терміни та визначення: ДСТУ 2860-94. - [Введ. в дію 
01.01.1996]. – К.: Держстандарт України, 1994. – 26 с. – (Національний стандарт 
України). 
23. Military handbook. Electronic reliability design handbook: MIL-HDBK-
338B. – [Put into operation 01.10.1998]. – Washington: USA, 1998. – 1046 p. – (Military 
standard of USA). 
24. Rausand, M. System reliability theory. Models and statistical methods: a 
monograph/M. Rausand, A. Hsyland. – New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2009. – 536 p. 
25. Nakagawa, T. Maintenance theory of reliability: monograph/T. Nakagawa. – 
London: Springer, 2005. – 274 p. 
26. Уланский, В. В. Оценка апостериорной надежности дискретно 
контролируемых технических систем/В. В. Уланский//Проблемы повышения 
эффективности эксплуатации авиационного и радиоэлектронного оборудования 
воздушных судов гражданской авиации: Сб. науч. тр. – К.: КИИГА, 1987. – С. 19-31. 
27. Уланский, В. В. Оценка эксплуатационной надежности периодически 
контролируемой одноблочной системы авионики при наличии явных и скрытых 
отказов/В. В. Уланский, И. А. Мачалин//Авиационно-космическая техника и 
технология. – 2007. - № 6(42). – С. 87-93. 
28. IATA. Guidance material and best practices for inventory management. – 
Montreal, 2015. – 155 p. 
29. Galisanskis, A. Statistical evaluation and analysis of mutual interactions of 
components/A. Galisanskis, V. Giniotis//Aviation. – 2006. V. X, No. 3. – P. 9-15. 
56 
 
30. Уланский, В. В. Диагностическое обеспечение эксплуатации 
радиоэлектронных систем воздушных судов: дис. докт. техн. наук: 05.22.14/ В. В. 
Уланский. — К.: КИИГА. — 1989. — 351 с. 
31. Ulansky, V. V. The choice of optimum variant of warranty maintenance 
management of modern avionics products/V. V. Ulansky, I. A. Machalin//Матеріали VI 
Міжнар. НТК “Авіа–2004”. – К.: НАУ, 2004. – Т. 2. – С. 22.31–22.34. 
32. Ulansky, V. V. Optimization of post-warranty maintenance of avionics 
systems/V. V. Ulansky, I. A. Machalin//International conference on aeronautical science 
and air transportation (ICASAT2007), 23-25 April, 2007, Tripoli, Libya. — Conference 
proceedings, 2007. — P. 619-628. 
33. Уланский, В. В. Уточненная модель обслуживания одноблочной системы 
авионики/В. В. Уланский, И. А. Мачалин//Электронное моделирование. – 2008. –
Т. 30, № 2. – С. 55–67. 
34. Maintenance strategy decision for avionics system based on cognitive 
uncertainty information processing/J. Tu, C. Sun, X. Zhang et al.//Maintenance and 
reliability. - 2015. - V. 17, 2. - P. 297–305. 
35. Feldman, K. A methodology for determining the return on investment associated 
with prognostics and health management/K. Feldman, T. Jazouli, P. Sandborn//IEEE 
Transactions on reliability. - 2009. - V. 58, No. 2. - P. 305-316. 
36. Scanff, E. Life cycle cost impact using prognostic health management (PHM) 
for helicopter avionics/E. Scanff, K. L. Feldman, S. Ghelam et al.//Microelectronics 
reliability. – 2007. - V. 47. - P. 1857-1864. 
37. Modeling aircraft operational reliability/ K. Tiassou, K. Kanoun, M. Ka et 
al.//Lecture notes in computer science: coll. monogr. – Berlin: Springer, 2011. – 
V. 6894. - P. 157-170. 
38. Dhillon, B. S. Maintainability, maintenance, and reliability for engineers: 
monograph/B. S. Dhillon. – London: CRC Press, 2006. – 278 p. 
39. Jun, L. Reliability analysis of aircraft equipment based on FMECA 
method/L. Jun, X. Huibin//Physics procedia. – 2012. – V. 25. – P. 1816–1822. 
57 
 
40. Mason, R. L. Stealth fighter avionics: 2LM versus 3LM/R. L. Mason//Air force 
journal of logistics. – 1998. – V. 22, No. 3. – P. 31-34. 
41. Wang, Y. Manpower management benefits predictor method for aircraft two-
level maintenance concept/Y. Wang, B. Song//Modern applied science. - 2008. - V. 2, 
No. 4. - P. 33-37. 
42. Ulansky, V. Availability modelling of a digital electronic system with 
intermittent failures and continuous testing/V. Ulansky, I. Terentyeva//Engineering 
letters. - 2017. - V. 25, No. 2. - P. 104-111. 
43. Уланский, В. В. Обобщенные функции стоимости обслуживания до 
безопасного отказа легкозаменяемых блоков систем авионики/ В. В. Уланский, И. А. 
Мачалин //Електроніка та системи управління. – 2008. – № 1 (15). – С. 86–97. 
44. Vega, D. J. G. Assessing the influence of the scale of operations on maintenance 
costs in the airline industry/D. J. G. Vega, D. A. Pamplona, A. V. M. Oliveira//Journal of 
transport literature. – 2016. – V. 10, No. 3. – P. 10-14. 
45. Ilarslan, M. An economic analysis of false alarms and no fault found events in 
air vehicles/M. Ilarslan, L. Y. Ungar, K. Ilarslan//2016 IEEE AUTOTESTCON, 12-15 
September, 2016, Anaheim, CA, USA. - AUTOTESTCON proceedings, 2016. - P. 1-7. 
46. Saltoglu, R. Aircraft scheduled airframe maintenance and downtime integrated 
cost model/R. Saltoglu, N. Humaira, G. Inalhan//Advances in operations research. – 
2016. - V. 2016. – P. 1-12. 
47. A framework to estimate the cost of no-fault-found events/J. A. Erkoyuncu, 
S. Khan, S. M. F. Hussain, R. Roy//International journal of production 
economics. - 2016. - V. 173. - P. 207-222. 
48. Nakagawa, Т. Maintenance theory of reliability: monograph/ 
T. Nakagawa. - London: Springer, 2005. – 269 p. 
49. Nakagawa, T. Advanced reliability models and maintenance policies: 
monograph/T. Nakagawa. - London: Springer, 2008. – 234 p. 
50. Hsu, Y. T. Novel model of intermittent faults for reliability and safety measures 
in long-life computer systems/Y. T. Hsu, C. F. Hsu//International journal of electronics. – 
1991. – V. 71, No. 6. – P. 917-937. 
58 
 
51. Optimal periodic testing of intermittent faults in embedded pipeline processor 
applications/N. Kranitis, A. Merentitis, N. Laoutaris et al.//Design, automation and test in 
Europe conference, 6-10 March, 2006, Munich, Germany. – Conference proceedings, 
2006. - P. 65-70. 
52. Prasad, V. B. Digital systems with intermittent faults and Markovian models/ 
V. B. Prasad//1992 IEEE 35th Midwest symposium on circuits and systems, 9-12 August, 
1992, Washington, USA. – Symposium proceedings, 1992. - V. 1. – P. 195-198. 
53. Cai, B. A dynamic-Bayesian-network-based fault diagnosis methodology 
considering transient and intermittent faults/B. Cai, Y. Liu, M. Xie//IEEE Transactions on 
automation science and engineering. - 2017. - V. 14, No. 1. - P. 276-285. 
54. Rashid, L. Intermittent hardware errors recovery: modelling and 
evaluation/L. Rashid, K. Pattabiraman, S. Gopalakrishnan//2012 Ninth international 
conference on quantitative evaluation of systems (QEST), 17-20 September, 2012, London, 
UK. - QEST proceedings, 2012. - P. 1-10. 
55. Zhao, X. Optimal time and random inspection policies for computer 
systems/X. Zhao, M. Chen, T. Nakagawa//Applied mathematics & information 
sciences. - 2014. - V. 8, No. 1L. - P. 413-417. 
56. Aeronautical design standard handbook. Condition based maintenance system 
for US army aircraft: ADS-79D-HDBK. – [Put into operation 07.03.2013]. – Huntsville: 
USA, 2013. – 284 p. – (Military standard of USA). 
57. Blan, D. R. Maximizing the P-F interval through condition-based 
maintenance/D. R. Blan//Maintworld. Maintenance & asset management. – Available at: 
http://www.maintworld.com/Applications/Maximizing-the-P-F-Interval-Through-
Condition-Based-Maintenance - 07.10.2013. 
58. Moubray, J. Reliability-centered maintenance: monograph/J. Moubray. – New 
York: Industrial press, inc., 1997. – 448 p. 
59. On-condition maintenance using P-F interval or failure detection threshold 
(FDT)/Reliability hot wire. – Available at: 
http://www.weibull.com/hotwire/issue76/hottopics76.htm - 1.06.2007. 
59 
 
60. GE, Boeing implement condition-based maintenance standard/ Reliable plant. – 
Available at: http://www.reliableplant.com/Read/18448/ge%2C-boeing-implement-
condition-based-maintenance-stard – 29.06.2010. 
61. Open system architecture for condition-based maintenance/MIMOSA OSA-
CBM. – Available at: http://www.mimosa.org/mimosa-osa-cbm - 29.06.2010. 
62. Condition monitoring and diagnostics of machines — General guidelines:  
ISO 17359. – [Put into operation 15.04.2011]. – Geneva: Switzerland, 2011. – 26 p. 
63. Condition monitoring and diagnostics of machines — Data interpretation and 
diagnostics techniques — Part 1: General guidelines: ISO 13379-1. – [Put into operation 
01.05.2012]. - Geneva: Switzerland, 2012. – 33 p. 
64. Cetin, E. N. FMECA applications and lessons learnt/E. N. Çetin//2015 Annual 
reliability and maintainability symposium (RAMS), 26-29 January, 2015, Palm Harbor, FL, 
USA. – RAMS proceedings, 2015. – P. 1-5. 
65. Improved multi-faults diagnosis for CNC machine tools/B. Sheng, C. Deng, 
Y. Wang, S. Xie//2016 12th IEEE/ASME International conference on mechatronic and 
embedded systems and applications (MESA), 29-31 August, 2016, Auckland,  
New Zealand. – MESA proceedings, 2016. – P. 1-6. 
66. Failure mode and effect analysis under uncertainty: an integrated multiple 
criteria decision-making approach/H. C. Liu, J. X. You, P. Li, Q. Su//IEEE Transactions on 
reliability. – 2016. – V. 65, No. 3. – P. 1380-1392. 
67. Stamatis, D. H. Failure mode and effect analysis: FMEA from theory to 
execution: monograph/D. H. Stamatis. - New York: ASQC Press, 2003. – 300 p. 
68. Operator/manufacturer scheduled maintenance development. Fixed wing 
aircraft – V. 1/Air transport association of America: MSG 3, V. 1, version 2015.1. – [Put 
into operation 01.01.2015] – New York: USA, 2015. – 128 p. 
69. Vogl, G. W. Standards for prognostics and health management (PHM) 
techniques within manufacturing operations/G. W. Vogl, B. A. Weiss, 
M. A. Donmez//2014 Annual conference of the prognostics and health management society, 
29 September-02 October, 2014, Fort Worth, TX, USA. - Conference proceedings, 
2014. - P. 576-588. 
60 
 
70. Maintenance review boards, maintenance type boards, and OEM/TCH 
recommended/Advisory circular 121-22С. U.S. Department of transportation. Federal 
aviation administration. – [Put into operation 27.08.2012]. – USA, 2012. – 81 p. 
71. Condition based maintenance plus (CBM+) for materiel maintenance/DoD 
Instruction (DoDI) 4151.22. - [Put in operation 16.10.2012]. – USA Department of defense, 
2012. – 8 p. 
72. Design & run-time information exchange for health-ready components/ SAE 
standard JA6268. [Put in operation 04.02.2018] - SAE International, 2018. - Available: 
https://doi.org/10.4271/JA6268_201804. 
73. Condition-based maintenance using the inverse Gaussian degradation 
model/N. Chen, Z. S. Ye, Y. Xiang, L. Zhang//European journal of operational 
research. - 2015. - V. 243, No. 1. - P. 190-199. 
74. Abdel-Hameed, M. Inspection and maintenance policies of devices subject to 
deterioration/M. Abdel-Hameed//Advances in applied probability. – 1987. – V. 19. – 
P. 917-931. 
75. Abdel-Hameed, M. Correction to: “Inspection and maintenance policies of 
devices subject to deterioration”/M. Abdel-Hameed//Advances in applied probability. – 
1995. – V. 27. – P. 584. 
76. Jia, X. A prototype cost model of functional check decisions in reliability-
centered maintenance/X. Jia, A. H. Christer//Journal of the operational research society. – 
2002. – V. 53, No. 12. – P. 1380-1384. 
77. Grall, A. A condition-based maintenance policy for stochastically deteriorating 
systems/A. Grall, C. Berenguer, L. Dieulle//Reliability engineering and system safety. – 
2002. – V. 76. – P. 167-180. 
78. Sequential condition-based maintenance scheduling for a deteriorating 
system/L. Dieulle, C. Bérenguer, A. Grall, M. Roussignol//European journal of operational 
research. – 2003. – V. 150, No. 2. – P. 451–461. 
79. Ferreira, R. A multi-criteria decision model to determine inspection intervals of 
condition monitoring based on delay time analysis/R. Ferreira, A. de Almeida, 
C. Cavalcante//Reliab. engineering and system safety. – 2009. – V. 94, No. 5. – P. 905-912. 
61 
 
80. Golmakani, H. Age-based inspection scheme for condition-based 
maintenance/H. Golmakani, F. Fattahipour//Journal of quality in maintenance 
engineering. – 2011. – V. 17, No. 1. – P. 93-110. 
81. Deloux, E. An adaptive condition-based maintenance policy with environmental 
factors/E. Deloux, B. Castanier, C. Bérenguer//Risk and decision analysis in maintenance 
optimization and flood management: coll. monogr. – Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009. – 
P. 137-148. 
82. Continuous-time predictive-maintenance scheduling for a deteriorating 
system/A. Grall, L. Dieulle, C. Bérenguer, M. Roussignol//IEEE Transactions on 
reliability. - 2002. - V. 51, No. 2. - P. 141-150. 
83. A periodic inspection and replacement policy for systems subject to competing 
failure modes due to degradation and traumatic events/K. T. Huynh, A. Barros, 
C. Bérenguer, I. Castro//Reliability engineering and system safety. - 2011. - V. 96, 
No. 4. - P. 497-508. 
84. Condition-based maintenance with scheduling threshold and maintenance 
threshold/H. K. Wang, H. Z. Huang, Y. F. Li, Y. J. Yang//IEEE Transactions on 
reliability. - 2016. - V. 65, No. 2. - P. 513-524. 
85. Catelani, M. Condition-based maintenance and Markov modelling for avionics 
devices/M. Catelani, L. Ciani, M. Venzi//2017 IEEE International workshop on metrology 
for aerospace (MetroAeroSpace), 21-23 June 2017, Padua, Italy. - MetroAeroSpace 
proceedings, 2017. - P. 1-5. 
86. Guo, C. Maintenance optimization for systems with non-stationary degradation 
and random shocks/C. Guo, Y. Bai, Y. Jia//9th IMA International conference on modelling 
in industrial maintenance and reliability, 12-14 July, 2016, London, UK. - Conference 
proceedings, 2016. - P. 77-83. 
87. Liu, B. Condition-based maintenance for degrading systems with state-
dependent operating cost/B. Liu, M. Xie, W. Kuo//9th IMA International conference on 
modelling in industrial maintenance and reliability, 12-14 July, 2016, London, 
UK. - Conference proceedings, 2016. - P. 121-126. 
62 
 
88. Inspection and maintenance optimization of a multi-state series-parallel 
system/M. A. Yin, Z. L. Sun, J. Wang, Y. Guo//9th IMA International conference on 
modelling in industrial maintenance and reliability, 12-14 July, 2016, London, 
UK. - Conference proceedings, 2016. - P. 235-241. 
89. Levitin, G. The universal generating function in reliability analysis and 
optimization: monograph/G. Levitin. - 2005. - London: Springer. – 442 p. 
90. Safety constraints applied to an adaptive Bayesian condition-based maintenance 
optimization model/R. Flage, D. W. Coit, J. T. Luxhoj, T. Aven//Reliability engineering & 
system safety. - 2012. - V. 102. - P. 16-26. 
91. Fouladirad, M. On the use of on-line detection for maintenance of gradually 
deteriorating systems/M. Fouladirad, A. Grall, L. Dieulle//Reliability engineering & system 
safety. - 2008. - V. 93, No. 12. - P. 1814-1820. 
92. Fouladirad, M. On-line change detection and condition-based maintenance for 
systems with unknown deterioration parameters/M. Fouladirad, A. Grall//IMA journal of 
management mathematics. - 2012. - V. 25. - P. 139-155. 
93. Wang, W. A model to determine the optimal critical level and the monitoring 
intervals in condition-based maintenance/W. Wang//International journal of production 
research. - 2000. - V. 38, No. 6. - P. 1425-1436. 
94. Fouladirad, M. Monitoring and condition-based maintenance with abrupt change 
in a system’s deterioration rate/M. Fouladirad, A. Grall//International journal of systems 
science. - 2015. - V. 46, No. 12. - P. 2183-2194. 
95. van der Weide, J. Stochastic analysis of shock process and modeling of 
condition-based maintenance/J. van der Weide, M. D. Pandey//Reliability engineering & 
system safety. - 2011. - V. 96, No. 6. - P. 619-626. 
96. Amari, S. V. Optimal design of a condition-based maintenance 
model/S. V. Amari, L. McLaughlin//Annual symposium on reliability and maintainability 
(RAMS), 26-29 January, 2004, Los Angeles, CA, USA. – RAMS proceedings, 
2004. - P. 528-533. 
63 
 
97. Li, W. An inspection-maintenance model for systems with multiple competing 
processes/W. Li, H. Pham//IEEE Transactions on reliability. - 2005. - V. 54, 
No. 2. - P. 318-327. 
98. Condition-based inspection/replacement policies for non-monotone deteriorating 
systems with environmental covariates/X. Zhao, M. Fouladirad, C. Bérenguer, 
L. Bordes//Reliability engineering & system safety. – 2010. – V. 95, No. 8. – P. 921-934. 
99. Optimal maintenance policy and residual life estimation for a slowly degrading 
system subject to condition monitoring/D. Tang, V. Makis, L. Jafari, J. Yu// Reliability 
engineering & system safety. – 2015. – V. 134. – P. 198-207. 
100. Golmakani, H. R. Optimal replacement policy and inspection interval for 
condition-based maintenance/H. R. Golmakani, F. Fattahipour//International journal of 
production research. - 2011. - V. 49, No. 17. - P. 5153-5167. 
101. Golmakani, H. R. Condition-based inspection scheme for condition-based 
maintenance/H. R. Golmakani//International journal of production research. - 2012. - V. 50, 
No. 14. - P. 3920-3935. 
102. He, K. Scheduling preventive maintenance as a function of an imperfect 
inspection interval/K. He, L. M. Maillart, O. A. Prokopyev//IEEE Transactions on 
reliability. - 2015. - V. 64, No. 3. - P. 983-997. 
103. Berrade, M. Maintenance scheduling of a protection system subject to 
imperfect inspection and replacement/M. Berrade, A. Cavalcante, P. Scarf//European 
journal of operational research. – 2012. – V. 218. – P. 716-725. 
104. Zequeira, R. I. Optimal scheduling of non-perfect inspections/R. I. Zequeira, 
C. Bérenguer//IMA J. of management mathematics. - 2006. - V. 17, No. 2. -  
P. 187-207. 
105. Badıa, F. Optimal inspection and preventive maintenance of units with revealed 
and unrevealed failures/F. Badıa, M. D. Berrade, C. A. Campos//Reliability engineering 
and system safety. – 2002. – V. 78. – P. 157-163. 
106. Lam, Y. An inspection-repair-replacement model for a deteriorating system 
with unobservable state/Y. Lam//Journal of applied probability. – 2003. – V. 40, No. 4. – 
P. 1031–1042. 
64 
 
107. Imperfect inspection and replacement of a system with a defective state.  
A cost and reliability analysis/M. D. Berrade, P. A. Scarf, C. A. V. Cavalcante, 
R. A. Dwight//Reliability engineering and system safety. – 2013. – V. 120. – P. 80–87. 
108. Уланский, В. В. Оптимальные стратегии обслуживания электронных 
систем на основе диагностирования/В. В. Уланский//Вопросы технической 
диагностики. - 1987. - С. 137-143. 
109. Уланский, В. В. Достоверность многоразового контроля 
работоспособности невосстанавливаемых электронных систем/ 
В. В. Уланский//Ресурсосберегающие технологии обслуживания радиоэлектронного 
оборудования воздушных судов гражданской авиации. - 1992. - С. 14-25. 
110. Kallen, M. Optimal maintenance decisions under imperfect inspection/ 
M. Kallen, J. Noortwijk//Reliability engineering and system safety. – 2005. –V. 90, No. (2-
3). – P. 177-185. 
111. Newby, M. Optimal inspection policies in the presence of covariates/ 
M. Newby, R. Dagg//European safety and reliability conference (ESREL’02),  
19-21 March, 2002, Lyon, France. – Conference proceedings, 2002. – P. 131-138. 
112. Ye, Z. A Bayesian approach to condition monitoring with imperfect 
inspections/Z. Ye, N. Chen, K. L. Tsui//Quality and reliability engineering international. – 
2015. – V. 31, No. 3. – P. 513–522. 
113. Remaining useful life prediction of lithium-ion batteries based on the Wiener 
process with measurement error/S. Tang, C. Yu, X. Wang et al.//Energies. – 2014. – V. 7, 
No. 2. – P. 520–547. 
114. Whitmore, G. A. Estimating degradation by a wiener diffusion process subject 
to measurement error/G. A. Whitmore//Lifetime data analysis. – 1995. - V. 1(3). - P. 307-
319. 
115. Prognosis of structural damage growth via integration of physical model 
prediction and Bayesian estimation/Y. Liu, Q. Shuai, S. Zhou, J. Tang//IEEE Transactions 
on reliability. - 2017. - V. PP, No. 99. - P. 1-12. 
65 
 
116. Wen, Y. Multiple-phase modeling of degradation signal for condition 
monitoring and remaining useful life prediction/Y. Wen, J. Wu, Y. Yuan// IEEE 
Transactions on reliability. - 2017. - V. 66, No. 3. - P. 924-938. 
117. Remaining useful life prediction based on a general expression of stochastic 
process models/N. Li, Y. Lei, L. Guo et al.//IEEE Transactions on industrial 
electronics. - 2017. - V. 64, No. 17. - P. 5709-5718. 
118. Liu, Y. Dynamic reliability assessment for nonrepairable multistate systems by 
aggregating multilevel imperfect inspection data/Y. Liu, C. J. Chen//IEEE Transactions on 
reliability. - 2017. - V. 66, No. 2. - P. 281-297. 
119. Zhai, Q. RUL prediction of deteriorating products using an adaptive wiener 
process model/Q. Zhai, Z. S. Ye//IEEE Transactions on industrial 
informatics. - 2017. - V. PP, No. 99. - P. 1-10. 
120. Kwon, D. Remaining-life prediction of solder joints using RF impedance 
analysis and Gaussian process regression/D. Kwon, M. H. Azarian, M. Pecht//IEEE Trans. 
on components, packaging, and manuf. technology. - 2015. - V. 5, No. 11. - P. 1602-1609. 
121. Sikorska, J. Prognostic modelling options for remaining useful life estimation 
by industry/J. Sikorska, M. Hodkiewicz, L. Ma//Mechanical systems and signal 
processing. – 2011. - V. 25, No. 5. - P. 1803-1836. 
122. Zhai, Q. Robust degradation analysis with non-Gaussian measurement 
errors/Q. Zhai, Z. S. Ye//IEEE Trans. on instrumentation and measurement. - 2017. – 
No. 99. - P. 1-10. 
123. Optimal two-variable accelerated degradation test plan for Gamma degradation 
processes/T. R. Tsai, W. Y. Sung, Y. L. Lio et al.//IEEE transactions on 
reliability. - 2016. - V. 65, No. 1. - P. 459-468.   
66 
 
CHAPTER 2: 
MAINTENANCE MODELS OF AVIONICS SYSTEMS CONSIDERING 
PERMANENT AND INTERMITTENT FAILURES 
2.1. Statement of tasks 
As shown in Chapter 1, modern avionics systems are redundant and comprise a set of 
easily replaceable LRUs/LRMs. Usually, avionics systems use permanent redundancy in 
combination with the active mode of operation. Each LRU/LRM includes several SRUs and 
has BITE, which provides continuous in-flight testing of the LRU/LRM. The modular 
design of avionics systems provides easy access to PCBs and components for maintenance 
and diagnostics. Each LRU/LRM operates until the event of a safe failure (permanent or 
intermittent), which is registered in flight or after landing. 
The analysis of maintenance mathematical models of digital avionics provided in 
Chapter 1 showed that no mathematical models exist to calculate the operational reliability 
indicators of redundant avionics systems, which consider the alternating mode of avionics 
systems operation, periodic nature of pre-flight maintenance, continuous character of in-
flight monitoring and possibility of occurrence of both permanent and intermittent failures 
in flight. Therefore, subsections 2.2-2.4 describe mathematical models of LRU/LRM and 
redundant avionics system operation over finite and infinite operating intervals, considering 
all of the factors as mentioned above. 
The analysis conducted in Chapter 1 shows that three maintenance levels (O, I and 
D) are practiced in civil and military aviation, differing in the place of maintenance 
performing and depth of fault detection in the dismantled LRUs/LRMs. Therefore, many 
potential avionics system maintenance options are possible, which differ in the number of 
maintenance levels and the use of outsourcing. It should also be noted that NFF events have 
a significant impact on the cost of maintenance of dismantled LRUs/LRMs. As noted in 
Chapter 1, intermittent failures are the leading cause of NFF occurrence in avionics systems. 
Furthermore, conventional ATE designed to detect functional failures, faulty components, 
short circuits and breaks in electrical circuits, is not capable of intermittent fault diagnostics. 
Therefore, specific intermittent failure diagnostics equipment such as VIFD and IFDS, is 
67 
 
being developed, capable of simulating flight conditions, with simultaneous and continuous 
monitoring of all tested devices of the diagnosed object, to detect intermittent failures with 
the duration as short as 50 ns. However, the specialized intermittent failure diagnostics 
equipment is not widely used because of the high price and the lack of economic justification 
of its application. The analysis conducted in Chapter 1 shows that no mathematical models 
exist to calculate the average operating costs over finite and infinite intervals of operation 
of continuously monitored redundant avionics systems that differ by the number of 
maintenance levels (O, I and D levels), which consider the maintainability characteristics 
and the possibility of diagnosing both permanent and intermittent failures. Therefore, in 
subsections 2.5-2.7, mathematical models are developed to calculate the average operating 
costs considering all the above factors. 
Both probabilistic and cost-related indicators we will use to assess maintenance 
effectiveness. The availability and ORF we further use as probabilistic maintenance 
effectiveness indicators. MTBUR is an essential indicator of the operational reliability of 
avionics LRUs/LRMs. A high rate of intermittent failures significantly reduces MTBUR. 
As indicated in [2], MTBUR of avionics systems is about 50 % of the MTBF, which results 
in a 40–50 % increase in direct operating costs [3]. Further, we use total expected 
maintenance costs for a given time interval as a generalized cost indicator. Maintenance 
effectiveness indicators will be determined individually for the warranty and post-warranty 
period of avionics system operation. 
2.2. A mathematical model of LRU/LRM operation and maintenance over a 
finite time interval 
2.2.1. Possible LRU/LRM states during operation and maintenance. When 
developing the mathematical model of LRU/LRM operation and maintenance, we assume 
that the operation interval is finite. Let us denote this interval as T. It may be associated, for 
example, with the warranty maintenance period duration. The BITE continuously monitors 
the LRU/LRM condition in a flight of duration τ, where τ is the average time between 
aircraft landings at the base airport. In case of permanent failure, the LRU/LRM is disabled, 
or the on-board computer ignores information from this unit. In case of intermittent failure, 
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the LRU/LRM is usually not disabled during flight. However, the on-board computer 
records information about intermittent failures that occurred during the flight. 
The procedure for repair operations is as follows: if a permanent or intermittent failure 
occurs in flight, then the LRU/LRM is dismantled after landing at the base airport and sent 
for repair. After any repair, the LRU/LRM is assumed to be as good as new. We describe 
the LRU/LRM behaviour in the interval (0, T) by a finite-state stochastic process S(t). The 
process S(t) changes with jumps. Each jump of S(t) is due to the LRU/LRM transition to one 
of the possible states. We assume that S(t) is a regenerative stochastic process and permanent 
failure of LRU/LRM occurs at time ξ, where kτ < ξ ≤ (k+1)τ. Then, at an arbitrary time t, 
the LRU/LRM can be in one of the following states [4, 5]: S1, if at time t the LRU/LRM is 
operable; S2, if at time t the LRU/LRM is inoperable due to the detected permanent failure 
that occurs in flight; S3, if at time t the LRU/LRM is in O-level maintenance (dismantling 
or mounting the LRU/LRM on aircraft board); S4, if at time t the LRU/LRM is in the state 
of waiting for a spare LRU/LRM from the airline warehouse; S5, if at time t the LRU/LRM 
is shipped to repair or from repair; S6, if at time t the LRU/LRM is repaired due to an 
intermittent failure; S7, if at time t the LRU/LRM is repaired due to a permanent failure. 
If BITE has rejected the LRU/LRM, then it must be replaced with operable 
LRU/LRM from the warehouse. The LRU/LRM replacement time should be short enough 
to avoid any disruptions to the flight regularity. Any aircraft departure delays will result in 
financial losses. Therefore, the warehouse must have a sufficient number of spare 
LRUs/LRMs. On the other hand, the surplus of spare LRUs/LRMs in the warehouse will be 
associated with financial losses as well, as the cost of avionics is exceptionally high. 
Let us denote the time spent by the LRU/LRM in the state Si (𝑖 = 1,7̅̅ ̅̅ ) as TSi., which 
is a random variable with the expected time E[TSi]. Let Ξ and Σ be, respectively, the random 
time to a permanent and intermittent failure with the probability density function (PDF) ω(ξ) 
and f(ε), and cumulative distribution function (CDF) Ω(ξ) and F(ε). The mean time of the 
LRU/LRM regeneration cycle is determined using the addition theorem of mathematical 
expectations: 
7
0
1
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E TS E TS
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2.2.2. Mean time of staying the LRU/LRM in different states. Let us determine 
the mean times 𝐸[𝑇𝑆1], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆7]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. Assume that the LRU/LRM works being operable till time 
ξ, where kτ < ξ ≤ (k + 1)τ, 𝑘 =  (0, 𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅), (N + 1)τ= T. The conditional mathematical 
expectation of the time spent by the LRU in the state S1 provided that Ξ = ξ is [4-6]:
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To determine the mathematical expectation of the time spent by the LRU/LRM in the 
state 𝑆𝑖  (𝑖 = 1,7̅̅ ̅̅ ), we will use the modified formula for the total mathematical expectation 
of a continuous random variable [4-6]: 
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kN
i i i
k k T
E TS E T k d E T dk T i
+ 
=
   
   
=  + +   . (2.3) 
Applying formula (2.3) to expression (2.2), we obtain [4, 6]: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( 1) ντ
1
0 ν 1 (ν 1)τ
ντ
ν 1 (ν 1)τ
[ ] ντ υ 1 τ ω υ υ+
ντ 1 ω υ υ.
kN k
k k
N
T
E TS f z dz F k d
f z dz Т F T d


+
= = −

= −
 
   
 
 
   
 
= + −  
+ − 
 (2.4) 
The conditional mathematical expectation of the time spent by the LRU/LRM in the 
state S2 provided that Ξ = ξ is equal to [4-6]: 
 
( ) ( )
2
1 ξ ,if τ ξ ( 1)τ,
ξ
0, if ξ .
k
k f z dz k k
E T
T
S 


     


+ −   +

=  (2.5) 
By substituting (2.5) into (2.3), we obtain the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in 
the state S2 [4-6]: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( 1)τ
2
0 τ
( 1)τ
0 τ
.
1 τ υ ω υ υ=
1 τ 1 τ ( 1)τ τ υω υ υ
kN
k k k
kN
k k
E TS f z dz k d
F k k k k d

+ 
=
+
=
 
       
 
 
       
 
= + −  
− +  + − − 
             (2.6) 
If the duration of the maintenance operations is constant over the interval (0, T), the 
mean times 𝐸[𝑇𝑆3], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are determined by the following formulas [4]: 
3
O level
ME TS t
− 
  = ,                                                    (2.7) 
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( )4 O levelspare M stopE TS t t t−   = + − ,                                           (2.8) 
5 shippingE TS t   = ,                                                    (2.9) 
where 𝑡𝑀
𝑂−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 is the average duration of maintenance operations at O-level; 𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒  is the 
average time of waiting for spare LRU/LRM from the warehouse in the situation “aircraft 
on ground”; 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 is the average scheduled stop time of the aircraft at the base airport; and 
𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 is the average time of shipping the failed LRU/LRM to the repair and back. 
If an intermittent failure occurs during the ν-th flight and until this moment there is 
no permanent failure, the conditional mathematical expectation of the time spent by the 
LRU/LRM in the state S6 provided that Ξ = ξ is equal to [4, 5]: 
 
( )
( )
ντ
ν 1 (ν-1)τ
6 ντ1
ν 1 (ν-1)τ
, if τ ξ ( 1 , 0)τ
ξ
, i
,
f ξ
,
,
k
IFR
N
f z dz k k
E TS t
f
N
z dz
k
T
=
+
=



   


=  + 
=
  
 (2.10) 
where 𝑡𝐼𝐹𝑅 is the average time of the LRU/LRM repair due to intermittent failure. 
By substituting (2.10) into (2.3), we obtain the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in 
the state S6 [4]: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( 1)τ ντ ντ1
6
0 ν 1 ν 1τ (ν-1)τ (ν-1)τ
0
ω υ υ ω υ υ
τ ( 1)τ τ 1 .
kN k N
IFR
k k T
N
IFR
k
E TS t f z dz d f z dz d
t F k k k F T T
+  +
= = =
=
     
       
        
        
= + =     
 + − + −
 (2.11) 
If a permanent failure occurs during the k-th flight and until moment kτ there is no 
intermittent failure, the conditional mathematical expectation of the time spent by the 
LRU/LRM in the state S7 provided that Ξ = ξ is equal to [4]: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( 1)τ
τ τ
7
ω υ υ, if τ ξ ( 1)τ,
ξ
1 , i ,f ξ
k
k k
PFR
f z dz d k k
E TS t
F T T
+

   
  

=

 +
−
 (2.12) 
where 𝑡𝑃𝐹𝑅 is the average time of the LRU/LRM repair due to permanent failure. 
By substituting (2.12) into (2.3), we obtain the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in 
the state S7 [4]: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
( 1)τ
7
0 τ τ
0
.
ω υ υ 1 ω υ υ
1 τ ( 1) 1 1
kN
PFR
k k k T
N
PFR
k
E TS t f z dz d F T d
t F k k k F T T 
+  
=
=
  
  =       
  
             
= + −   
−  + − + − −
 (2.13) 
2.2.3. The case of an exponential failure distribution. As is well known [7], the 
exponential distribution is suitable to describe failure distribution of complex systems. On-
board electronic LRUs/LRMs have a complex structure and include a considerable number 
of components. Extrinsic and intrinsic failure mechanisms of these components may cause 
the units to fail. These failure mechanisms can combine forming a constant failure rate, 
which is only possible with an exponential distribution of time to failure [8]. Therefore, the 
exponential distribution with the PDF 
λξω(ξ) λe−=  (2.14) 
is the appropriate failure distribution for most electronic avionics LRUs, where λ is the 
LRU/LRM permanent failure rate. 
Let us consider the case when intermittent failures are also subject to the exponential 
distribution with the PDF 
 
θε(ε) θf e−= ,                                                (2.15) 
where θ is the LRU/LRM intermittent failure rate. 
Substituting (2.14) and (2.15) into (2.4), (2.6), (2.11), and (2.13), we obtain [4-6]: 
 
( )
( )λ θ
(λ+θ) λτ λτ (λ+θ)
1 θτ θτ (λ θ)τ
τ 1 τ 1
1 1 τ τ
1 λ 1 1
T
T TeE TS e e e e
e e e
− +
− − − −
− − − +
 
        
 
−
= − + − − − +
− − −
,  (2.16) 
 
( )λ θλτ
2 (λ θ)τ
1 1
τ
λ 1
Te e
E TS
e
− +−
− +
  
     
   
− −
= −
−
, (2.17) 
 
( ) ( ) 
λτ λ (λ θ)τ (λ θ)
λτ θ λ
6 λτ (λ θ)τ
1 1
1 1
T T
T T
IFR
e e e e
E TS t e e e
e e
− − − + − +
− − −
− − +
  
     
  
− −
= − − + −
− −
, (2.18) 
 
( ) 
(λ θ)
λτ (λ θ)
7 (λ θ)τ
1
1
1
T
T
PFR
e
E TS t e e
e
− +
− − +
− +
 
    
 
−
= − +
−
. (2.19) 
Expressions for mean times 𝐸[𝑇𝑆1], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆7]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ may be used to determine complex 
reliability indicators. For example, the LRU/LRM availability is determined as follows: 
 1 0
A E TS E TS      = . (2.20) 
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Figure 2.1 shows the dependence of the LRU/LRM availability on the rate of 
intermittent failures in the case of an exponential distribution. 
 
 
Fig. 2.1. Dependence of the LRU/LRM availability on the intermittent failure rate at 
T = 5,000 h, τ = 5 h and λ = 1×10-4 h-1 
As can be seen in Fig. 2.1, the availability begins to decrease significantly when  
θ > 1×10-4 h-1. For θ < 5 × 10-5 h-1, the availability does not depend on the intermittent failure 
rate. 
2.2.4. Mean time between unscheduled removals. As previously noted, MTBUR is 
widely used by airlines as an LRU/LRM operational reliability indicator. Let us determine 
MTBUR considering permanent and intermittent failures. Assume as in paragraph 2.2.2 that 
the LRU/LRM permanent failure occurs at time ξ, where 𝑘τ < ξ ≤ (𝑘 + 1)τ , 𝑘 = 0, 𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 
Then, the LRU/LRM will be removed from the aircraft board at the time ντ, if an intermittent 
failure occurs during the ν-th flight, where ν = 1, 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅̅. Also, the LRU/LRM will be removed 
from the aircraft at time (𝑘 + 1)τ, unless an intermittent failure occurs before the instant 𝑘τ. 
Therefore, under the condition that Ξ = ξ, the mathematical expectation of the time to the 
LRM/LRU removal is equal to [4, 6]: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ντ
ν 1 (ν 1)τ
ντ
ν 1 (ν 1)τ
ντ ( 1)τ 1 τ , if τ ξ ( 1)τ, =
ντ 1 , if ,ξ
0, ,
ξ
k
T
N
f z dz k F k k k k
E TB
F T
UR
f z dz T T
N
= −
= −

   
   
   

+ + −   + 

=
+ − 
 (2.21) 
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where 𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑅𝑇 is the random time between unscheduled removals. 
Substituting (2.21) into (2.3), we obtain the following expression for MTBUR [4]: 
 
  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( 1)τ ντ
0 ν 1τ (ν 1)τ
ντ
ν 1 (ν 1)τ
ντ ( 1)τ 1 τ ω(υ) υ
ντ 1 ω υ υ.
kN k
T
k k
N
T
E TBUR f z dz k F k d
f z dz T F T d
+
= = −

= −
 
   
 
 
   
 
= + + − +  
+ − 
 (2.22) 
Let us assume that both failure types have an exponential distribution. Then, after 
substituting (2.14) and (2.15) into (2.22) and performing the necessary mathematical 
transformations, we obtain [4]: 
  ( )
( )λ θ
(λ+θ) λτ λτ (λ+θ)
θτ θτ (λ θ)τ
λτ (λ θ)
(λ θ)τ
.
τ 1 τ 1
1 1 τ τ
1 λ 1 1
1 1
τ
λ 1
T
T T
T
T
E TBUR
e
e e e e
e e e
e e
e
− +
− − − −
− − − +
− − +
− +
 
     
 
   
   
   
−
= − + − − − + +
− − −
− −
−
−
 (2.23) 
If λ → 0, (2.23) transforms into the form 
 
  ( ) ( )θ θττ 1 1TTE TBUR e e− −= − − . (2.24) 
If θ → 0, using (2.23) yields 
 
 
( )λ
λτ
τ 1
1
T
TE TBUR
e
e
−
−
−
=
−
. (2.25) 
Using (2.24) and (2.25), we determine the upper estimate of MTBUR: 
 
 
( ) ( )θ λ
θτ λτ
τ 1 τ 1
min ,
1 1
T T
TE TBUR
e e
e e
− −
− −
  
 
  
− −

− −
. (2.26) 
Example 2.1. Calculation of MTBUR for avionics LRU when T = 5,000 h, τ = 4 h, θ = 5 × 
10-4 h-1, and λ = 1×10-4 h-1. 
Solution. Using (2.24)–(2.26), we obtain 
  ( )min 1837,3935 1837hTE TBUR  = . 
Substitution of the initial data into (2.23) yields 𝐸[𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑅𝑇] = 1,586 h. In this manner, 
the upper estimate of MTBUR is 16 % higher than its real value. Therefore, one may use 
inequality (2.26) only for approximate calculations of MTBUR. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the dependence of MTBUR on the intermittent failure rate for 
an exponential distribution of time to both failure types. As can be seen in Fig. 2.2, MTBUR 
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rapidly decreases when the intermittent failure rate increases. It should also be noted that 
E[TBURT] = 3,935 h for θ = 0. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Dependence of MTBUR on the intermittent failure rate at T = 5,000 h, τ = 4 h and 
λ = 1×10-4 h-1 
2.2.5. Operational reliability function. ORF is the leading indicator of maintenance 
effectiveness for systems that affect safety. Onward, we shall use the ORF to describe the 
LRU/LRM failure-free operation over the time interval (kτ, t), 𝑘𝜏 < 𝑡 ≤ (𝑘 + 1)𝜏, 
considering that the LRU/LRM could undergo an unscheduled repair due to a permanent or 
intermittent failure at time-moments 𝜏, 𝑘𝜏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . 
To determine the ORF, we use the joint PDF of random variables Ξ, Θ1, Θ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , which we 
denote as ω0(ξ, θ1, θ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅), where Θ𝑖 = Θ − (𝑖 − 1)τ is the remainder of the operating time to 
intermittent failure after i - 1 flights (𝑖 = 1, 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅̅). Using the multiplication theorem of the 
PDFs, we can write the following expression [5, 6]: 
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 1ω ξ,θ ,θ ω ξ θ ,θ ξ ,k kf=                                          (2.27) 
where 𝑓(Θ1, Θ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ |𝜉) is the conditional PDF of random variables Θ1, Θ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  provided that Ξ = ξ.  
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To determine the ORF, we introduce some conditional probabilities associated with 
intermittent failures [5, 6]. The conditional probability of intermittent failure occurrence 
during the ν-th (𝜈 = 1, 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅̅) flight is described as follows: 
 
( )  
ν 1
νξ
1
ντ ξ τ τ ξiIF
i
P P
−
=
=      (2.28) 
The conditional probability of intermittent failure non-occurrence during the k-th 
flight is described as follows: 
 
( )  ξ
1
τ ξ τ ξ .
k
iIF
i
P k P
=
=    (2.29) 
The probabilities (2.28) and (2.29) are determined by integrating PDF 𝑓(Θ1, Θ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ |ξ) 
between the corresponding limits [5, 6]: 
 
( ) ( )
τ
. .(ν 1) 1 1ξ
τ τ 0
ντ ξ , | ξ
IF
P f u u du du 
 
−=     (2.30) 
 
( ) ( ). .( ) 1 1ξ
τ τ
τ ξ , ξk k kIFP k f u u du du
 
=    (2.31) 
The ORF over the finite time interval T is determined as follows [9]: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )τ ξ
0 τ
0
τ
τ, τ υ ω υ υ, τ
ω
Tk
R
T j IF
j t j
P j
R k t P k j d t k
x dx
−
= −
= −  

, (2.32) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )R IF PFP j P j P j  = + , (2.33) 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
1
ξ
ν 0 ( ν)τ
0
ντ
( ν)τ υ ω υ υ
ω
Tj
R
IF T IF
j
P
P j P j d
x dx


−
−
= −
= − 

, (2.34) 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
1
ξ
ν 0 ( ν)τ
0
ντ
1 ( ν 1)τ υ ω υ υ
ω
Tj
R
PF T IF
j
P
P j P j d
x dx


−
−
= −
= − − − 

, (2.35) 
where 𝑃𝑅(𝜏), 𝑃𝐼𝐹(𝑗𝜏) и 𝑃𝑃𝐹(𝑗𝜏) are, respectively, the probabilities of total LRU repairing, 
the LRU/LRM repairing due to intermittent failure, and the LRU repairing due to permanent 
failure at the time jτ. 
Let us start the proof of relations (2.32)–(2.35) with expression (2.33). Let us 
introduce the following events: Π(jτ) is the event of LRU/LRM repairing at the time jτ after 
the j-th flight; hIF(jτ) and hPF(jτ) are the events of LRU/LRM repairing due to intermittent 
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and permanent failure, respectively. The event hIF (jτ) will appear in the case if the 
intermittent failure occurs in the j-th flight. It should be noted that some avionics 
LRUs/LRMs are dismantled after registering several intermittent failures. Similarly, the 
event hPF(jτ) will appear in the case if the permanent failure occurs during the j-th flight. 
The LRU/LRM will be restored at the time jτ in case one of the events hIF(jτ) or hPF(jτ) 
occurs. Consequently, 
 ( ) ( ) ( )IF PF
j j jh h   = + . (2.36) 
Assuming that hIF(jτ) and hPF(jτ) are mutually exclusive events, and applying the 
addition theorem of probability to (2.36), we obtain (2.33). 
To prove (2.32), (2.34), and (2.35), let us write down the probabilistic definition of 
the probabilities R(kτ, t), PIF(jτ) and PPF(jτ). 
Operational reliability function can be formulated as follows: 
 
( ) ( )
0 1
,
i
k k
j
i
j
R j t tP j j   
= +=
   
  
 
 
 
 
= −    . (2.37) 
The formulation of the probability of LRU/LRM recovery due to intermittent or 
permanent failure is as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2
1
1
ν 0
τ ντ ( ν)τ ( )\ ν τ
j
IFP j P E j jE
−
=
     
=  − − , (2.38) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
ν 0
τ 1 ντ ( ν)τ
j
PFP j P E j
−
=
 
   
 
= −  − , (2.39) 
where 
( )
1
1
1
ν
( ν)τ ( ν)τ τ
j
i
i
E j j
−
= +
 
 
 
 − = −   
is the event consisting in the fact that in the LRU/LRM, which began to operate at time ντ, 
no permanent failure will occur during the time (j-ν)τ, and no intermittent failure - during 
flights 𝜈 + 1, 𝑗 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅; 
( )
ν
2
1
( ν)τ ( ν) ττ
j
i
i
E j j
= +
 
 
 
 − = −  
is the event similar to 𝐸1((𝑗 − 𝜈)𝜏), with the only difference that no intermittent failure 
occurs in the j-th flight as well; 
‘\’ is a symbol of the difference between the two events. 
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Assuming that PR(0) = 1 and applying the addition and multiplication theorems of 
probability to expressions (2.37)–(2.39), we obtain (2.32), (2.34) and (2.35). 
Let us determine the probabilities (2.32)-(2.35) for an exponential distribution of 
permanent and intermittent failures. Due to memoryless property inherent to the exponential 
distribution, the probabilities (2.30) and (2.31) transform into [5]: 
 
( ) ( )(ν 1)θτ θτξ ντ ξ 1IFP e e
− − −= − , (2.40) 
 
( ) θτξ τ ξ
k
IF
P k e−= . (2.41) 
Substituting (2.14), (2.15), (2.40), and (2.41) into (2.32), (2.34) and (2.35), we obtain  
 
( )
( ) ( )θτ λ( τ) λ
λ( τ)
0
,
1
k
R k j t j T
T j
j
P j
R k t e e e
e

 − − − − −
− −
=
 
 = − −
, (2.42) 
 
( ) ( )
( )1θτ ( ν 1)θτ ( ν)λτ λ
λ( ντ)
ν=0
ντ
τ 1
1
j
R j j T
IF T
P
P j e e e e
e
−
− − − − − − −
− −
 
 = − − −
, (2.43) 
 
( )
( )1 ( ν 1)θτ ( ν)λτ λ
λ( ντ)
ν=0
ντ
τ 1
1
j
R j j T
PF T
P
P j e e e
e
−
− − − − − −
− −
 
 = − − −
. (2.44) 
It should be noted that beginning from the fourth or fifth flight, the probabilities (2.41) 
and (2.42) reach the steady-state values 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )* θτ λτ λ λ θτ 1 1 1T T TIFP e e e e e− − − − −  = − − − − ,                          (2.45) 
( ) ( ) ( )* λτ λ λτ 1 1T TPFP e e e− − −= − − − .                                                   (2.46) 
2.3. A mathematical model of LRU/LRM operation and maintenance over an 
infinite time interval 
An infinite interval of operation usually means a time interval that significantly 
exceeds the average time between LRU/LRM recoveries. To obtain expressions over an 
infinite time interval, it suffices to set 𝑇 = ∞ in the previously derived formulas. 
2.3.1. Mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in different states. By substituting 𝑇 =
∞ into (2.9), (2.11), (2.15), and (2.17), we obtain 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( 1) ντ
1
0 ν 1 (ν 1)τ
[ ] ντ υ 1 τ ω υ υ
k k
k k
E TS f z dz F k d


+
= = −
 
   
 
= + −   , (2.47) 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( 1)τ
2
0 τ
( 1)τ
0 τ
1 τ υ ω υ υ=
1 τ 1 τ ( 1)τ τ υω υ υ ,
k
k k k
k
k k
E TS f z dz k d
F k k k k d

+ 
=
+
=
 
       
 
 
       
 
= + −  
− +  + − − 
 (2.48) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
( 1)τ ντ
6
0 ν 1 0τ (ν-1)τ
ω υ υ τ ( 1)τ τ ,
k k
IFR IFR
k kk
E TS t f z dz d t F k k k
+ 
= = =
            
   
= =  + −      (2.49) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
( 1)τ
7
0 0τ τ
ω υ υ 1 τ ( 1) .
k
PFR PFR
k kk k
E TS t f z dz d t F k k k 
+  
= =
  
   =          
  
= −  + −    (2.50) 
Substituting 𝑇 = ∞ into (2.16)–(2.19), we obtain the mean times 
𝐸[𝑇𝑆1], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆2], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆6] и 𝐸[𝑇𝑆7] in the case of exponential distribution of failures [5, 10]: 
 
( )λτ λτ1 θτ θτ (λ θ)τ
τ 1 τ 1
1 τ
1 λ 1 1
E TS e e
e e e
− −
− − − +
 
      
 
= + − − −
− − −
, (2.48) 
 
λτ
2 (λ θ)τ
1 1
τ
1 λ
e
E TS
e
−
− +
 
    
 
−
= −
−
, (2.49) 
 
( )
λτ (λ θ)τ
λτ
6 λτ (λ θ)τ
1
1 1IFR
e e
E TS t e
e e
− − +
−
− − +
 
    
 
= − −
− −
, (2.50) 
 
λτ
7 (λ θ)τ
1
1PFR
e
E TS t
e
−
− +
 
    
 
−
=
−
. (2.51) 
Figure 2.3 shows the dependences of 𝐸[𝑇𝑆1] и 𝐸[𝑇𝑆2] on the intermittent failure rate. 
As can be seen in Fig. 2.3, both mean times decrease as θ increases. 
Figure 2.4 (a, b) illustrates the dependences of 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5]/𝑡𝐼𝐹𝑅 (curve 1) and  𝐸[𝑇𝑆6] ∕
𝑡𝑃𝐹𝑅 (curve 2) on the permanent (a) and intermittent (b) failure rate. Figure 2.4 (a) clearly 
shows that 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5]/𝑡𝐼𝐹 decreases, and 𝐸[𝑇𝑆6] ∕ 𝑡𝑃𝐹 increases as λ increases. As can be seen 
in Fig. 2.4 (b), the dependence of 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5]/𝑡𝐼𝐹  и 𝐸[𝑇𝑆6] ∕ 𝑡𝑃𝐹 on θ is reversed. 
It should be noted that the sum of 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5]/𝑡𝐼𝐹  и 𝐸[𝑇𝑆6] ∕ 𝑡𝑃𝐹 is equal to unity for any 
combination of θ and λ, because the relations 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5]/𝑡𝐼𝐹 and 𝐸[𝑇𝑆6]/𝑡𝑃𝐹 determine a 
posteriori probabilities 𝑃𝐼𝐹 and 𝑃𝑃𝐹 that the LRU/LRM was removed from the aircraft either 
due to intermittent or permanent failure. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 2.3. Dependence of mean times 𝐸[𝑇𝑆1] (a) and 𝐸[𝑇𝑆2] (b) on the intermittent failure 
rate at τ = 5 h and λ = 1×10 -4 h-1 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2.4. Dependence of 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5]/𝑡𝐼𝐹 (curve 1) and  𝐸[𝑇𝑆6]/𝑡𝑃𝐹 (curve 2) on the permanent 
(a) and intermittent (b) failure rate at τ = 5 h, 𝑡𝐼𝐹 = 𝑡𝑃𝐹 = 1 h, θ = 1 × 10
-4 h-1 (a), and λ = 1 
× 10-4 h-1 (b) 
2.3.2. Mean time between unscheduled removals. By substituting 𝑇 = ∞ into the 
expression (2.22), we obtain the general formula to calculate MTBUR [4]: 
 
  ( ) ( )
( 1)τ ντ
0 ν 1τ (ν 1)τ
ντ ( 1)τ 1 τ ω(υ) υ.
k k
k k
E TBUR f z dz k F k d
+
= = −
 
   
 
= + + −    (2.52) 
At 𝑇 = ∞ from (2.23), we get 
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  ( )
λτ
λτ λτ
θτ θτ (λ θ)τ (λ θ)τ
τ 1 τ 1 1 1
1 τ τ
1 λ 1 1 1 λ
e
E TBUR e e
e e e e
−
− −
− − − + − +
  
     
   
−
= + − − − + −
− − − −
. (2.53) 
Figure 2.5 shows the dependence of MTBUR on the intermittent failure rate. By 
comparing Fig. 2.2 and 2.5 we can conclude, firstly, that MTBUR has a strong dependence 
on θ for both finite and infinite operation intervals, and secondly, MTBUR has a significant 
dependency on the length of the interval (0, T). 
 
 
Fig. 2.5. Dependence of MTBUR on the intermittent failure rate for T = ∞, τ = 4 h and  
λ = 1×10-4 h-1 
 
Indeed, 𝐸[𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑅] = 5,000 h for 𝑇 = ∞ and θ = 10−4h−1, and 𝐸[𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑅𝑇] =
3,200 h for 𝑇 = 5,000 h and θ = 10−4h−1. 
2.3.3. Operational reliability function. Substituting 𝑇 = ∞ into (2.32), (2.34), and 
(2.35), we obtain expressions for ORF and probabilities of LRU/LRM repairing due to 
intermittent and permanent failure at time jτ [11]: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ξ
0 τ
τ, τ τ υ ω υ υ,
k
R IF
j t j
R k t P j P k j d t k

= −
= −   , (2.54) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
ξ
ν 0 ( ν)τ
ντ ( ν)τ υ ω υ υ
j
IF R IF
j
PP j P j d
−
= −
= −  , (2.55) 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
ν 0 ( ν)τ
ντ1 ( ν 1)τ υ ω υ υ
j
PF R IF O
j
PP j P j d
−
= −
= − − −  . (2.56) 
By substituting 𝑇 = ∞ into (2.42)–(2.44) and performing the necessary mathematical 
transformations, we obtain the following formulas that are valid for the exponential failure 
distribution [11]: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
0
, τ exp θτ λ τ
k
R
j
R k t P j k j t j
=
  = − − + − ,                                     (2.57) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
1
θτ
ν 0
τ 1 ντ exp ν 1 θ ν λ τ
j
IF RP j e P j j
−
−
=
  = − − − − + − ,         (2.58) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
1
ν 0
τ 1 ντ exp ν 1 θ ν λ τ
j
PF RP j P j j
−
=
  = − − − − + − .                      (2.59) 
Example 2.2. Calculate (2.57)–(2.59) assuming that λ = 10-4 h-1, θ = 2×10-4 h-1, τ = 
5 h, and t = (k+1)τ in (2.57). 
Table. 2.1 presents the calculation results. 
Table 2.1. Calculated probabilities as a function of the flight number 
k PR(kτ) PIF(kτ) PPF(kτ) R[kτ, (k+1)τ] 
0 1.0 0 1.0 0.999500124979169 
1 0.001498875562289 0.000999000541458 0.000499875020831 0.999498252229370 
2 0.001498876161360 0.000999001140529 0.000499875020831 0.999500125577941 
3 0.001498874964116 0.000999000542057 0.000499874422059 0.999500124979169 
4 0.001498875562289 0.000999000541458 0.000499875020831 0.999500124979169 
5 0.001498875562289 0.000999000541458 0.000499875020831 0.999500124979169 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, all probabilities reach steady-state values beginning from 
the fourth flight. It should also be noted, that PIF is twice larger than PPF. 
Since the stochastic process of changing the LRU/LRM states is regenerative, then 
by the limiting theorem the following limits must exist: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) * * * *lim , 1 , lim , lim , lim .IF IF PF PF R Rk j j jR R k k P P j P P j P P j        → → → → = = = = +  (2.60) 
In the case of exponential failure distributions, the limits (2.60) take the following 
form: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) * λτ * θτ λτ * λτ * (λ+θ)τ1, , 1 , 1 .IF PF Re eR e P P e P e   − − − − −= − = == − −                (2.61) 
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The proof of the limits (2.61) follows from (2.42), (2.45) and (2.46) when 𝑇 = ∞. 
Indirect substantiation is the data given in Table 2.1. 
The limits (2.60) and (2.61) allow us to calculate the steady-state values of a series of 
maintenance effectiveness indicators. The average number of removals due to intermittent 
failures over time t (flight hours) is determined by the following formula [11]: 
 ( ) ( )
* τIF IFN t tP =  (2.62) 
The average number of removals due to permanent failures over time t is [11] 
 ( ) ( )
* τ τPF PFN t tP=  (2.63) 
The average total number of removals due to permanent and intermittent failures over 
time t is [11] 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
R R IF PFtN t P N t N t = = +  (2.64) 
The proofs of the relations (2.62)–(2.64) are omitted because of their obviousness. 
The average repair cost of a set of m LRUs over time t may be used as a cost-related 
indicator [11]: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )* * ,IF IF PF PF
mt
C t C P C P 

  = +  (2.65) 
where CIF and CPF are, respectively, the average cost of LRU/LRM repair due to intermittent 
and permanent failure. 
Example 2.3. Using (2.64) and (2.65), plot the dependencies of NR(t) and C(t) as 
functions of the intermittent failure rate θ at t = 40,000 h, λ = 10-4 h-1, τ = 5 h,  
CIF = $ 1,000 and CPF = $ 2,000. 
Figure 2.6 shows the graphs of these dependencies. As can be seen in Fig. 2.6, the 
average number of replacements and the average repair cost begin to increase significantly 
when θ > 10-4 h-1. Therefore, the following requirement related to the intermittent failure 
rate should be ensured when designing and operating the electronic avionics LRUs/LRMs: 
θ ≤ 10-4 h-1. Particular attention should be paid to the case of a high intermittent failure rate. 
So for θ = 10-2 h-1, the cost of repairing the dismantled LRUs/LRMs reaches $ 12×106, 
which is 50 times the repair cost for θ = 10-5 h-1. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 2.6. Dependencies of the average total number of removals (a) and the average repair 
cost over time t (b) on the rate of intermittent failures 
2.4. Maintenance effectiveness indicators of redundant avionics systems 
Most avionics systems comprise several identical LRUs/LRMs, and the system 
reliability is a function of the reliability of individual LRUs/LRMs. We assume further that 
LRU/LRM failures are statistically independent. Let us consider an active redundancy case, 
in which all m identical LRUs/LRMs are operational from the start of system operation. 
Avionics systems operate in an intermittent mode due to the alternation of flights and 
landings in airports. Such LRU/LRM maintenance operations as dismantling, mounting, and 
pre-flight inspection may be carried out during stops at the base or transit airports. 
Consequently, such LRU/LRM states as S3, S5, S6, and S7 are related only to maintenance, 
repair, and shipping costs and do not affect the probabilistic indicators of redundant avionics 
systems. Therefore, we introduce a new time axis associated only with the LRU/LRM states 
S1, S2, and S4, which assume LRUs/LRMs usage for their intended purpose. To determine 
the probabilistic effectiveness indicators, we are going to use the method of structure 
functions [12, 13], which is used to represent any probabilistic reliability indicator as a 
mathematical expectation of the corresponding structure function. 
2.4.1. The case of a parallel redundancy structure. In the case of a parallel 
redundancy structure, the steady-state availability and steady-state ORF are determined by 
the following formulas [4, 10]: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 41 1
m
A E TS E TS E TS E TS  = − − + + , (2.66) 
 
( ) ( )* *1 1
m
mR R   = − − . (2.67) 
The unavailability ?̅? and the probability of system failure in flight 𝑄𝑚
∗ (τ) are 
determined as the complementary events probabilities, i. e.: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 41
m
A E TS E TS E TS E TS  = − + + , (2.68) 
 
( ) ( )* *1
m
mQ R   = − . (2.69) 
Example 2.4. Calculation of the unavailability of a redundant avionics system as a function 
of the intermittent failure rate with the following initial data: m = 2, τ = 5 h, 𝐸[𝑇𝑆4] = 1 h 
and λ = 1×10-4 h-1. 
Figure 2.7 illustrates the unavailability dependence on the intermittent failure rate. As 
can be seen in Fig. 2.7, the unavailability begins to increase substantially when θ > 10-4 h-1. 
 
 
Fig. 2.7. Dependence of unavailability of the duplicated avionics system on the intermittent 
failure rate 
2.4.2. The case of a majority vote redundant structure k-out-of-m. With the 
majority structure of redundancy, the avionics system is operable if k-out-of-m LRUs/LRMs 
are operable, where 𝑘 > 𝑚 2.⁄  
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Using the method of structure functions, we determine availability and ORF [4, 5]: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 4 1 2 4
1
i m i
m
i k
m
i
E TS E TS
A
E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS
−
=
    
    
        
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+ + + +
, (2.70) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )* * *1
m i m i
m
i k
m
R R R
i
  
−
=
 
        
 
= − . (2.71) 
The unavailability and the probability of system failure in flight are determined as the 
complementary events probabilities. 
Parallel and majority redundancy structures of avionics systems are the most 
common. Among other structures of avionics systems, regarding reliability, parallel-series 
structure should also be specified. 
2.4.3. The case of a parallel-series structure. In this case, a non-redundant system 
consists of l multi-type LRUs, which form a series structure regarding reliability. A 
redundant system is a parallel connection of m series structures. Using the structure 
functions method, we derive the following expressions for the system steady-state 
availability and ORF during flight: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1,
1
1, 2, 4,
1 1
m
l
i
i
i i i
E TS
A
E TS E TS E TS=
 
 
 
  
= − −
+ +
, (2.72) 
 
( ) ( )* *
1
τ 1 1
m
l
m i
i
R R 
=
 
  
= − − . (2.73) 
In conclusion, it should be noted that formulas (2.67), (2.69), (2.71), and (2.73) have 
a known form for the probabilistic reliability indicators of redundant systems. At the same 
time, the formulas to calculate the ORF of LRUs/LRMs included in the indicated relations 
and calculated by (2.54), (2.57), (2.60), and (2.61) have been derived by the author and are 
new. Therefore, formulas (2.67), (2.69), (2.71), and (2.73) are given in this chapter only to 
show how to calculate the ORF of a redundant avionics system when the values of ORF for 
LRUs/LRMs are known. 
2.5. Warranty maintenance model of redundant avionics systems 
2.5.1. Analysis of warranty time-related indicators of avionics systems’ 
suppliers. Efficient operation of an aircraft is primarily determined by the proper regulation 
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of the relationship between an aircraft supplier (manufacturer) and aircraft operator (airline). 
The acutest problem faced in this relationship is during the warranty period, where the main 
cost for aircraft systems’ repair is borne by the supplier, i.e., the supplier will remedy the 
defect in a system free of charge and in a reasonable time, by either repairing or replacing 
the defective system. However, the aircraft buyer must purchase a sufficient number of spare 
LRUs/LRMs to ensure regularity of flights. The number of spare LRUs/LRMs depends on 
the selected warranty maintenance option (WMO). The selection of the optimal WMO for 
avionics systems depends on the following factors: 1) supplier’s warranty obligations; 2) 
operational reliability indicators; 3) whether the buyer has ground test equipment. 
Manufacturers and suppliers of avionics systems typically use the following warranty 
time-related indicators: warranty period (TW); guaranteed repair time (TRS); guaranteed 
expedited delivery time of a spare LRU/LRM (TED). Warranty time-related indicators have 
specific units of measurement. The warranty period is expressed in a calendar period (years, 
months) from the beginning of the warranty. The guaranteed repair time is measured in a 
calendar duration (days) from the beginning of repairs. The guaranteed expedited delivery 
time of a spare LRU/LRM is expressed in a calendar duration (days) from the claim date. 
Values of TW, TRS, and TED are specified in any contract for the supply of avionics systems. 
For example, one of the avionics manufacturers uses the following values of warranty time-
related indicators for its products: TW = 3 years, TRS = 15 days and TED = 5 days. 
The initial time-moments of accounting for warranty obligations are described as 
follows: 1) for TW, the date of official reception of the avionics system from the supplier 
(manufacturer); 2) for TRS, the date when the manufacturer is notified about the avionics 
system failure; 3) for TED, the date when the manufacturer should deliver a spare LRU/LRM 
to the buyer. 
The supplier’s warranty time-related indicators may be presented in other units of 
measurement. For example, if the avionics system has a 3-year warranty and the aircraft has 
an annual flight time of 2,000 hours, if necessary, the warranty period can be measured in 
hours, e. g. TW = 3 × 2,000 = 6,000 hours. In some cases, the length of the warranty period 
is specified separately in the calendar duration and flight hours. In such cases, the indicator 
TW is equal to the value that is achieved first. 
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2.5.2. Analysis of possible warranty maintenance options. During the warranty 
period, the buyer of the aircraft does not pay the failed LRUs/LRMs repair costs. However, 
he pays for spare LRUs/LRMs needed to ensure the regularity of flights. Therefore, the 
buyer must choose such WMO for which the total operating costs during the warranty period 
will be minimal. Possible WMOs may differ in the presence or absence of ground test 
equipment at the base airport and the values of TRS and TED. Presence of ground test 
equipment at the base airport allows testing the dismantled LRUs/LRMs and shipping to the 
manufacturer only the ones with confirmed failures. LRUs/LRMs with unconfirmed failures 
are sent to the warehouse and then installed in the aircraft on demand. The use of ground 
test equipment reduces the mean repair time of dismantled LRUs/LRMs and, consequently, 
reduces the number of spare LRUs/LRMs. 
The first WMO includes only O-level maintenance, where all dismantled 
LRUs/LRMs are shipped to the manufacturer for repair. The most significant cost measure 
for an aircraft buyer is the total expected cost of maintenance during the warranty period, 
which we will denote by WTEC (warranty total expected costs). WTEC is the total costs 
incurred by the buyer during the warranty period, which comprise the following two main 
components: the cost of dismantling and installing the LRUs/LRMs on board the aircraft 
during the warranty period and the cost of spare LRUs/LRMs recalculated per one aircraft. 
We denote the average costs associated with the first WMO as WTEC1. Evident that the cost 
of spare LRUs/LRMs has a significant impact on WTEC1. Since each LRU/LRM has a 
manufacturer’s warranty, it will be repaired free of charge in case of a failure. 
WTEC1 is determined as follows [5]: 
 1
( ) ( )O levelM R W LRU WWTEC m LC t N T PS US C N
−=   + +  , (2.74) 
where LC is the operational maintenance labour cost per hour ($ /h); 𝑁𝑅(𝑇𝑊) is the average 
number of unscheduled removals of LRUs/LRMs due to permanent and intermittent failures 
for time TW; PS is the planned number of spare LRUs/LRMs in the warehouse; US is the 
unplanned number of spare LRUs/LRMs that will need to be supplied from the manufacturer 
to ensure regularity of flights; 𝐶𝐿𝑅𝑈 is the cost of a spare LRU/LRM; NW is the number of 
aircraft under the supplier’s warranty. In equation (2.74), the warranty period TW is 
expressed in flight hours. 
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The average number of unscheduled removals of LRUs/LRMs due to permanent and 
intermittent failures during the period TW is calculated by (2.63), or by the following 
formula: 
 
( )
WR W W T
N T T E TBUR 
 
=
. (2.75) 
The second WMO assumes that ground test equipment is used at the base airport at 
the I-level maintenance to recheck the dismantled LRUs/LRMs. Since conventional test 
equipment cannot practically detect the presence of intermittent failures in dismantled 
LRUs/LRMs, such LRUs/LRMs are sent to the warehouse after testing. We denote the 
average costs associated with the second WMO as WTEC2. These costs include the 
following components: the cost of dismantling and mounting LRUs/LRMs on board aircraft 
during the warranty period; the cost of rechecking the dismantled LRUs/LRMs using ground 
test equipment; the cost of ground test equipment and the cost of spare LRUs/LRMs 
recalculated per one aircraft. 
WTEC2 is determined as follows [5]: 
( )2 ( ) ( )
I level
O level I level TE
M TE R W LRU WI level
W TE
N T
C
WTEC m LC t t PS US C N
N F
−
− −
−
=  + + + +

,   (2.76) 
where 𝑡𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 is the average LRU/LRM testing time using the ground test equipment at the 
I-level maintenance; 𝐹𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  is the number of LRU/LRM types that can be tested by the 
ground test equipment at the I-level maintenance; 𝐶𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙   is the cost of the ground test 
equipment used at the I-level maintenance. 
As seen from (2.74) and (2.76), WTEC1 and WTEC2 are the functions of the planned 
(PS) and unplanned (US) number of spare LRUs/LRMs in the warehouse at the base airport. 
The optimal number of spare LRUs/LRMs is determined by the following criterion: 
 ( )4 , 0,
O level
spare M stopE TS t PS US t t
−     = + − →  (2.77) 
which is a modification of the criterion proposed in [13]. 
We can see from (2.76) that if 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 ≥ 𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑃𝑆, 𝑈𝑆) + 𝑡𝑀
𝑂−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 , then no disruption 
of the regularity of flights will occur. In contrast, if 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 < ∆𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑃𝑆, 𝑈𝑆) + 𝑡𝑀
𝑂−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 , 
there will be a disruption of the flight regularity. Therefore, the optimal number of spare 
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LRUs/LRMs is the minimum possible number of LRUs/LRMs, which ensures that there are 
no delays in departures from the base airport. 
The mathematical relationships to calculate the waiting time for a spare LRU/LRM 
at the base airport are given in Appendix 2. 
Example 2.5. Calculation of the optimal number of spare LRUs/LRMs in the warehouse of 
the base airport with the following initial data: TW = 5,000 h; m = 3; 𝑡𝑀
𝑂−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 0.5 h; λ = 
1×10-4 h-1; TRS = 103 h; TED = 34 h; 𝑡𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 = 1 h. 
The dependence of the mean waiting time 𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒  on the number of planned spare 
LRUs/LRMs (PS) for the first WMO at 𝑁𝑊 = 10 is shown in Fig. 2.8 (a). Since the mean 
waiting time for a spare LRU/LRM does not exceed 0.5 h, 4 spare LRUs/LRMs are required 
for θ = 1×10-4 h-1 and 6 spare LRUs/LRMs for θ = 1×10-3 h-1. As can be seen in Fig. 2.8 (a), 
the mean waiting time 𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒  largely depends on the LRU/LRM intermittent failure rate. 
Figure 2.8 (b) shows the dependence of the optimal number of spare LRUs/LRMs on 
the number of aircraft for the 1st WMO. The following conclusions may be drawn from the 
analysis of Fig. 2.8 (b): the function 𝑃𝑆(𝑁𝑊) is an integer increasing function of 𝑁𝑊; an 
increase in the intermittent failure rate leads to a significant increase in the number of spare 
LRUs/LRMs (PS); the case when θ = 1×10-3 h-1 is more sensitive to the increase in the 
number of aircraft than the case when θ = 1×10-4 h-1. The latter circumstance indicates that 
a high intermittent failure rate has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the 1st WMO. 
Figure 2.9 (a) shows the dependence of the expected unplanned number of spare 
LRUs/LRMs (US) on the planned number of spare LRUs/LRMs (PS) for the 1st WMO. As 
seen, the US decreases rapidly as PS increases. Besides, the US is highly dependent on the 
expedited delivery time (TED). With a decrease of TED, US decreases as well. 
Let us suppose that the second WMO is used. Using formulas (A.2.3), (A.2.7) and 
(A.2.8), we calculate that E[TR] = 12.8 h, PIF = 0.905 and PPF = 0.095 for θ = 1×10
-3 h-1, and 
E[TR] = 73.5 h, PIF = 0.316 and PPF = 0.684 for θ =1×10
-4 h-1. 
Figure 2.9 (b) shows the dependence of unavailability on the number of spare 
LRUs/LRMs of a triple redundant avionics system for the 2nd WMO when m = 3, TW = 
5,000 h, NW = 10, τ = 4 h, λ = 1×10
-4h -1, TRS = 103 h, and TED = 34.3 h. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 2.8. Dependences of the mean waiting time on the number of planned spare 
LRUs/LRMs (PS) for the first WMO (a) and the number of spare LRUs/LRMs on the 
number of aircraft in the airline (b). Circles: θ = 1 × 10-4 h-1; squares: θ = 1×10-3 h-1 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 2.9. (a) Dependence of the expected unplanned number of spare LRUs/LRMs (US) on 
the planned number of spare LRUs/LRMs (PS) for the first WMO. Squares: TRS = TED = 
103 h; circles: TRS = 103 h and TED = 34.3 h. (b) Dependence of unavailability on the number 
of spare LRUs/LRMs for a triple redundant avionics system. Circles: θ = 1×10-4 h-1; squares: 
θ = 1×10-3 h-1 
As can be seen in Fig. 2.9 (b), with a high intermittent failure rate, more spare 
LRUs/LRMs are required to achieve the minimum possible unavailability. 
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The dependence of the mean waiting time (𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒) on the number of spare 
LRUs/LRMs (PS) for the second WMO when 𝑁𝑊 = 10 is shown in Fig. 2.10 (a). As can 
be seen in Fig. 2.10 (a), 𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒  has a much weaker dependence on the intermittent failure 
rate in comparison with the same dependence for the 1st WMO. 
The dependence of the number of spare LRUs/LRMs on the number of aircraft 
operated by the airline for the 2nd WMO is shown in Fig. 2.10 (b). As can be seen in Fig. 
2.10 (b), the optimal number of spare LRUs/LRMs is a little dependent on the intermittent 
failure rate. 
Moreover, for 𝑁𝑊 = 1, 2, 3, 7, … , 12, the number of spare LRUs/LRMs does not 
depend on θ at all. In addition, the optimal number of spare LRUs/LRMs is significantly 
lower for the 2nd WMO compared to the 1st WMO, especially in the case of a high rate of θ. 
Thus, with the use of ground test equipment to recheck dismantled LRUs/LRMs, the number 
of spare LRUs/LRMs needed to ensure flight regularity reduces. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 2.10. (a) Dependence of the waiting time (𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒) on the number of spare LRUs/LRMs 
(PS) for the 2nd WMO. Circles: θ = 1×10-4 h-1; squares:  
θ = 1×10-3 h-1. (b) Dependence of the number of spare LRUs/LRMs on the number of aircraft 
operated by the airline for the second WMO. Circles: θ = 1×10-4 h-1; squares: θ = 1×10-3 h-1 
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2.5.3. Choosing the optimal warranty maintenance option. Let us consider the 
problem of choosing the optimal WMO through the example of distance measuring 
equipment (DME). Optimal WMO should ensure the minimum value of the average buyer's 
costs during the warranty period, i. e.: 
 ( )min , 1,2opt iWTEC WTEC i= = .                                     (2.78) 
Modern wide-body aircraft, as a rule, have a duplicated DME system on board 
(m = 2). Suppose that the DME is used on board of a medium-range aircraft. The following 
parameter values are selected to compare the first and second WMO: 𝑁𝑊 = 10; TW = 
5,000 h; CLRU = $ 13,000; LC = $ 20; τ = 4 h; 𝑡𝑀
𝑂−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 0.5 h; λ = 1×10-4 h-1; tstop = 1 h; 
TRS = 103 h; TND = 34 h; tTE = 3 h; CTE = $ 23,000. 
The results of calculations for the first and second WMO are given in Tables 2.2 and 
2.3, respectively. 
As can be seen in Table 2.2, when θ = 10-3 h-1, WTEC1 is 40.5 % higher than for θ = 
10-4 h-1. Therefore, WTEC1 depends strongly on the intermittent failure rate θ. 
Table 2.2. Results of calculations for the first WMO 
Intermittent failure 
rate 
(h-1) 
MTBUR 
(h) 
The optimal 
number of 
spare LRUs 
(PS) 
WTEC1 
(USD ) 
Unavailability 
(?̅?) 
θ = 10−4 3,163 3 3,933 4 × 10-8 
θ = 10-3 907 5 6,612 4 × 10-8 
 
Table 2.3. Results of calculations for the second WMO 
Intermittent failure 
rate 
(h-1) 
MTBUR 
(h) 
The optimal 
number of 
spare LRUs 
(PS) 
WTEC2 
(USD ) 
Unavailability 
(?̅?) 
θ = 10−4 3,163 3 5,272 4 × 10-8 
θ = 10-3 907 3 5,836 4 × 10-8 
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On the contrary, as can be seen in Table 2.3, WTEC2 is less dependent on the 
intermittent failure rate θ. Also, the number of spare LRUs is the same for both low and high 
intermittent failure rate θ. This result may be explained by analysing the formulas (A.2.1) 
and (A.2.3). Indeed, when the intermittent failure rate increases, the rate of unscheduled 
removal of LRU λi,i+1 increases as well. In this case, the mean repair time of the removed 
LRU (M[TR]) reduces due to a decrease of the probability PPF. As a result, when ground test 
equipment is used to recheck the dismantled LRUs, the optimal number of spare LRUs may 
almost not dependent on the intermittent failure rate. 
2.6. Post-warranty maintenance model of redundant avionics systems 
2.6.1. Analysis of possible post-warranty maintenance options. Small or low-cost 
airlines with a small number of aircraft may not have enough money to implement O-, I- 
and D-level maintenance. Therefore, such airlines can eliminate I- and D-level maintenance 
and use only O-level. Heavy maintenance checks and routines can be transferred to 
specialized companies, the so-called repair stations. As noted in [14], U.S. airlines 
outsourced 71 % of heavy maintenance in 2008. Therefore, only the organizational level 
maintenance (O-level) is considered for the first PWMO. The first PWMO is simple for 
airlines but may turn to be very expensive. All LRUs/LRMs that are rejected by BITE in 
flight are shipped to the manufacturer for repair. In this case, the airline must have a 
relatively large number of spare LRUs/LRMs to ensure flight regularity. This PWMO 
implies that LRUs/LRMs delivered to the manufacturer will include units with permanent 
and intermittent failures. The airline will have to pay for repairing the LRUs/LRMs with 
both failure types. As the warranty period is over, the airline is obliged to pay LRU/LRM 
repair costs, transportation costs, labour costs, and the cost of spare LRUs/LRMs throughout 
the post-warranty period. Therefore, the integral maintenance cost indicator for the airline 
is the total expected maintenance cost during the post-warranty service life of the avionics 
system, which will be denoted as PWTEC (post-warranty total expected cost). PWTEC1 
comprises the following components for the first PWMO: the cost of dismantling and 
mounting LRUs/LRMs in the aircraft during the post-warranty period; the cost of shipping 
the dismantled LRUs/LRMs to the manufacturer and back; the cost of LRU/LRM repairs at 
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the manufacturer; the cost of spare LRUs/LRMs per aircraft. PWTEC1 is determined as 
follows: 
 ( )1 ( ) ,
O level
M TR IF IF PF PF R PW LRU PWPWTEC m LC t C C P C P N T C PS US N
−  =  + + + + +     (2.79) 
where 𝐶𝑇𝑅 is the average cost of LRU/LRM shipping to manufacturer and back; 𝐶𝐼𝐹 and 
𝐶𝑃𝐹 are, respectively, the average cost of repairing the LRU/LRM with intermittent and 
permanent failure at the manufacturer; 𝑇𝑃𝑊 is the post-warranty period expressed in flight 
hours; 𝑁𝑃𝑊 is the number of aircraft operated in the airline without warranty. 
Let’s consider three different options of a two-level maintenance system, which 
includes O- and I-levels. For the first option, the airline uses ground test equipment at the I-
level to recheck the dismantled LRUs/LRMs. After rechecking, the LRUs/LRMs with 
confirmed failures are shipped to the manufacturer or to repair station (in the case of 
outsourcing) for repair. LRUs/LRMs, whose failures have not been confirmed, are delivered 
to the warehouse of spare LRUs/LRMs. 
For this option of a two-level maintenance system, PWTEC2 includes the following 
cost components: the cost of O-level maintenance during the post-warranty period; the cost 
of re-checking the dismantled LRUs/LRMs using ground test equipment; the cost of 
shipping LRUs/LRMs with permanent failures to the manufacturer and back; the repair cost 
of failed LRUs/LRMs at the manufacturer; the cost of ground test equipment recalculated 
per one aircraft; the cost of spare LRUs/LRMs recalculated per one aircraft. 
The indicator PWTEC2 is determined as follows: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
.
( )O level I levelTR PF PF M TE R PW
I level I level
TE PW TE LRU PW
PWTEC m C C P LC t t N T
C N F C PS US N
− −
− −
 
 
= + + + +
 + +
 (2.80) 
In the second option of the two-level maintenance system, the I-level maintenance 
uses a ground ATE to recheck the dismantled LRUs/LRMs and detect the failure location 
with depth up to the faulty SRU. As noted in Chapter 1, conventional ATE is not capable of 
detecting intermittent failures. Therefore, dismantled LRUs/LRMs with intermittent failures 
after rechecking by ATE will be delivered to the warehouse of spare LRUs/LRMs. Repair 
of LRUs/LRMs with permanent failures is carried out by replacing the faulty SRUs. After 
identifying the faulty SRUs, they are shipped to the manufacturer or the repair station (in 
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the case of outsourcing) for repair. PWTEC3 indicator represents the sum of the following 
cost components: the cost of O-level maintenance during post-warranty period; the cost of 
rechecking the dismantled LRUs/LRMs using ATE and detection of the faulty SRUs; the 
cost of shipping the faulty SRUs to the manufacturer, as well as the repaired SRUs back to 
the airline; the cost of SRU repairs at the manufacturer; the cost of ATE and spare 
LRUs/LRMs and SRUs recalculated per one aircraft. 
PWTEC3 is defined as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
3 , , ,
1
,
O level I level I level
M ATE PF R PF D PF TR SRU R PW
n
I level I level
ATE PW ATE LRU j j PW
j
LC LC C N TPWTEC m t t C t P
C N F C PS US C SRU N
− − −
− −
=
  +

 

= + + + +
 + + +
 (2.81) 
where 𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 is the average time of rechecking the LRU/LRM using ATE at the I-level 
maintenance; 𝐶𝑃𝐹,𝑅 is the average cost of repairing the SRU with permanent failure; 𝑡𝑃𝐹,𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 
is the average time to detect a permanent failure in the dismantled LRU/LRM with depth to 
SRU using ATE; 𝐶𝑇𝑅,𝑆𝑅𝑈 is the average cost of shipping the faulty SRU to the manufacturer 
and back; 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 is the cost of ATE used at the I-level maintenance; 𝐹𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  is the number 
of LRUs that can be rechecked using ATE; 𝐶𝑗 is the cost of the j-th SRU (𝑗 = 1, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅); 𝑆𝑅𝑈𝑗 
is the number of spare SRUs of the j-th type; n is the number of SRU types in the examined 
LRU/LRM. 
The number of spare SRUs can be calculated from the condition of guaranteed 
provision of all LRUs/LRMs (on-board and spare) with spare SRUs at a high probability 
(0.95–0.99) [13]. In the case of the simplest flow of failures, the optimal number of spare 
SRUs of the j-th type is determined by the Poisson formula as the minimal integer number 
𝑆𝑅𝑈𝑗 satisfying the following inequality [13]: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( 1)
,
,
λ
1 exp λ
1 !
SRU
j
j j RS j
j j j RS j
j
t
P t
SRU
+

−   −
+
,                        (2.82)
 
where Η𝑗 = 𝑚𝑁𝑃𝑊 + 𝑃𝑆𝑗 + 𝑈𝑆𝑗 is the total number of SRUs of the j-th type installed on the 
on-board and spare LRUs/LRMs; 𝑃(Η𝑗) is the probability that all LRUs/LRMs will be 
provided with SRUs of the j-th type; λ𝑗 is the rate of permanent failures of j-th type SRUs; 
𝑡𝑅𝑆,𝑗 is the average repair time of the j-th type SRU at the manufacturer. 
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In the third option of the two-level maintenance system, both ATE and IFD are used 
at the I-level to recheck the dismantled LRUs/LRMs and detect faulty SRUs. The 
combination of ATE and IFD allows not only check the dismantled LRUs/SRUs for 
permanent and intermittent failures but also detect faulty SRUs. Repair of LRUs/LRMs with 
permanent and intermittent failures is performed by replacing the identified faulty SRUs. 
Further, the airline will ship the SRUs with detected permanent and intermittent failures to 
the manufacturer for repair. It should be noted that IFD can also be used to detect 
intermittent failures in SRUs with the depth up to non-repairable elements. 
The indicator PWTEC4 comprises the same cost components as PWTEC3, as well as 
the additional cost of IFD and operations to detect SRUs with intermittent failures, and is 
determined by the following formula [6]: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
4 , , , , ,
1
,
O level I level I level I level
M ATE PF R PF D PF IF R IF D IF TR SRU R PW
n
I level I level I level
ATE PW ATE IFD PW IFD LRU j j PW
j
LC LC N TPWTEC m t t C t P C LC t P C
C N F C N F C PS US C SRU N
− − − −
− − −
=
  +

 

= + + + + +  +
 +  + + +
 (2.83) 
where 𝐶𝐼𝐹,𝑅 is the average cost of the SRU repair due to intermittent failure at the 
manufacturer; 𝑡𝐼𝐹,𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 is the average time to detect the location of an intermittent failure in 
the dismantled LRU with depth up to SRU using IFD; 𝐶𝐼𝐹𝐷 is the IFD cost; 𝐹𝐼𝐹𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  is the 
number of LRU types that can be tested using IFD to detect intermittent failures. 
By analogy with (2.82), the optimal number of spare SRUs of the j-th type is 
determined as the minimal integer number 𝑆𝑅𝑈𝑗 satisfying the following inequality [6]: 
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λ θ
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 
 
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 
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   
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 +
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              (2.84)
 
where θ𝑗 is the intermittent failure rate of the j-th type SRU. 
Let's consider one of the possible options of realization of a three-level maintenance 
system, including O-, I- and D-level maintenance. As previously mentioned, D-level 
maintenance is carried out in specialized repair back-shops equipped with diagnostic tools 
capable of detecting faulty non-repairable electronic component or a group of elements in a 
printed circuit board (SRU) rejected at I-level. Maintenance at the D-level can function 
successfully if there is a sufficient number of spare non-repairable electronic components in 
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the relevant warehouse. The indicator PWTEC5 includes the following cost components: the 
cost of dismantling and mounting the LRUs/LRMs on-board the aircraft during the post-
warranty period; the cost of rechecking the dismantled LRUs/LRMs using ATE and 
identification of faulty SRUs at the I-level maintenance; the cost of diagnosing and repairing 
SRUs at the D-level maintenance; the cost of ATE, IFD, spare LRUs/LRMs, SRUs, and 
non-repairable electronic components recalculated per one aircraft. 
PWTEC5 is calculated using the following formula: 
 
( ) ( )
( )( )  ( )
( )
5 , , ,
, , ,
I level D level D levelO level I level
M ATE PFPF D PF D PF R
I levelI level D level D level I level
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D level D level
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= = =

 

+ + + + 
(2.85) 
where 𝑡𝑃𝐹,𝐷
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  is the average time to detect a permanent failure in the SRU with depth to 
one or more non-repairable electronic components and replace them at the D-level 
maintenance; 𝑡𝐼𝐹,𝐷
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  is the average time to detect an intermittent failure in the SRU with 
depth to one or more non-repairable electronic components and replace them at the D-level 
maintenance; 𝐶𝑃𝐹,𝑅
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  is the average cost of replaced non-repairable components when 
repairing the SRU with a permanent failure at the D-level maintenance; 𝐶𝐼𝐹,𝑅
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  is the 
average cost of replaced non-repairable components when repairing the SRU with an 
intermittent failure at the D-level maintenance; 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑇
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  is the cost of diagnostics and repair 
equipment used at the D-level maintenance; 𝑍𝐷𝑅𝑇
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  is the number of SRU types repaired 
at the D-level maintenance; 𝐶𝑙,𝑞 (𝑙 = 1, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑞 = 1, 𝑆𝑅𝑈𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) is the cost of a spare electronic 
component of the q-th type in the l-th SRU; 𝑋𝑙,𝑞 is the number of spare non-repairable 
components of the q-th type in the l-th SRU. 
To determine the optimal number of spare LRUs/LRMs, we will use the warehouse 
management model of LRUs/LRMs as shown in Fig. A.2.1. For all PWMOs, we calculate 
the rates λ𝑖,𝑖+1 and μ𝑖+1,𝑖  by formulas (A.2.1) and (A.2.2). However, the LRU/LRM average 
repair time (𝐸[𝑇𝑅]) is calculated using different formulas. So, for the 1
st and 2nd PWMO, 
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the indicator 𝐸[𝑇𝑅] is determined by (A.2.3), and for the 3rd PWMO - by the formula given 
below as it follows from (2.83): 
 , .
I level I level
R ATE PF D PFE T t t P
− −   = +                                              (2.86) 
Further, for the 4th and 5th PWMO, as it follows from (2.83) and (2.85), the indicator 
𝐸[𝑇𝑅] is determined by the following formula: 
 , , .
I level I level I level
R ATE PF D PF IF D IFE T t t P t P
− − −   = + +                                     (2.87) 
Since the 5th PWMO implies repairing the faulty SRUs at the D-level of maintenance, 
and not shipping them to the manufacturer for repair, the optimal number of spare SRUs is 
determined from the following inequality: 
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Let us calculate the optimal number of spare LRUs for different PWMOs when  
𝑇𝑃𝑊 = 40,000  h, 𝑁 = 10, m = 3, 𝑡𝑀
𝑂−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 0.5 h, 𝑡𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 3 h, 𝑡𝑃𝐹,𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =
𝑡𝐼𝐹,𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 2 h, λ = 1×10-4 h-1, TRS = 103 h, TND = 34 h, and 𝑡𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 = 1 h. 
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show the dependence of the optimal number of planned spare 
LRUs/LRMs on the number of aircraft owned by the airline from the 1st to the 5th PWMO, 
respectively. From a comparison of the graphs in Figs. 2.11 and 2.12 follows that the optimal 
number of spare LRUs/LRMs is significantly less for the 2nd and 3rd than for the 1st PWMO. 
Also, the optimal number of spare LRUs/LRMs for the 3rd PWMO is practically independent 
of the rate of intermittent failures. 
As can be seen in Fig. 2.12 (b), the number of spare LRUs/LRMs does not depend on 
the intermittent failure rate for 𝑁 = 1, 6 … 15. When 𝑁 = 2 … 5, the number of spare 
LRUs/LRMs for θ = 1×10-3 h-1 is twice larger than that for θ = 1×10-4 h-1. Regarding the 
dependences of 𝑃𝑆(𝑁) presented in Fig. 2.12 (a, b), we can observe that the 3rd PWMO is 
less sensitive to changes in the intermittent failure rate than the 4th and 5th PWMO. Besides, 
𝑃𝑆 = 1 when 𝑁 = 1,8̅̅ ̅̅  for both values of θ for the 3rd PWMO, and 𝑃𝑆 = 1 only when 𝑁 =
1,5̅̅ ̅̅  for the 4th and 5th PWMO. The latter is due to the fact that when θ > 0 the average repair 
time is longer for the 4th and 5th than for the 3rd PWMO. This conclusion can be drawn from 
a comparison of formulas (2.86) and (2.87). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 2.11. Dependence of the number of spare LRUs/LRMs on the number of aircraft for the 
1st (a) and 2nd (b) PWMO. Circles: θ = 1×10-4 h-1; squares: θ = 1×10-3 h-1 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 2.12. Dependence of the number of spare LRUs/LRMs on the number of aircraft for the 
3rd (a), 4th and 5th (b) PWMO. Circles: θ = 1×10-4 h-1; squares: θ = 1×10-3 h-1 
 
2.6.2. Choosing the optimal option of the post-warranty maintenance. The 
optimal PWMO should satisfy the following criterion: 
 ( )1,5min , .opt iPWTEC PWTEC i= =                                     (2.89) 
Let us consider an example of choosing the optimal PWMO for DME. Suppose, as 
before, that DME is used in a medium-range aircraft. The considered DME type has a 
modular design and comprises the following three SRUs: transmitter module (TM), receiver 
module (RM) and electronic power supply module (EPSM). The following parameter values 
are chosen to be the same for all compared PWMO: 𝑁 = 15; 𝑇𝑃𝑊 = 40,000 h; τ = 4 h; 
𝐶𝑇𝑅 = $ 120; 𝐶𝐿𝑅𝑈 = $ 13,000 ; 𝐿𝐶 = $ 20; 𝑡𝑀
𝑂−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 0.5 h; λ = 1 × 10−4 h−1; 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 =
1 h; 𝑇𝐸𝐷 = 34.3 h. For the first PWMO, we assume that 𝑇𝑅𝑆 = 103 h, 𝐶𝐼𝐹 = $ 1,300  and 
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𝐶𝑃𝐹 = $ 2,600. For the 1
st, 2nd and 3rd PWMO, we assume that θ = 1×10-4 h-1. The use of 
IFD in the repair of on-board electronic LRUs/LRMs allows the identification and 
replacement of electronic components and connections that cause intermittent failures. As 
noted in Chapter 1, the intermittent failure rate of LRUs, which have been repaired using 
IFD, is significantly reduced. Therefore, in further calculations, we assume that the 
intermittent failure rate is less by a factor of 10, i. e. θ = 1×10-5 h-1, for the 4th and 5th PWMO. 
For the 2nd PWMO, the parameter values related to ground ATE are the same as for the 2nd 
WMO, i. e. 𝐹𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 2, 𝑡𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 3 h and 𝐶𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = $ 23,000. The following data were 
used for the 3rd and 4th PWMO: 𝐹𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 10; 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = $ 200,000; 𝐹𝐼𝐹𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 50; 
𝐶𝐼𝐹𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = $ 150,000 ; 𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 0.5 h; 𝑡𝑃𝐹,𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 0.25 h; 𝑡𝐼𝐹,𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 0.5 h; 𝐶𝑃𝐹,𝑅 =
𝐶𝐼𝐹,𝑅 = $ 400 ; 𝐶𝑇𝑅,𝑆𝑅𝑈 = $ 70 . 
Table 2.4 shows the initial data for SRUs. The symbols in Table 3.4 denote the 
following parameters of the j-th (𝑗 = 1, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) SRU: λ𝑗 is the permanent failure rate; θ𝑗 is the 
intermittent failure rate; 𝐶𝑗 is the cost; 𝑡𝑅𝑆,𝑗 is the average repair time at the manufacturer. 
For the 3rd and 4th PWMO, 𝑡𝑅𝑆,𝑗 = 103 h. The average repair time of SRUs for the 5
th 
PWMO is included into (2.86). 
Table 2.4. SRU initial data 
SRU name λj (h
−1) θj (h
−1) Cj ($ ) 
TM (j = 1) 6.7 × 10-5 0.7 × 10-5 4700 
RM (j = 2) 2.3 × 10-5 0.2 × 10-5 7000 
EPSM (j = 3) 1 × 10-5 0.1 × 10-5 1300 
 
The following initial data relating to the D-level maintenance are used for the 
5th PWMO: ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑙,𝑞𝑋𝑙,𝑞 = $ 12,000 
𝑆𝑅𝑈,𝑙
𝑞=1
𝑛
𝑙=1 ; 𝐶𝑃𝐹,𝑅
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝐶𝑃𝐹,𝑅
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =$ 150; 𝑡𝑃𝐹,𝐷
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =
𝑡𝐼𝐹,𝐷
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 1 h; 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑇
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙= $ 200,000; 𝑍𝐷𝑅𝑇
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 250. The rest of the initial data have the 
same values as for the 3rd and 4th PWMO. 
Table 2.5 presents the calculation results. The unplanned number of spare LRUs (US) 
is zero for all PWMO. The number of spare SRUs (𝑆𝑅𝑈𝑗) was calculated for 𝑃(Η𝑗) =
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0.99 (𝑗 = 1,2,3). Using the inequalities (2.82), (2.84) and (2.88), we obtain that F1 = 2 and 
F2 = F3 = 1 for the 3
rd and 4th PWMO, and F1 = F2 = F3 = 1 for the 5
th PWMO. 
As follows from Table 2.5, the 5th PWMO has the smallest value of PWTEC. 
Therefore, the 5th PWMO is the best choice regarding the initial data used. Indeed, PWTEC5 
is 4.6 times less than PWTEC1 and over three times less than PWTEC2. 
Table 2.5. Calculation results 
PWMO 
(i) 
E[TBUR] 
(h) 
The optimal 
number of spare 
LRUs (PS) 
PWTECi 
($ ) 
Unavailability 
(?̅?) 
i = 1 5,000 3 35,880 4 × 10-8 
i = 2 5,000 2 25,380 4 × 10-8 
i = 3 5,000 1 10,400 4 × 10-8 
i = 4 8,982 1 10,200 4 × 10-8 
i = 5 8,982 1 7,778 4 × 10-8 
 
It should also be noted that the 3rd and 4th PWMO have almost the same PWTEC 
values, which are respectively 34 % and 31 % higher than PWTEC5. The 5
th PWMO requires 
the least number of spare parts, namely one LRU and one SRU of each type. 
2.7. Minimizing the total expected costs of avionics systems’ maintenance during 
the service life 
Consider the task of minimizing the total expected costs of a redundant avionics 
system, including m LRUs/LRMs, over its service life. The service life of any technical 
device is defined as the period from the beginning of its operation to the point of discard. 
We denote the avionics system service life as 𝑇𝐿𝑇. Obviously, the service life includes 
warranty and post-warranty periods. Therefore, 𝑇𝐿𝑇 can be defined in the following form: 
 
LT W PWT T T= + .                                                    (2.90) 
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In subsections 2.5 and 2.6, we analysed two WMOs and five PWMOs. In this way, 
theoretically, ten different combinations of maintenance options can be obtained for the 
entire service life. The combination of WMO and PWMO must satisfy the following 
criterion: 
  ( , ) ,min ; 1,2; 1,5i j opt i jTEC WTEC PWTEC i j= + = =                        2.91) 
where 𝑇𝐸𝐶(𝑖,𝑗)𝑜𝑝𝑡 is the minimum value of the total expected costs. 
Table 2.6 presents the calculated values of 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑗 for various combinations of 𝑊𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖 
and 𝑃𝑊𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑗. 
Table 2.6. Calculated values 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑗 
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑗  PWTEC1 PWTEC2 PWTEC3 PWTEC4 PWTEC5 
WTEC1 TEC1,1 = $ 39,813 TEC1,2 = $ 29,313 TEC1,3 = $ 14,333 TEC1,4 = $ 14,133 TEC1,5 = $ 11,711 
WTEC2 TEC2,1 = $ 41,152 TEC2,2 = $ 30,652 TEC2,3 = $ 15,672 TEC2,4 = $ 15,472 TEC2,5 = $ 13,050 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.6, the combination of the 1st WMO and the 5th PWMO is 
optimal. It should also be noted that the unavailability value is the same for all maintenance 
options. Therefore, option (1, 5) is indeed optimal. 
2.8. Conclusions 
1. A new mathematical model has been developed to evaluate the operational 
reliability indicators of continuously monitored LRUs/LRMs over a finite and an infinite 
time interval, which, unlike the known models, considers the impact of both permanent and 
intermittent failures. 
2. The generalized analytic expressions (2.4), (2.6), (2.11), (2.13), (2.22), (2.47)–
(2.50), and (2.52) have been developed for mean times spent by the LRU/LRM in different 
operating states in the case of an arbitrary distribution of operating time to permanent and 
intermittent failures over a finite and an infinite time intervals, which allows calculation of 
availability and MTBUR. 
3. The mathematical expressions (2.16)–(2.19), (2.23), (2.48)–(2.51) and (2.53) 
have been derived to calculate the mean times spent by the LRU/LRM in different states, 
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which are used to calculate the availability and MTBUR for cases of an exponential 
distribution of the operating time to permanent and intermittent failures over a finite and an 
infinite time interval. The numerical example shows that MTBUR decreases rapidly as the 
intermittent failure rate increases. 
4. The relations (2.32)–(2.35) and (2.54)–(2.56) have been proved, which allow 
determining the ORF and the probability of unscheduled repair of LRU/LRM for an 
arbitrary distribution of the operating time to permanent and intermittent failures over a 
finite and an infinite time interval. 
5. The relationships (2.42)–(2.44) and (2.57)–(2.59) have been derived to calculate 
the ORF and the probability of unscheduled LRU/LRM repair for an exponential 
distribution of the operating time to permanent and intermittent failures over a finite and an 
infinite time interval. 
6. The relationships (2.62)–(2.65) have been developed to calculate the average 
number of unscheduled removals due to permanent and intermittent failures and the average 
cost of LRU repairs during a specified period; the numerical examples show that the average 
number of unscheduled removals and the average cost of LRU/LRM repairs sharply increase 
when the intermittent failure rate exceeds 10-4 h-1. 
7. The relations (2.66), (2.68), (2.70), and (2.72) have been developed to calculate 
the availability of redundant avionics systems with a parallel, majority, and parallel-series 
redundancy structure, and an illustrative numerical example shows that the unavailability of 
a duplicated avionics system begins to increase sharply when the intermittent failure rate 
exceeds 10-4 h-1. 
8. The equations (2.74) and (2.76) have been developed to calculate the total 
operating costs during the warranty period for two WMOs that are distinguished by the 
presence or absence of ground test equipment at the I-level maintenance. A numerical 
example shows that the use of the test equipment can almost eliminate the harmful effect of 
intermittent failures on the number of spare LRUs/LRMs and maintenance costs. 
9. The generalized relations (2.79) - (2.81), (2.83) and (2.85) have been developed 
to calculate the average operating costs during the post-warranty period for five alternative 
maintenance options that differ by the existence of I- and D-level maintenance. A numerical 
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example shows that a three-level post-warranty maintenance system is optimal for the 
selected source data since it results in a minimum number of spare LRUs and SRUs, as well 
as minimum operating costs that are 4.6 times less than for a single-level maintenance 
system and over 30 % less than for any two-level maintenance system. 
10. The criterion (2.91) to minimize the total expected cost of avionics systems' 
maintenance during the service life has been formulated, which consists in a comparative 
analysis of all possible combinations of warranty and post-warranty maintenance options 
and the selection of such combination that provides the lowest expected maintenance cost. 
The numerical example shows that the combination of single-level warranty maintenance 
(O-level) and three-level post-warranty maintenance (O-, I- and D-levels) is optimal for the 
selected initial data. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
CONDITION-BASED MAINTENANCE MODELS OF DEGRADING SYSTEMS 
 
3.1. Statement of tasks 
As noted in Chapter 1, the goals of the CBM are to minimize the volume of heavy 
maintenance, increase aircraft availability, improve safety and reduce the cost of 
maintenance. To achieve these objectives, some tasks must be solved, among which the 
problems of determining the optimal time intervals for maintenance or replacement of 
equipment components subject to wear and degradation are the most relevant. 
The analysis of CBM models presented in Chapter 1 shows that the published 
maintenance models with imperfect inspections incorporate a decision rule, which is aimed 
to reject the systems that are inoperable at the time of condition monitoring. The drawback 
of this decision rule is the impossibility of rejecting the systems that may fail in the period 
before the next inspection time. Therefore, subsection 3.2 develops a mathematical model 
of CBM, which makes it possible to substantially reduce the probability of system failure in 
the interval between inspections due to the rejection of potentially unreliable systems. To 
achieve this effect, in addition to the functional failure threshold, a replacement threshold is 
introduced for each inspection time. A new decision rule is proposed for checking the system 
condition, which is based on comparing the time of the check with the time estimate to the 
pre-failure state. Following this decision rule, general expressions are derived to calculate 
the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions when checking system suitability, 
considering the results of previous inspections. The optimality criteria such as maximum net 
income, minimum Bayesian risk, maximum a posteriori probability, and minimum total 
error probability are used to determine optimal replacement thresholds. 
In subsection 3.3, a mathematical model is developed that allows simultaneously to 
determine the optimal inspection times and replacement thresholds for the case of imperfect 
inspections. The model is based on the properties of the regenerative stochastic process of 
changing the system states. When checking the system suitability, the same decision rule is 
used as in subsection 3.2. Conditional probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions are 
determined when checking the system suitability for failure-free operation in the 
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forthcoming time interval, which is necessary to calculate the mean time spent by the system 
in different states. We consider the system operation and maintenance over a finite time 
interval. The developed mathematical model supposes the use of both a sequential and 
periodic inspection schedule. The proposed criteria for optimizing the inspection schedule 
include maximum availability, minimum average costs when operating the system, and 
minimum average maintenance costs with a restriction on ORF. 
3.2. A mathematical model of CBM to determine the optimal replacement 
thresholds on an infinite interval of system operation 
3.2.1. The decision rule when checking the system suitability for use in the 
forthcoming interval of operation. This subsection considers a degrading system subjected 
to random failures. We assume that the system state parameter L(t), which is a non-stationary 
stochastic process with continuous time, completely identifies the system condition. The 
system is monitored at successive times tk (k = 1, 2, ...), where t0 = 0. If the system state 
parameter value exceeds the functional failure threshold FF, the system goes into a failed 
state. If there is a measurement error (or noise) Y(tk), the measurement result Z(tk) is related 
to the true value L(tk) as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )k k kZ t L t Y t= + . (3.1) 
Figure. 3.1 shows a typical realization of the stochastic process L(tk), measured at 
time points tk (𝑘 = 1, 𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ). 
 
Fig. 3.1. A realization of the stochastic process L(t) measured at times tk (k = 1, 2, ..., j) with 
an error yk having a PDF φ (yk) 
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We introduce the following decision rule when checking the system condition at time 
tk. If z(tk) < PFk, the system is judged as suitable for operation over the time interval (tk, tk+1); 
if z(tk) ≥ PFk the system is judged as unsuitable and excluded from operation over the time 
interval (tk, tk+1), where PFk (PFk < FF) is the replacement threshold at time tk. As PFk < FF, 
this decision rule is aimed to reject the systems that can fail over the time interval between 
inspections. 
With the introduced decision rule, two system repair or replacement strategies are 
possible. If PFk ≤ Z(tk) < FF, then a preventive repair or replacement of the system is carried 
out at time tk. If Z(tk) ≥ FF, then a corrective repair or replacement of the system is performed 
at time tk. We assume that any repair or replacement leads to a complete renewal of the 
system, i. e. the system becomes as good as new. 
3.2.2. The space of events. Regarding the system suitability for operation over the 
time interval (tk, tk+1), when checking the parameter L(t) at time tk, one of the following 
mutually exclusive events might occur [1]: 
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where Γ1(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) is the joint occurrence of the following events: the system is suitable 
for operation over the time interval (𝑡𝑘,𝑡𝑘+1) and is judged as suitable at inspection times 
𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; Γ2(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) is the joint occurrence of the following events: the system is suitable 
for operation over the time interval (𝑡𝑘,𝑡𝑘+1), is judged as suitable at inspection times 
(𝑡1,𝑡𝑘−1), and is judged as unsuitable at inspection time 𝑡𝑘; Γ3(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) is the joint 
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occurrence of the following events: the system is operable at inspection time 𝑡𝑘, fails within 
interval (𝑡𝑘,𝑡𝑘+1), and is judged as suitable at inspection times 𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; Γ4(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) is the 
joint occurrence of the following events: the system is operable at inspection time 𝑡𝑘, fails 
during interval (𝑡𝑘,𝑡𝑘+1), is judged as suitable at inspection times 𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, and is judged as 
unsuitable at inspection time 𝑡𝑘; Γ5(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) is the joint occurrence of the following 
events: the system has failed until inspection time 𝑡𝑘 and has been judged suitable at 
inspection times 𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; Γ6(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) is the joint occurrence of the following events: the 
system has failed until inspection time 𝑡𝑘, judged to be suitable at inspection times 𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
and unsuitable at time 𝑡𝑘. 
Figure 3.2 shows the graph of decision making when checking system suitability [2]. 
As can be seen in Fig. 3.2, the system can a priori be in one of the three states when checking 
the system suitability at time 𝑡𝑘: suitable with probability P(tk+1); operable but unsuitable 
with probability P(tk) – P(tk+1); inoperable with probability 1 – P(tk), where P(t) is the 
reliability function of the system. 
Let us determine the probabilities of the events (3.2)–(3.7). Assume that the random 
variable Η (Η ≥ 0) denotes the time to failure of the system with a failure PDF ω(η). 
 
 
Fig. 3.2. The graph of decision making when checking system suitability at time 𝑡𝑘 
 
We introduce two new random variables associated with the replacement threshold 
𝑃𝐹𝑘. Let Η0,𝑘 denote a random time of the system operation until it exceeds the replacement 
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threshold PFk by the parameter X(t), and let Η𝑘 denote a random assessment of Η0,𝑘 based 
on the results of inspection at time tk. Random variables Η, Η0,𝑘, and Η𝑘 are defined as the 
smallest roots of the following stochastic equations [3]: 
 ( )
0L t FF− = , (3.8) 
 ( )
0kL t PF− = , (3.9) 
 ( )
0k kZ t PF− = . (3.10) 
The following implies from the definition of the random variable Η𝑘 
 
( ) ( )
( )
, if 1,2,...
, if
k k k
k
k k k
t Z t PF k
t Z t PF
  
 
  
 =
 =
  . (3.11) 
Based on equation (3.11), the previously introduced decision rule can be converted to 
the following form: the system is judged to be suitable at the time point 𝑡𝑘 if η𝑘 > 𝑡𝑘; 
otherwise (i.e. if η𝑘 ≤ 𝑡𝑘), the system is judged to be unsuitable, where η𝑘 is the realization 
of Η𝑘 for the system under inspection. 
Equations (3.1) and (3.10) imply that Η𝑘 is a function of random variables 𝐿(𝑡𝑘), 
𝑌(𝑡𝑘), and the replacement threshold 𝑃𝐹𝑘. Presence of 𝑌(𝑡𝑘) in (3.10) leads to appearing a 
random measurement error of the time to failure at inspection time 𝑡𝑘, which is defined as 
follows: 
 , 1,2, ...k k k = − = . (3.12) 
Random variables Η (0 < Η < ∞) and Δ𝑘 (-∞ <  Δ𝑘 < ∞) have an additive relationship. 
Therefore, the random variable Η𝑘 is defined in a continuous range of values from -∞ to +∞. 
Mismatch between the solutions of equations (3.8) and (3.10) results in the appearance of 
one of the  following mutually exclusive events when checking suitability at time 𝑡𝑘 [3]: 
 
( )1 1 1 1
1
, ;
k
k k k i i
i
t t t t t+ +
=
  
  
  
 =     , (3.13) 
 
( )
1
2 1 1 1
1
, ;
k
k k k k k i i
i
t t t t t t
−
+ +
=
  
  
  
 =       , (3.14) 
 
( )3 1 1 1
1
, ;
k
k k k k i i
i
t t t t t t+ +
=
  
  
  
 =     , (3.15) 
 
( )
1
4 1 1 1
1
, ;
k
k k k k k k i i
i
t t t t t t t
−
+ +
=
  
  
  
 =       , (3.16) 
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( )5 1 1
1
, ;
k
k k k i i
i
t t t t t+
=
  
  
  
 =     , (3.17) 
 
( )
1
6 1 1
1
, ;
k
k k k k k i i
i
t t t t t t
−
+
=
  
  
  
 =       . (3.18) 
The events (3.13)–(3.18) are equivalent to the events (3.2)–(3.7). The events (3.2)–
(3.7) and (3.13)–(3.18) differ by the fact that the former are formulated on the spatial axis 
(vertical axis), and the latter — on the time axis (horizontal axis). Since reliability indicators 
are usually formulated regarding the events that occur on the time axis, then we will use 
(3.13)–(3.18) further when evaluating the operational reliability indicators. 
Equations (3.15) and (3.16) show that with regards to the system suitability over the 
time interval (𝑡𝑘,𝑡𝑘+1), the event Γ3(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) corresponds to an incorrect decision, while 
the event Γ4(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) — to the correct decision. When the event Γ3(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) occurs, 
the unsuitable system is mistakenly allowed to use over the time interval(𝑡𝑘,𝑡𝑘+1). It should 
be noted that in the case of the operability checking at time 𝑡𝑘, the events Γ3( 𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) 
and Γ4(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) are, respectively, match the correct and incorrect decision. This is the 
fundamental difference between the suitability and operability checking. So, the operability 
checking does not allow to reject potentially unreliable systems. 
Further, the event Γ2(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) is called a “false alarm” (“false positive”), and 
events Γ3(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) and Γ5(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) are called “missed detection 1” and “missed 
detection 2”, respectively. The events Γ1(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1), Γ4(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1), and Γ6(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) 
correspond to the correct decisions on the system suitability and unsuitability. 
It should be specially noted that even for 𝑌(𝑡𝑘) = 0 (𝑘 = 1, 2, … ), incorrect decisions 
are possible when checking system suitability. Indeed, if 𝑌(𝑡𝑘) = 0, then equations (3.13)–
(3.18) are converted to the following form: 
 
( )1 1 1 1 0,
1
, ;
k
k k k i i
i
t t t t t+ +
=
  
  
  
 =     , (3.19) 
 
( )
1
2 1 1 1 0, 0,
1
, ;
k
k k k k k i i
i
t t t t t t
−
+ +
=
  
  
  
 =       , (3.20) 
 
( )3 1 1 1 0,
1
, ;
k
k k k k i i
i
t t t t t t+ +
=
  
  
  
 =     , (3.21) 
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( )
1
4 1 1 1 0, 0,
1
, ;
k
k k k k k k i i
i
t t t t t t t
−
+ +
=
  
  
  
 =       , (3.22) 
 
( )5 1 1 Ø, ;k kt t t + = , (3.23) 
 
( )
1
6 1 1 0, 0,
1
, ;
k
k k k k k i i
i
t t t t t t
−
+
=
  
  
  
 =       , (3.24) 
where Ø denotes the impossible event. 
The errors arising at 𝑌(𝑡𝑘) = 0 are methodological in nature and non-removable with 
the decision rule used herein. 
3.2.3. The probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions when checking system 
suitability. Determination of the probabilities of the events (3.13) - (3.18) reduces to the 
calculation of the probability that the random point {Η, Η1, Η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } falls into the (𝑘 + 1)-
dimensional region formed by the limits of the variation of each random variable, and is 
equal to (𝑘 + 1) - fold integral over this region. 
We denote the joint PDF of the random variables {Η, Η1, Η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } as 𝜔0(η, η1, η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅). The 
event Γ1(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) corresponds to a (𝑘 + 1)-dimensional region with the following 
limits: 𝑡𝑘+1 ≤ Η < ∞ and 𝑡𝑖 < 𝛨𝑖 < ∞, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅̅. By integrating the PDF 𝜔0(η, η1, η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 
within the specified region, we determine the probability of the event Γ1(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) [3] 
 
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1, ; ... ω , ,
k k
k k k k
t t t
P t t t u u du du d 
+
  
+
 
 
 =    . (3.25) 
The event Γ2(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) corresponds to a (𝑘 + 1)-dimensional region with the 
limits: 𝑡𝑘+1 ≤ Η < ∞, −∞ < Η𝑘 ≤ 𝑡𝑘, and 𝑡𝑖 < 𝛨𝑖 < ∞, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑘 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . Integrating the PDF 
𝜔0(η, η1, η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) within the limits, we obtain the probability of the event Γ2(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) [3] 
 
( ) ( )
1 1 1
2 1 1 0 1 1, ; ... ω , ,
k
k k
t
k k k k
t t t
P t t t u u du du d 
+ −
  
+
−
 
 
 =     . (3.26) 
The event Γ3(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) corresponds to a (𝑘 + 1)-dimensional region with the 
following limits: 𝑡𝑘 ≤ Η < 𝑡𝑘+1 and 𝑡𝑖 < 𝛨𝑖 < ∞, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅̅. By integrating the PDF 
𝜔0(η, η1, η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) within the indicated limits, we obtain [3] 
 
( ) ( )
1
1
3 1 1 0 1 1, ; ... ω , ,
k
k k
t
k k k k
t t t
P t t t u u du du d 
+  
+
 
 
 =    . (3.27) 
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The event Γ4(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) corresponds to a (𝑘 + 1)-dimensional region with the 
following limits: 𝑡𝑘 ≤ Η < 𝑡𝑘+1, −∞ < Η𝑘 ≤ 𝑡𝑘, and 𝑡𝑖 < 𝛨𝑖 < ∞, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑘 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . By 
integrating the PDF 𝜔0(η, η1, η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) within the given limits, we obtain [3] 
 
( ) ( )
1
1 1
4 1 1 0 1 1, ; ... ω , ,
k k
k k
t t
k k k k
t t t
P t t t u u du du d 
+
−
 
+
−
 
 
 =     . (3.28) 
The event Γ5(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) corresponds to a (𝑘 + 1)-dimensional region with the 
following limits: 0 < Η ≤ 𝑡𝑘 and 𝑡𝑖 < 𝛨𝑖 < ∞, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅̅. By integrating the PDF 
𝜔0(η, η1, η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) within the corresponding limits, we obtain [3] 
 
( ) ( )
1
5 1 1 0 1 1
0
, ; ... ω , ,
k
k
t
k k k k
t t
P t t t u u du du d 
 
+
 
 
 =    . (3.29) 
The event Γ6(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1) corresponds to a (𝑘 + 1)-dimensional region with the 
following limits: 0 < Η ≤ 𝑡𝑘, −∞ < Η𝑘 ≤ 𝑡𝑘 , and 𝑡𝑖 < 𝛨𝑖 < ∞, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑘 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . By 
integrating the PDF 𝜔0(η, η1, η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) within the specified limits, we obtain [3] 
 
( ) ( )
1 1
6 1 1 0 1 1
0
ω, ; ... , ,
k k
k
t t
k k k k
t t
P t t t u u du du d 
−
 
+
−
 
 
 =     . (3.30) 
As seen from (3.25)–(3.30), to find the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions 
made when checking system suitability, the joint PDF ω0(η, η1, η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) of random variables 
Η, Η1, Η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  must be known. We denote the conditional PDF of random variables Δ1, Δ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  as 
ψ0(δ1, δ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|η) provided that Η =  η. Following the multiplication theorem of PDFs, we 
represent the PDF ω0(η, η1, η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) in the following form [4]: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 1ω η,η ,η ω η φ η ,η ηk k= , (3.31) 
where φ(η1, η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|η) is the conditional PDF of random variables Η1, Η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  provided that Η =  η. 
In the case of Η =  η, the random variables Η1, Η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are defined as 
Η1 = η + Δ1, Η𝑘 = η + Δ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 
By virtue of the additive relationship between random variables Η and Δ𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅̅) 
the following equality holds: 
 
( ) ( )1 0 1φ η ,η η ψ η η,η η ηk k= − − . (3.32) 
By substitution of (3.32) into (3.31), we obtain the following expression for the 
multidimensional PDF ω0(η, η1, η𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅): 
114 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 1ω η,η ,η ω η ψ η η,η η ηk k= − − . (3.33) 
The relation (3.33) makes it possible to simplify (3.25)–(3.30). Substituting (3.33) 
into (3.25) gives [3] 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1, ; ω ... ψ ,
k k
k k k k
t t t
P t t t u u du du d    
+
  
+
 
 
 = − −   . (3.34) 
Assuming that 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝜗 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅̅) in (3.34), we obtain: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1, ; ω ... ψ ,
k k
k k k k
t t t
P t t t g g dg dg d
 
  
+
  
+
− −
 
 
 =    . (3.35) 
By performing analogous changes of variables in (3.26)–(3.30), we obtain [3]: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
2 1 1 0 1 1, ; ω ... ψ ,
k
k k
t
k k k k
t t t
P t t t g g dg dg d

 
  
+ −
−  
+
− − −
 
 
 =     , (3.36) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
3 1 1 0 1 1, ; ω ... ψ ,
k
k k
t
k k k k
t t t
P t t t g g dg dg d
 
  
+  
+
− −
 
 
 =    , (3.37) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
4 1 1 0 1 1, ; ω ... ψ ,
k k
k k
t t
k k k k
t t t
P t t t g g dg dg d

 
  
+
−
−  
+
− − −
 
 
 =     , (3.38) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
5 1 1 0 1 1
0
, ; ω ... ψ ,
k
k
t
k k k k
t t
P t t t g g dg dg d
 
  
 
+
− −
 
 
 =    , (3.39) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
6 1 1 0 1 1
0
, ; ω ... ψ ,
k k
k
t t
k k k k
t t
P t t t g g dg dg d

 
  
−
−  
+
− − −
 
 
 =     . (3.40) 
As seen from (3.35)–(3.40), to calculate the probabilities of correct and incorrect 
decisions made when checking system suitability, the PDF ω(η) and ψ0 (δ1, δ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ |η) must be 
known. It should also be noted that formulas (3.35)–(3.40) are generalized, i. e. they can be 
used for any stochastic process 𝐿(𝑡). 
3.2.4. Determination of the optimal replacement threshold. The problem of 
determining the optimal replacement threshold 𝑃𝐹𝑘
𝑜𝑝𝑡
 at inspection time 𝑡𝑘(𝑘 = 1, 2, … ) 
depends on the chosen optimization criterion. Let us consider some optimization criteria. 
The maximum net income criterion is given by [3] 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 
1 1 1 1 4 1 1
2 1 1 6 1 1
3 1 1 5 1 1 ,
min , ; , ;
, ; , ;
, ; , ;
k
opt
k profit k k k k pr k k
PF
pr k k cr k ksp
uf k k k k
PF C t t P t t t C P t t t
C C P t t t C P t t t
C P t t t P t t t
+ + +
+ +
+ +
   
   
   
   
   
   
 −  −  −
+  −  −
 + 
 (3.41) 
where 𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 is the average profit per unit time of system operation; 𝐶𝑝𝑟 is the average cost 
of preventive replacement (repair) of the system; 𝐶𝑠𝑝 is the average cost of additional spare 
parts due to untimely preventive replacement (repair) of the system; 𝐶𝑐𝑟 is the average cost 
of corrective replacement (repair) of the system; 𝐶𝑢𝑓 is the average loss due to missed failure 
detection when checking the system suitability. 
The minimum Bayes risk criterion can be formulated as follows [3]: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 1 3 1 1 5 1 1min , ; , ; , ;
k
opt
k pr k k uf k k k ksp
PF
PF C C P t t t C P t t t P t t t+ + +          
 +  +  +  . (3.42) 
The criterion of minimum total error probability is represented as [5] 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 1 3 1 1 5 1 1min , ; , ; , ;
k
opt
k k k k k k k
PF
PF P t t t P t t t P t t t+ + +          
  +  +  .                   (3.43) 
The criterion of a given a posteriori probability of failure-free operation of the system 
in the forthcoming interval of time is represented in the following form [5]: 
 
 1
opt
k kk k APF P t t P+   = , (3.44) 
where 𝑃{Η > 𝑡𝑘+1|Η𝑘 > 𝑡𝑘} is the a posteriori probability of the system failure-free 
operation in the interval (𝑡𝑘,𝑡𝑘+1), under condition that at time 𝑡𝑘 the system was judged as 
suitable; 𝑃𝐴 is the minimum allowable value of the a posteriori probability of the system 
failure-free operation. 
The probability 𝑃{Η > 𝑡𝑘+1|Η𝑘 > 𝑡𝑘} is defined as the ratio of the probability 
𝑃{Γ1(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1)} to the sum of probabilities 𝑃{Γ1(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1)}, 𝑃{Γ3(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1)} and 
𝑃{Γ5(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1)}, i.e. 
 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 1 3 1 1 5 1
1
1
, ;
, ; , ; , ;
k k k
k k
k k k k k k
P t t t
P t
P t t t P t t
t
t P t t t
+
+
+
+ +
 
 
     + +
     

 =
 


  . (3.45) 
3.2.5. Model of the degradation process. Let us assume that a monotone stochastic 
function describes the process of degradation of a system 
 ( ) 0 1L t A At= + , (3.46) 
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where 𝐴0 is the initial random value of the system state parameter 𝐿(𝑡), defined in the range 
from 0 to FF; 𝐴1 is the random degradation rate of the system state parameter, defined in 
the interval from 0 to ∞. It should be noted that a linear model of the stochastic degradation 
process has been used in many other studies to describe the real physical deterioration 
processes. For example, a linear regression model is presented in [6] to describe the changes 
in the output voltage of the radar transmitter power supply over time. Also, a linear model 
was used to describe the corrosion strength function in [7]. 
Let us determine the conditional PDF ψ0(δ1, δ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|η) of the stochastic process 
described by equation (3.46). Let us prove that if the measurement errors 𝑌(𝑡1), 𝑌(𝑡𝑘)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are 
independent random variables, then [8] 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0
0 1 0 0
10
ψ δ ,δ η ω η + δ
η η ω η
k
FF k
k k i
i
FF a a FF da
f a a PF FF
=
    
    
     
−
=   −
−
 , (3.47) 
where 𝑓(𝑎0) is the PDF of the random variable 𝐴0; Ω(𝑦𝑖) is the PDF of the random variable 
𝑌(𝑡𝑖); 𝜔(η|𝑎0) is the conditional PDF of the random variable Η provided that 𝐴0 = 𝑎0. 
Since the random variables 𝑌(𝑡1), 𝑌(𝑡𝑘)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are independent, for the stochastic process 
(3.46) we can write: 
 
( ) ( )1 0 0
1
δ ,δ |η, δ |η,
k
k i
i
f a f a
=
= , (3.48) 
where 𝑓(δ1, δ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|η, 𝑎0) is the conditional PDF of random variables Δ1, Δ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  provided that Η =
η and 𝐴0 = 𝑎0. 
Denoting 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑌(𝑡𝑖) (𝑖 = 1, 2, …), we solve the stochastic equations 
 0 1A A FF+ = , (3.49) 
 0 1 +i i iA A Y PF+  =  (3.50) 
concerning variables Η and Η𝑖. As a result, we obtain 
 
0
1
FF A
A
−
 = , (3.51) 
 
0
1
i i
i
PF A Y
A
− −
 = . (3.52) 
By substituting (3.51) and (3.52) into (3.12), we obtain 
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 1
i i
i
PF Y FF
A
− −
 = . (3.53) 
By solving equation (3.49) concerning 𝐴1, we obtain 
 
0
1
FF A
A
−
=

. (3.54) 
Substitution of (3.54) into (3.53) gives 
 
( )
0
.
i i
i
PF Y FF
FF A
 − −
 =
−
 (3.55) 
For any values,  𝑌𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖, 𝐴0 = 𝑎0, and Η =  η, the random variable Δ𝑖 with the 
probability of unity has only one value. Therefore, the conditional PDF of random variables 
Δ1, Δ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  relative to 𝑌1, 𝑌𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝐴0, and Η is the Dirac delta function (𝛿𝑓): 
 
( )
( )
1 1 0
1
0
η
λ ,λ , ,η, δ δ
k
i i
k k f i
i
PF y FF
f y y a
FF a=
− −
= −
−
 
 
 
 (3.56) 
Using the chain rule for PDFs, we find the joint PDF of random variables Δ1, Δ𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 
𝑌1, 𝑌𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, Η, and 𝐴0 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0λ ,λ , , , η, , , η, δ ,δ , ,η,k k k k kf y y a f y y a f y y a=  (3.57) 
Considering (3.56), expression (3.57) transforms into the form 
 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 0 1 0
1
0
η
δ ,δ , , , η , , , η, δ δ
k
i i
k k k f i
i
PF y FF
f y y a f y y a
FF a=
− −
= −
−
 
 
 
. (3.58) 
Since random variables 𝑌1, 𝑌𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are assumed to be independent and do not depend on Η 
and 𝐴0, then 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 0 0
1
, ,η, ω η,
k
k i
i
f y y a a y
=
=  . (3.59) 
By substitution of (3.59) into (3.58), we obtain 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 0 0
1
0
η
δ ,δ , , , η, ω η, δ δ
k
i i
k k i f i
i
PF y FF
f y y a a y
FF a=
− −
=  −
−
 
 
 
. (3.60) 
By integrating (3.60) over the independent variables 𝑌1, 𝑌𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ gives 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 0 0
1
0
η
δ ,δ ,η, ω η, δ δ
k
i i
k f ii i
i
PF u FF
f a a u
FF a
du

= −
− −
=  − 
−
 
 
 
.          (3.61) 
Using the chain rule for PDFs, we define the joint PDF of random variables Η and 𝐴0 
as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0ω η, ω ηa f a a= . (3.62) 
Considering (3.62), expression (3.61) takes the form 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 0 0 0
1
0
η
δ ,δ ,η, ω η δ δ
k
i i
k f ii i
i
PF u FF
f a f a a u
FF a
du

= −
− −
=  − 
−
 
 
 
. (3.63) 
Let us analyse the integral under the product sign in (3.63). Considering the delta 
function properties, we can obtain the following equality: 
 
( )
( )
00
0
η
δ δ δ
η η
i i
f ii i i i
PF u FF a FFFF a
u PF FF
FF a
du

−
 
 
 
− − −−
 −  +
−
    
= −    
   
.   (3.64) 
Substituting (3.64) into (3.63) results in
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 001 0 0 0
1
δ ,δ ,η, ω η δ
η η
k i i
k k
i
a FFFF a
f a f a a PF FF
 
 
  =
−−
=  +
  
−  
  
. (3.65) 
By integrating the PDF (3.65) over the variable 𝑎0, we obtain 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 001 0 0 0
10
δ ,δ ,η ω η δ
η η
k
FF k
k i i
i
a FFFF a
f f a a PF FF da
=
 
 
 
−−
=  +
  
−  
  
. (3.66) 
Using the PDF chain rule, we have 
 
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 1ψ δ ,δ η δ ,δ ,η ω ηk kf= . (3.67) 
Finally, by substituting (3.66) in (3.67), we obtain (3.47). This completes the proof. 
In the absence of a replacement threshold, i. e. for 𝑃𝐹𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅̅), expression 
(3.47) is converted into the form [8]: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0
0 1 0 0
10
ψ δ ,δ η ω η δ
η η ω η
k
FF k
k i
i
FF a a da
f a a
FF
=
   
          
−
=  
−
 . 
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If the initial value of the system state parameter is considered almost identical for 
different systems, i. e. 𝐴0 = 𝑎0 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡, then (3.47) is converted into the form [3]: 
 
( ) ( )000 1
1
δ
ψ δ ,δ η
η η
k
k
i
k i
i
a FFFF a
PF FF
=
  
  
   
−−
=  + − . (3.68) 
For the case of normal distribution of the measurement error 𝑌𝑖  (𝑖 = 1, 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅̅) from (3.47) 
and (3.68), we obtain 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
0
0 1 0 0
0
2
0 0
2
1
η
1
ψ δ ,δ η ω η
σ 2π
δ1
exp ,
2σ η ω η
k
k
FF
k
y
k
i
i
i y
FF a
f a a
a FF da
PF FF
=
 
 
 
  
 
  
    
−

−
− + −
 
=  
   (3.69) 
( ) ( )
2
00
0 1 2
1η
1 δ1
ψ δ ,δ η exp
2σ ησ 2π
k
k
k
i
k i
i y
y
a FFFF a
PF FF
=
     
   
      
−−
− + −
 
= 
 
.    (3.70) 
Example 3.1. Assume the system state parameter is the output voltage of the radar 
transmitter power supply [6]. Let us assume that the random measurement error of the 
system state parameter has a normal distribution with zero mathematical expectation and 
standard deviation σ𝑦 = 1 kV . Let 𝑎0 = 20 kV, 𝐹𝐹 = 25 kV, and η = 450 h. It is required 
to plot a conditional PDF of the error in evaluating the operating time to failure. 
For 𝑘 = 1, from expression (3.70), we obtain 
 
( )
2
00
0 2η
1 δ1
ψ (δ η) exp
2σ ησ 2π y
y
a FFFF a
PF FF
     
   
      
−−
= − + −
 
 
 
. (3.71) 
Figure 3.3 (a) shows a plot for the conditional PDF of the measurement error of the 
operating time to failure at 𝑃𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹 = 25 kV. As can be seen in Fig. 3.3 (a), the conditional 
PDF of the random variable ∆ has a symmetric Gaussian distribution when 𝑃𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹. 
120 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 3.3. Plots of the conditional PDF of the error in evaluating the operating time to failure 
(a) and the PDF of the measurement error of the system state parameter (b) 
For comparison, Fig. 3.3 (b) shows a plot for the PDF of the measurement error of 
the system state parameter. By comparing the plots presented in Fig. 3.3 (a) and (b), we can 
see that both PDFs are of the same form, though the abscissa axis denotes the error in 
evaluating the time to failure for the PDF ψ0(δ|η) and the measurement error of the system 
state parameter for the PDF Ω(𝑦). Therefore, expressions (3.47), (3.68), (3.69) and (3.70) 
are used to convert the PDF of the measurement error of the system state parameter into the 
conditional PDF of the error in evaluating the operating time to failure. 
Figure 3.4 shows a 3D presentation of the conditional PDF ψ0(δ|η) when PF = FF, 
rendered in 3D Surface Plotter. As can be seen in Fig. 3.4, the conditional PDF ψ0(δ|η) 
flattens with an increase in the failure time η, which indicates an increase in the variance of 
the error in evaluating the operating time to failure. 
Figure 3.5 shows a 3D presentation of the conditional PDF ψ0(δ|η) when PF = 24 kV 
and FF = 25 kV. As can be seen in Fig. 3.5, the introduction of even a small anticipatory 
tolerance leads to a shift in the mathematical expectation of the PDF ψ0(δ|η) to the left, in 
the direction of negative errors in measuring the operating time to failure. It should also be 
noted that the greater the failure time η, the greater the shift to the left of the mathematical 
expectation of the conditional PRB ψ0(δ|η). 
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Fig. 3.4. A 3D presentation of the conditional PDF of the error in evaluating the operating 
time to failure as a function of arguments δ and η at PF = FF 
 
Fig. 3.5. A 3D presentation of the conditional PDF of the error in evaluating the time to 
failure as a function of arguments δ and η at PF = 24 kV and FF = 25 kV 
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So, for η = 100 h, the shift to the left equals 17.86 h, and for η = 400 h this shift is 
76.83 h, i. e. it increases by more than four times. The dominance of negative measurement 
errors increases the probability of a false alarm and reduces the probability of a missed 
detection when checking the system suitability. 
Figure 3.6 shows a 3D presentation of the conditional PDF of the error in evaluating 
the operating time to failure as a function of arguments σ𝑦 and η at δ = 50 h, PF = 24 kV 
and FF = 25 kV. The blue colour in Fig. 3.6 shows the region where, for an error δ = 50 h, 
the value of the PDF ψ0(δ|η) is practically zero. The boundary of this region is marked by 
a black line in Fig. 3.6. The ends of the black line in Fig. 3.6 correspond to the following 
coordinates: σ𝑦 = 1 kV and η = 88 h; σ𝑦 = 0.4 kV and η = 500 h. 
Analysis of the 3D images of the conditional PDF ψ0(δ|η) allows determining the 
requirements for the measurement accuracy of the system state parameter. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.6. A 3D presentation of the conditional PDF of the error in evaluating the time to 
failure as a function of arguments σ𝑦 and η for δ = 50 h, PF = 24 kV and FF = 25 kV 
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Therefore, considering the graph in Fig. 3.6, it can be said that the standard deviation 
of the measurement error should be at least 0.4 kV, i. e. σ𝑦 ≥ 0.4 kV. 
Let us determine the probabilities (3.35)–(3.40) when 𝐴0 = 𝑎0 in the stochastic 
process model (3.46). By substituting the PDF (3.68) into (3.35), we obtain 
 
( ) ( )
( )00
1 1 1
1
1
, ; ω
i
k
i
k k i i
it t
k
a FF gFF a
P t t t PF FF dg d

 
 
 
+
= −
+
           
−−
 =  + −  . (3.72) 
We introduce a new variable 
 
( )0 i
i i
a FF g
x PF FF

−
= + − . (3.73) 
Note that the new variable varies from 
( )( )0 k
i
a FF t
PF FF


− −
+ −  
to −∞. By substituting (3.73) into (3.72) and considering that 
( )
0i i
dg dx a FF= −  
after simple transformations, we obtain [3]: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
0
1
( )( )
1 1 1
1
, ; ω
i
i
k
a FF t
PF FF
k
k k i i
it
P t t t x dx d


 
+
− −
+ −

+
= −
 
  
   
  
 =   . (3.74) 
Performing similar transformations over the formulas (3.36) - (3.40), we find [3] 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
0
2 1 1
1 ( )( )
1
, ; ω
i
i
k
k k i i
i a FF tt
k PF FF
P t t t x dx d


 
 
+
= − −
+ + −
 
  
   
  
 =   , (3.75) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
0
1
( )( )
3 1 1
1
, ; ω
i
i
k
k
a FF t
PF FF
t k
k k i i
it
P t t t x dx d


 
+
− −
+ −
+
= −
 
  
   
  
 =   , (3.76) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
0
4 1 1
1 ( )( )
, ; ω
k
ik
i
t k
k k i i
i a FF tt
PF FF
P t t t x dx d


 
+ 
+
= − −
+ −
 
  
   
  
 =   , (3.77) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
0( )( )
5 1 1
10
, ; ω
i
i
k
a FF t
PF FF
t k
k k i i
i
P t t t x dx d


 
− −
+ −
+
= −
 
  
   
  
 =   , (3.78) 
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( ) ( ) ( )
0
6 1 1
1 ( )( )0
, ; ω
k
i
i
t k
k k i i
i a FF t
PF FF
P t t t x dx d


 

+
= − −
+ −
 
  
   
  
 =   . (3.79) 
It is easy to comprehend that the sum of (3.74)–(3.79) is equal to unity. 
Example 3.2. Suppose that a linear stochastic process describes the output voltage of 
the radar transmitter power supply (3.46), while 𝐴0 = 𝑎0 and A1 is a normal random 
variable. In this case, the PDF of the operating time to failure is given by [9]: 
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where 𝑚1 and σ1 are the mathematical expectation and standard deviation of the random 
variable A1. Assume that 𝑎0 = 19.645 kV, 𝑚1 = 0.025 kV/h, σ1 = 0.012 kV/h, σ𝑦 =
0.1 kV, and 𝑚𝑦 = 0, where 𝑚𝑦 is the mathematical expectation of 𝑌(𝑡). 
Let us determine the optimal thresholds 𝑃𝐹𝑘  (𝑘 = 1, 2, … ) when checking the power 
supply suitability at time points 𝑡𝑘 = 𝑘τ by the criterion of minimum total error probability 
(4.43), where 𝜏 = 100 h. Figure 3.7 (a) shows the dependence of the total error probability 
on the threshold 𝑃𝐹1 for 𝑘 = 1, 𝑡1 = 100 h, and 𝑡2 = 200 h. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 3.7. Dependence of the total error probability on the threshold 𝑃𝐹1 for 𝑘 = 1, 𝑡1 =
100 h, and 𝑡2 = 200 h (a), as well as on the threshold 𝑃𝐹2 for 𝑘 = 2, 𝑡2 = 200 h, 𝑡3 =
300 h, and 𝑃𝐹1 = 22.33 kV (b) 
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Figure 3.7 (b) shows the dependence of the total error probability on the threshold 
𝑃𝐹2 for 𝑘 = 2, 𝑡2 = 200 h, 𝑡3 = 300 h, and 𝑃𝐹1 = 22.33 kV. As can be seen in Fig. 3.7 (b), 
the optimal replacement threshold is 23.21 kV, which exceeds the 𝑃𝐹1 value by 0.88 kV. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the optimal PF threshold increases towards the FF 
threshold with an increase in the system operational time. 
Figure 3.8 shows the dependence of the optimal value of the replacement threshold 
from the moment of suitability checking 𝑡𝑘(𝑘 = 1,7̅̅ ̅̅ ). As can be seen in Fig. 3.8, the optimal 
replacement threshold increases with the time of inspection, which may be explained by the 
increase in the mathematical expectation of the stochastic process (4.46) with time. 
Table 3.1 gives the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions when checking the 
system suitability at the time 𝑡2 = 200 h and PF2 = FF for two values of the standard 
deviation σ𝑦, which differ by a factor of ten. 
 
 
Fig. 3.8. Dependence of the replacement threshold, optimal by the criterion of the minimum 
total error probability, from the time of inspection 𝑡𝑘(𝑘 = 1,7̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
 
Table 3.1. The probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions when system suitability at 
time t2 when PF2 = FF 
σy 
(kV) 
P{Γ1} P{ Γ2} P{ Γ3} P{ Γ4} 
 
P{ Γ5} 
 
P{ Γ6} 
 
Perror 
(PF2 = FF) 
1 0.260 0.0019 0.225 0.064 0.061 0.388 0.288 
0.1 0.262 0 0.282 0.00671 0 0.449 0.282 
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It should be noted that with PF2 = FF, the suitability checking turns into the 
operability checking. 
As can be seen in Table 3.1, the total error probability (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟) practically does not 
decrease with a 10-fold increase in the measurement accuracy of the system state parameter. 
Thus, at 𝑃𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹 the probabilities of incorrect decisions made when checking system 
suitability are non-zero even for a zero-measurement error. The main contribution to the 
total error probability gives the probability 𝑃{Γ3(𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑡3)}, i.e. the probability that the 
system being judged as suitable at inspection times 𝑡1и 𝑡2 then fails in the interval (𝑡2, 𝑡3). 
Table 3.2 gives the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made when 
checking system suitability at time 𝑡2 = 200 h and 𝑃𝐹2 = 𝑃𝐹2
𝑜𝑝𝑡
 for the same values of the 
standard deviation σ𝑦 as in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.2. The probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made when checking 
system suitability at time t2 when 𝑃𝐹2 = 𝑃𝐹2
𝑜𝑝𝑡
 
σy 
(kV) 
P{Γ1} P{Γ2} P{Γ3} P{Γ4} P{ Γ5} P{ Γ6} 
Perror 
( )2optPF  
1 0.203 0.059 0.046 0.243 0.00043 0.448 0.105 
0.1 0.257 0.0052 0.0061 0.282 0 0.45 0.0113 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.2, in the case of 𝑃𝐹2 = 𝑃𝐹2
𝑜𝑝𝑡
 , the probabilities of incorrect 
decisions 𝑃{Γ2(𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑡3)} and 𝑃{Γ3(𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑡3)} decrease by 11.3 and 7.5 times, respectively, 
with σ𝑦 decreasing by 10 times, while the probability 𝑃{Γ5(𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑡3)} decreases almost to 
zero. 
By comparing Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the following conclusions may be drawn: firstly, 
when introducing the optimal replacement threshold, the probability 𝑃{Γ3(𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑡3)} 
decreases by 5 and 46 times for the corresponding values of σ𝑦. Secondly, the probability 
of a false alarm 𝑃{Γ2(𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑡3)} increases by 31 times. Thirdly, the effect of decreasing the 
probability 𝑃{Γ3(𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑡3)} significantly exceeds the effect of increasing the probability 
𝑃{Γ2(𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑡3)}, which ultimately reduces the total error probability 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟. Fourthly, the 
127 
 
probability 𝑃{Γ4(𝑡1, 𝑡2; 𝑡3)} increases almost fourfold, which is equivalent to an increase in 
the corresponding number of times the probability of the predicted failures. 
Example 3.3. For the conditions of Example 3.2, determine the optimal values of the 
replacement thresholds by the criterion of a given a posteriori probability of the system's 
failure-free operation in the upcoming time interval (3.44). Let the given value of the a 
posteriori probability of the system failure-free operation is 𝑃𝐴 = 0,95 . 
Figures 3.9 (a) and (b) show the dependences of the a posteriori probability of failure-
free operation on the replacement threshold value for the first and seventh operation interval, 
respectively. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 3.9. Dependences of the a posteriori probability of failure-free operation on the 
replacement threshold value for the first (𝑡1, 𝑡2) (a) and seventh (𝑡7, 𝑡8) (b) system operation 
intervals 
 
As can be seen in Fig. 3.9, the replacement threshold increases with increasing number 
of the operational interval. Thus, for the inspection times 𝑡1 = 100 h and 𝑡7 = 700 h, the 
values of the replacement thresholds, providing 𝑃𝐴 = 0.95 for the intervals (𝑡1, 𝑡2) and 
(𝑡7, 𝑡8), are respectively 𝑃𝐹1 = 21.95 kV and 𝑃𝐹7 = 24.23 kV. 
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Figure 3.10 shows the dependence of the replacement threshold, optimal on the 
criterion of the given a posteriori probability, from the inspection time 𝑡𝑘(𝑘 = 1,7̅̅ ̅̅ ). As can 
be seen in Fig. 3.10, the character of the dependence of the optimal replacement threshold 
from the time-point of suitability checking is the same as in Fig. 3.8. However, all the points 
in Fig. 3.10 lie below the corresponding points in Fig. 3.8, which indicates a wider 
anticipatory tolerance in the case of using the criterion of a given a posteriori probability. 
 
 
Fig. 3.10. Dependence of the replacement threshold, optimal by the criterion of a given a 
posteriori probability, from the time of inspection 𝑡𝑘(𝑘 = 1,7̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
3.3. A mathematical model of CBM for determining the optimal replacement 
thresholds and the inspection times on a finite interval of system operation 
This section discusses the task of determining the optimal inspection schedule for the 
system, which is subject to gradual failures. Gradual failures are caused by internal 
degradation of the system, which can be detected by instrumental inspections. A 
mathematical model of condition monitoring with imperfect inspections and perfect repairs 
is proposed based on a regenerative process of system state changes. The system inspection 
consists in measuring the state parameter and comparing its value with the replacement 
threshold. 
3.3.1. Inspection policy. Let us assume that the operation of the new system begins 
at time 𝑡0, and sequential inspections are scheduled at times 𝑡1 < 𝑡2 < ⋯ 𝑡𝑀 < 𝑇, where T 
is the interval of the system operating time for which the condition monitoring is planned.  
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When checking the system suitability at time 𝑡𝑘 (𝑘 = 1, 𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ), the following decisions 
are possible: 
• if the system is judged as suitable, then it is permitted for use during the operating 
interval (𝑡𝑘 , 𝑡𝑘+1); 
• if the system is judged as unsuitable, then it is repaired and permitted for use during 
the operating interval (𝑡0, 𝑡1). 
In the case of periodic inspections, the interval T is divided equally into M + 1 sub-
intervals, and the system is inspected at times 𝑘τ (𝑘 = 1, 𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ), where 𝑀 = 𝑇 τ⁄ − 1. 
3.3.2. The space of system states. To determine the condition-based maintenance 
effectiveness indicators, we are going to use the well-known property of regenerative 
stochastic processes [10], according to which the fraction of time the system remains in the 
state 𝑆𝑖 is the ratio of the mean time spent in the state 𝑆𝑖 during the regeneration cycle to the 
average duration of this cycle. The process of system operation will be considered as a 
sequence of different states over a finite time interval T. Therefore, as in Section 2, the 
system behaviour over the time interval (0, T) will be described using a finite-state stochastic 
process S(t). The process S(t) includes the following states: 𝑆1if the system is used for its 
intended purpose and is in the operable state at time t; 𝑆2 if the system is not used for its 
intended purpose and is in the inoperable state (unrevealed failure) at time t; 𝑆3 if the system 
is not used for its intended purpose because a scheduled suitability checking is carried out 
at time t; 𝑆4 if the system is not used for its intended purpose at time t and preventive 
maintenance is performed, since a “false alarm” event (3.14) or a “true negative 1” event 
(3.16) occurred at the last suitability checking; 𝑆5 if the system is not used for its intended 
purpose at time t and corrective repair is performed, since a “true negative 2” event (3.18) 
occurred at the last suitability checking. 
We denote the time spent by the system in the state 𝑆𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,5̅̅ ̅̅ ) by 𝑇𝑆𝑖. It is evident 
that 𝑇𝑆𝑖 is a random variable with the expected mean time 𝐸[𝑇𝑆𝑖]. Since the process of state 
changes is regenerative, the system becomes as good as new after repairing in the state 𝑆4 
or 𝑆5. Therefore, the average duration of the regeneration cycle is [4] 
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3.3.3. Conditional probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made when 
checking the system suitability. Let us consider the conditional probabilities of correct and 
incorrect decisions made when checking the system suitability, which are necessary to 
determine the expected mean times 𝐸[𝑇𝑆1], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. Suppose that the gradual failure of the 
system occurs at time η, where 𝑡𝑘 < η ≤ 𝑡𝑘+1 (𝑘 = 0, 𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). To determine the conditional 
probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions, we use the time axis shown in Fig. 3.11, 
which demonstrates the location of inspection times 𝑡1, 𝑡𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and gradual failure time η. 
 
 
Fig. 3.11. The time-location of suitability checks 𝑡1, 𝑡𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and gradual failure η 
 
The conditional probability of a “false alarm” when checking the system suitability 
at the time 𝑡𝑛 (𝑛 = 1, 𝑘 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) can be defined as follows: 
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The conditional probability that operable system is correctly judged as unsuitable 
(“true negative 1”) when inspecting the system at the time 𝑡𝑘  (𝑘 = 1, 𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is formulated as 
follows: 
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The conditional probability of the “missed detection 1” event when checking the 
system suitability at the time 𝑡𝑘  (𝑘 = 1, 𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) can be defined as follows: 
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The conditional probability that the system is correctly judged as suitable (“true 
positive”) when inspecting the system at the time 𝑡𝑛 (𝑛 = 1, 𝑘 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is formulated as follows: 
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The conditional probability that inoperable system is judged as unsuitable (“true 
negative 2”) when inspecting the system at the time 𝑡𝑗  (𝑗 = 𝑘 + 1, 𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) is formulated as 
follows: 
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The conditional probability of the “missed detection 2” event when checking the 
system suitability at the time 𝑡𝑗  (𝑗 = 𝑘 + 1, 𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) can be defined as follows: 
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As in subsection 3.2.3, the determination of each of the conditional probabilities 
(3.82) - (3.87) reduces to the calculation of the probability of the random point {Δ1, Δ𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } 
hitting into the m-dimensional region formed by the limits of the variation of each random 
variable, and is equal to the m-fold integral over this region from the PDF ψ0(δ1, δ𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ |η). 
The conditional probability of the “false alarm” at time 𝑡𝑛 (𝑛 = 1, 𝑘 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) corresponds 
to the 𝑛-dimensional region with the following limits: −∞ < Δ𝑛 ≤ 𝑡𝑛 − η and 
𝑡𝑙 − η ≤ Δ𝑙 < ∞ (𝑙 = 1, 𝑛 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). By integrating the PDF ψ0(δ1, δ𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|η) over the indicated 
limits, we obtain [4]: 
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The conditional probability of the “true negative 1” at time 𝑡𝑘 (𝑘 = 1, 𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) corresponds 
to the 𝑘-dimensional region with the following limits: −∞ < Δ𝑘 ≤ 𝑡𝑘 − η and 
𝑡𝑖 − η ≤ Δ𝑖 < ∞ (𝑖 = 1, 𝑘 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). By integrating the PDF ψ0(δ1, δ𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|η) over the indicated 
limits, we obtain [4]: 
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The conditional probability of the “missed detection 1” at time 𝑡𝑘 (𝑘 = 1, 𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 
corresponds to the 𝑘-dimensional region with the following limits: 𝑡𝑖 − η ≤ Δ𝑖 < ∞ (𝑖 =
1, 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅̅). By integrating the PDF ψ0(δ1, δ𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|η) over the indicated limits, we have [4]: 
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The conditional probability of the “true positive” at time 𝑡𝑛 (𝑛 = 1, 𝑘 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
corresponds to the 𝑛-dimensional region with the following limits: 𝑡𝑙 − η ≤ Δ𝑙 < ∞ (𝑙 =
1, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅). By integrating the PDF ψ0(δ1, δ𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|η) over the indicated limits, we obtain [4]: 
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The conditional probability of the “true negative 2” at time 𝑡𝑗 (𝑗 = 𝑘 + 1, 𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 
corresponds to the 𝑗-dimensional region with the following limits: −∞ < Δ𝑗 ≤ 𝑡𝑗 − η and 
𝑡𝑖 − η ≤ Δ𝑖 < ∞ (𝑖 = 1, 𝑗 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅). By integrating the PDF ψ0(δ1, δ𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|η) over the indicated 
limits, we get [4]: 
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The conditional probability of the “missed detection 2” at time 𝑡𝑗 (𝑗 = 𝑘 + 1, 𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 
corresponds to the 𝑗-dimensional region with the following limits: 𝑡𝑖 − η ≤ Δ𝑖 <
∞ (𝑖 = 1, 𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ). By integrating the PDF ψ0(δ1, δ𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅|η) over the indicated limits, we obtain [4]: 
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3.3.4. Mean time of staying the system in different states. Let us determine the 
expected mean times 𝐸[𝑇𝑆1], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. Using Fig. 3.11, we determine the conditional 
mathematical expectation of the time the system spends in the state S1, provided that Η = η 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
,1 ,1 1
1
1
1
η η η η ,if η ,
η
η η f ., i η
k
n FA n k TN k MD k k k
n
M
k FA k TP M
k
t P t t P t P t t t
E TS
t P t TP t T
−
+
=
=


   


+ +  
=
+ 
 (3.94) 
By applying the formula of the total mathematical expectation of a continuous random 
variable (2.8) to (3.94), we obtain [4]: 
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The conditional mathematical expectation of the time spent by the system in the state 
S2 provided that Η = η is determined from the analysis of Fig. 3.11 as follows: 
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By applying the formula of the total mathematical expectation of a continuous random 
variable (2.8) to (3.96), we obtain [4]: 
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From the analysis of Fig. 3.11 it follows that the conditional mathematical expectation 
of the time spent by the system in the state S3 under the condition that Η =  η is equal to 
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where 𝑡𝑆𝐶 is the average duration of the system suitability checking. 
By applying the formula of the total mathematical expectation of a continuous random 
variable (2.8) to (3.98), we obtain [4]: 
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On the base of Fig. 3.11, we determine the conditional mathematical expectation of 
the time spent by the system in the state S4, provided that Η =  η 
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where  𝑡𝑃𝑅 is the average duration of preventive maintenance. 
By applying the formula of the total mathematical expectation of a continuous random 
variable (2.8) to (3.100), we obtain [4]: 
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The conditional mathematical expectation of the time spent by the system in the state 
S2 provided that Η =  η is determined from the analysis of Fig. 3.11 as follows: 
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where 𝑡𝐶𝑅 is the average duration of corrective maintenance. 
By applying the formula of the total mathematical expectation of a continuous random 
variable (2.8) to (3.102), we get [4]: 
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In the case of a periodic inspection schedule, the mean times 𝐸[𝑇𝑆1], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5] are 
determined by the following formulas: 
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3.3.5. The effectiveness indicators of CBM based on suitability checking. The 
typically used CBM effectiveness indicators are availability, average maintenance costs and 
ORF. 
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As in Chapter 2, we determine the availability by the formula (2.20). However, the 
mean times 𝐸[𝑇𝑆1], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are calculated using the formulas (3.95), (3.97), (3.99), (3.101), 
and (3.103) in the case of a sequential inspection schedule or using the formulas (3.104)–
(3.108) in the case of a periodic inspection schedule. 
Average system operation costs per unit time are given by [4]: 
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where 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑀,1 are the system operation costs per unit time; 𝐶𝐿𝐹 are the losses per unit time 
due to the system stay in the failed state; 𝐶𝑆𝐶 is the cost of system inspection per unit time; 
𝐶𝑃𝑅 is the cost of preventive repair per unit time;; 𝐶𝐶𝑅 is the cost of corrective repair per 
unit time. 
Average system operation costs over a time interval (0, T) is 
 ,1 ,1
T
CBM CBME C T E C      =  , (3.110) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑀,1
𝑇  are the system operation costs in the interval (0, T). 
As in Chapter 2 for the safety-critical systems, we will use ORF 𝑅(𝑡𝑘 , 𝑡) as the 
primary maintenance effectiveness indicator, and as an additional indicator, the average 
system maintenance costs 𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑀,2
𝑇 ] over time T, which is determined by the following 
formulas: 
 
 ,2 3 4 5
0
1
CBM SC PR CRE C C E TS C E TS C E TS
E TS
       
        
 
= + + , (3.111) 
 ,2 ,2
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From a comparison of formulas (3.109) and (3.111) it is clear that in (3.111) the 
coefficient 𝐶𝐿𝐹 is zero. This is because, for systems that affect safety, it is usually not 
possible to quantify the consequences of failures, so the indicator 𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑀,2
𝑇 ] does not include 
losses due to the system being in an inoperable state. 
When using CBM, under ORF we understand the probability that the system will not 
fail in the interval (𝑡𝑘, 𝑡), 𝑡𝑘 < 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑘+1, considering that at time points (𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘) the 
suitability checks and, if necessary the repairs, are carried out. On the finite operating time 
interval (0, T), ORF is determined as follows [11]: 
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where 𝑃𝑅(𝑡𝑗) is the probability of the system repair at the time 𝑡𝑗; 𝑃𝑃𝑅(𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗) is the 
probability of the system preventive repair at the time 𝑡𝑗 due to the occurrence of the event 
(3.14); 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑡ℎ𝑒 (𝑡𝑗) is the probability of the system corrective repair at the time 𝑡𝑗 due to the 
occurrence of the event (3.16) or (3.18). 
The proof of (3.113) - (3.116) we begin with expression (3.114). Let us introduce the 
following events: 𝑊(𝑡𝑗) is the event of the system being repaired at the time  𝑡𝑗 after the j-
th inspection; 𝑊𝑃𝑅(𝑡𝑗) and 𝑊𝐶𝑅(𝑡𝑗) are the events of the preventive and corrective system 
repair, respectively. The system will be repaired at the time 𝑡𝑗 if one of the events 𝑊𝑃𝑅(𝑡𝑗) 
or 𝑊𝐶𝑅(𝑡𝑗) occurs. Consequently, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )j PR j CR jt t tW W W= + . (3.117) 
Events 𝑊𝑃𝑅(𝑡𝑗) and 𝑊𝐶𝑅(𝑡𝑗) are mutually exclusive, since they are based on 
incompatible events (3.14), (3.16), and (3.18). Therefore, by applying the addition theorem 
of probability to (3.117), we obtain (3.114). 
To prove (3.113), (3.115), and (3.116), we write the probabilistic definition of the 
indicators 𝑅(𝑡𝑘, 𝑡), 𝑃𝐹𝑅(𝑡𝑗) and 𝑃𝑇𝑅(𝑡𝑗): 
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Since the scheduling of inspections is carried out over a finite time horizon (0, T), 
then considering that last repair of the system occurs at the time 𝑡𝑗, the random variable Η 
exists in the interval (0, 𝑇 − 𝑡𝑗) with the conditional PDF: 
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Let us prove (3.113). Suppose that the last restoration of the system was at the time 
𝑡𝑗. Assume the system failure occurs in the time interval from η to η + 𝑑η. Then the 
conditional probability of such an event provided that during previous inspections the 
system was correctly judged as suitable is equal to 
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The unconditional probability of the formulated event is given by
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The probability of the event 
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is determined by integrating (3.123) over the region of existence of the random variable Η: 
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Considering (3.121), relation (3.125) reduces to the following form:
 
( )
( ) ( )
1
0
1
ω
ω
j
j
T tk
t
i jj j i TP k jT t
i j t
j
PP t t t t t x x x
x dx
T t t d
−
−
= + −
   
  
   
− −  −  −

= . (3.126) 
Using the multiplication theorem of probability, we determine the joint probability of 
system recovery at the time 𝑡𝑗 and event (3.124) 
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Since the system can be repaired at any of the moments 𝑡0, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and after repair the 
system becomes as good as new, the events 𝑊0, 𝑊𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are independent, then the sum of the 
probabilities (3.127) with the change of j from 0 to k yields formula (4.113) , where 𝑃𝑅(𝑡0) =
𝑃[𝑊(𝑡0)] = 1. Q.E.D. 
The proof of relations (3.115) and (3.116) is similar. 
3.3.6. Determination of the optimal inspection times and replacement thresholds. 
The task of determination of the optimal inspection times and replacement thresholds over 
a finite interval of system operation can be formulated according to various criteria. 
Optimization criteria may include such measures as maximum availability, minimum 
average system operation costs over time T, the provision of the required level of ORF with 
a minimum of average maintenance costs over time T or maximum of ORF with a restriction 
on the average maintenance costs over time T. 
The criterion of minimum average system operation costs over time T is presented in 
the following form: 
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where 𝑡1
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In the case of a periodic inspection schedule, the criterion (3.128) takes the form 
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where τ𝑜𝑝𝑡 is the optimal periodicity of inspection; 𝑃𝐹𝜏𝑜𝑝𝑡
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replacement thresholds at times τ𝑜𝑝𝑡 , 𝑀τ𝑜𝑝𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . 
In the case of a sequential inspection schedule, the maximum availability criterion is 
formulated as follows: 
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In the case of a periodic inspection schedule, the criterion (3.130) is converted into 
the following form: 
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The task (3.131) may be simplified if, instead of the optimal replacement threshold 
for each inspection time, determine one optimal threshold 𝑃𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑡 for all checking times. In 
such case the optimization criterion can be formulated as follows: 
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Since two indicators evaluate the effectiveness of the safety-critical systems, we may 
formulate two optimization criteria. If the minimum allowable ORF R* is specified, then one 
can minimize the average maintenance cost 
,2
T
CBME C   . The optimization criterion, in this 
case, has the following form [11]: 
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If the maximum allowed average maintenance cost *E C    is specified, the 
optimization criterion is as follows [11]: 
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In the case of periodic inspections, the criteria (3.132) and (3.133) have the following 
form [11]: 
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Example 3.3. Assume that as in Example 3.1, the system state parameter is the output 
voltage of the radar transmitter power supply. It is necessary to solve the problem (3.132) 
with the following initial data: 𝑇 = 3,000 h; 𝐹𝐹 = 20 kV; 𝑎0 = 16 kV; 𝑚1 = 0.002 kV; 
σ1 = 0.00085 kV/h; σ𝑦 = 0.25 kV; 𝑡𝑆𝐶 = 𝑡𝑃𝑅 = 3 h; 𝑡𝐶𝑅 = 10 h. 
Figure 3.12 shows the dependence of the system availability on the number of 
inspections in the interval (0, T). From Fig. 3.12 follows that the optimal solution for the 
case of suitability checking has the following form: 𝑃𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 18.5 kV, 𝑀𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 5, τ𝑜𝑝𝑡 =
500 h, and ( )max , 0.99.optoptA PF =  In the case of operability checking, i. e. at 𝑃𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹 =
20 kV, the following solution is optimal: 𝑀𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 25, τ𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 115.4 h, and 
( )max , 0.928optA PF FF = = . Thus, the use of the optimal replacement threshold 𝑃𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑡 < 𝐹𝐹 
substantially increases the availability and significantly reduces the number of inspections. 
 
 
Fig. 3.12. Dependence of availability on the number of inspections at 𝑃𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 18.5 kV <
𝐹𝐹 (red squares) and at 𝑃𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹 = 20 kV (black circles). 
 
Example 3.4. Assume again that as in Example 3.1, the system state parameter is the 
output voltage of the radar transmitter power supply. It is necessary to solve the problem 
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(3.133) for the same initial data as in Example 3.3. Let us assume that the minimum 
allowable value of ORF is R* = 0.95. 
We solve the problem (3.133) using Mathcad. Table 3.3 presents the values of optimal 
suitability checking times and replacement thresholds. As can be seen in Table 3.3, the time 
interval between suitability checking decreases and tends to approximately 500 h value. At 
the same time, the optimal replacement threshold value gets stable starting with the 2nd 
inspection. 
Table 3.3. The values of optimal suitability checking times and replacement thresholds 
Inspection 
time (h) 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 
1165 1890 2475 3015 3535 4040 4535 
Replacement 
threshold 
(kV) 
PF1 PF2 PF3 PF4 PF5 PF6 PF7 
18.5 19 19 19 19 19 19 
 
Figure 3. 13 shows the dependence of the ORF on the system operational time with 
the indication of suitability checking times over the interval (0, 5,000 h). As can be seen in 
Fig. 3.13, with the course of the running time, the ORF changes from a maximum value 
close to one, after the suitability checking and, if necessary, restoration works to a minimum 
of 0.95, immediately preceding the next inspection time. In this example, the maximum 
ORF value 𝑅(𝑡𝑘,𝑡𝑘), 𝑘 = 1,7̅̅ ̅̅  virtually does not change with the inspection number and is 
approximately equal to 0.99. Apparently, the higher the minimum allowed ORF level 𝑅∗, 
the more inspections are required over a specified interval (0, T). 
The minimum value of the average maintenance cost when checking the system 
suitability in the time interval (0, 5,000 h) is equal to 
( ) ( )
7 7
1 1
7 3000 0.36 1.98 10000 7 500 $24,370.T FR FR j TR TR j CM
j j
E C C P t C P t C
= =
 
  = + +  =  +  +  =    (3.137) 
Suppose now that PFk = FF (𝑘 = 1, 𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ), that is, instead of checking the system 
suitability, an operability check is applied. The optimal operability checking times are given 
in Table 3.4. 
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Fig. 3.13. Dependence of ORF on the system operating time with the indication of suitability 
checking times over the interval (0, 5,000 h) 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.4, the time interval between operability checking decreases 
and tends to an approximately 80 h. In this case, the number of operability checks necessary 
to ensure the minimum ORF-value of 0.95 increases to 43. 
Table 3.4. Optimal operability checking times 
Inspection 
time (h) 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 … t43 
1165 1285 1380 1470 1555 … 4920 
Replacement 
threshold 
(kV) 
FF FF FF FF FF … FF 
20 20 20 20 20 … 20 
 
Figure 3. 14 shows the dependence of the ORF on the system operational time with 
the indication of operability checking times over the interval (0, 5,000 h). In this case, the 
minimum value of the average maintenance cost is equal to 
( ) ( )
43 43
1 1
43 3000 0.258 2.365 10000 43 500 $ 45,924.T FR FR j TR TR j CM
j j
E C C P t C P t C
= =
 
  = + +  =  +  +  =    (3.137) 
By comparing (3.136) and (3.137), we can see that the minimum average cost of 
maintenance based on suitability checking is less by almost half of the average cost of 
maintenance based on operability checking. 
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Fig. 3.14. Dependence of ORF on the system operating time with the indication of 
operability checking times over the interval (0, 5,000 h) 
 
Therefore, for safety-critical systems, the maintenance strategy based on suitability 
checking is more efficient than the maintenance strategy based on operability checking. 
3.4. Conclusions 
1. A mathematical model of CBM has been developed which, unlike the known 
models, considers the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made when checking 
system suitability at scheduled times, to significantly reduce the probability of system failure 
in the interval between inspections due to the rejection of potentially unreliable systems. 
2. Generalized expressions (3.25)–(3.30) and (3.35)–(3.40) have been developed to 
calculate the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made when checking system 
suitability, considering the results of previous inspections and the possibility of discarding 
potentially unreliable systems. 
3. The criteria for determining the optimal replacement thresholds such as maximum 
net income (3.41), minimum average risk (3.42), minimum total error probability (3.43), 
and given a posteriori probability of the system’s failure-free operation in the forthcoming 
time interval (3.44) have been formulated, which can significantly reduce the likelihood of 
system failure in the intervals between inspections. 
4. Expression (3.47) is obtained that allows for a linear random process of 
degradation to calculate the conditional joint PDF of the errors in the evaluation of the 
operating time to failure through the known PDF of the measurement error of the system 
state parameter and the values of the functional failure and replacement thresholds. 
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5. With the use of 3D images of the conditional PDF of errors in the evaluation of 
time to failure, it has been shown that the introduction of a small anticipatory tolerance 
significantly weakens the requirements to the accuracy of measuring the system state 
parameter. 
6. Numerical examples show that in the absence of an anticipatory tolerance, the 
total error probability practically does not decrease with a 10-fold increase in the accuracy 
of measuring the system state parameter. While with the introduction of the optimal 
anticipatory tolerance, the total error probability decreases by almost ten times with a 10-
fold increase in the measurement accuracy of the state parameter due to a significant increase 
in the likelihood of rejecting potentially unreliable systems. 
7. Numerical examples have shown that when using the criteria of the minimum total 
error probability and given a posteriori probability, the optimum value of the replacement 
threshold increases with the time of inspection, and the value of the anticipatory tolerance 
decreases, which is explained by the increase in the mathematical expectation of the 
stochastic degradation process with time. 
8. The generalized analytical expressions (3.95), (3.97), (3.99), (3.101), and 
(3.104)–(3.108) have been obtained for the mean time spent by the system in different states 
of operation and maintenance for sequential and periodic inspection schedule, considering 
the conditional probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made when checking system 
suitability. 
9. Cost-related effectiveness indicators have been developed for CBM based on 
suitability checking of systems not affecting safety (3.109) and (3.110), and for safety-
critical systems (3.111) and (3.112). 
10. For systems that affect safety, the generalized relations (3.113) - (3.116) have 
been proved to calculate the ORF and the probability of an unplanned recovery in a finite 
time interval. 
11. The tasks of determining the optimal scheduling of suitability checks and 
replacement thresholds according to the criteria of minimum average system operation costs 
(3.128) and (3.129), maximum availability (3.130) - (3.132), minimum average maintenance 
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cost with restriction on the ORF (3.133) and (3.135), and maximum ORF with a limit on the 
average maintenance cost (3.134) and (3.136), have been formulated. 
12. The results of numerical calculations show that the CBM based on suitability 
checking is more effective than the maintenance based on operability checking, as it ensures 
higher availability and lower maintenance costs with fewer inspections. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
TECHNIQUES OF OPTIMIZING THE MAINTENANCE OF VEHICLES’ 
EQUIPMENT 
4.1. The architecture of modern avionics 
Avionics systems must meet a large number of requirements for safety, reliability, 
performance standards, overall dimensions, power consumption, weight, etc. Over the past 
40 years, in response to these requirements, manufacturers have proposed two digital 
avionics architectures [1, 2]. 
Federated avionics (FA) architecture implies that each system has a dedicated 
controller, and different systems do not use the controller hardware. These controllers have 
a weak association with the controllers of other functions. Therefore, the propagation of 
errors from function to function is possible only in the case of an interaction, which can be 
detected and allowed by software. 
Figure 4.1 shows an example of FA architecture. 
The advantages of this architecture compared to the independent avionics architecture 
used in analogue avionics includes a reduction in the amount of hardware due to the 
principle of complex information processing and reduction of the total weight of the cable 
network by using multiplexed communication links between on-board sources and receivers 
of information. The disadvantages include the possibility of failure spreading from one 
system to other systems due to mutual data exchange. Failure diagnostics is done 
automatically by hardware and software system monitoring means. Boeing 767 and 757 
series were the first commercial aircraft with the digital FA architecture. 
As can be seen in Fig. 4.1, the FA architecture assumes the use of dedicated LRUs for 
each avionics function and interconnection of each LRU with others via point-to-point data 
buses such as ARINC 429 or ARINC 629. However, very soon it became apparent that 
ARINC 429 capabilities were not sufficient to transfer the volumes of digital data exchanged 
between different LRUs. The original ARINC 429 standard (1978) included the definition 
of about one hundred (32-bit) data words identified by unique “labels.” By the early 1990s, 
the number of such data words had increased to such a level that the ARINC 429 standard 
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was divided into three parts. Part 2 contained definitions for labels and data words and was 
approaching 200 pages in volume for the latest edition published in 2004. Part 3 defined the 
data file sending method since the transfer of significant data volumes became extremely 
important. 
One of the drawbacks of the FA architecture is that it is difficult to expand. Any 
additional LRUs require additional cable links with each other and with existing LRUs. This 
architecture requires long cable runs to connect remote LRUs that increase weight and may 
lead to reliability problems. 
It should be noted that until the late 1990s, digital avionics of most civil aircraft, 
including Airbus A320, A330, and A340 series, was based on the FA architecture 
philosophy. 
Integrated modular avionics was developed to create a modular, open, fault-tolerant 
and flexible digital avionics architecture. The IMA architecture presents open network 
architecture with the common computing platform. This architecture uses standard computer 
systems as a common platform for multiple functions. These so-called IMA modules are 
connected via data buses. Since all functions located on one module share the computational 
resource and memory of the corresponding platform, propagation of failures is suppressed 
using time division mechanisms. By now, several generations of IMA architecture have 
been developed. 
Starting with the Boeing 777 series, the FA architecture began to progressively move 
to IMA with the Airplane Information Management System (AIMS). Several vital functions 
(for example, flight control, communication management, aircraft condition monitoring) 
previously performed by independent LRUs were implemented using IMA. The IMA 
architecture was developed for most functions of A380 avionics. 
Figure 4.2 shows an example of the IMA architecture. Dedicated avionics applications 
perform most functions of conventional LRUs in IMA architecture. Generic IMA modules, 
called CPIOMs run these dedicated applications. 
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Fig. 4.1. Example of federated avionics architecture 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Example of integrated avionics architecture [3] 
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Consequently, the IMA concept reduces operating costs due to fewer computers 
needed. Each CPIOM integrates new hardware and software technologies and runs these 
dedicated applications on common computing and memory resource while providing an I/O 
interface for specific conventional avionics system LRUs. Moreover, to meet the high 
demand for connection to conventional avionics systems, additional IOMs are included in 
the IMA structure. CPIOMs and IOMs are LRMs. Communication between LRMs is carried 
out via the ADCN through communication technologies developed by a non-aeronautical 
standard, which is adapted to aviation restrictions. This technology is called AFDX, and it 
complies with the ARINC 664 standard. The IMA architecture involves connecting all 
modules (CPIOM and IOM) into ADCN, while all information is routed through the AFDX 
switches to the required LRMs. 
A380 aircraft have seven avionics CPIOMs that perform different types of functions, 
each being identified by the letter (from A to G): A — pneumatic + air conditioning 
(optional); B — air conditioning; C — cockpit + flight control; D — data transmission 
channel; E — energy; F — fuel; G — chassis. 
Each CPIOM type is associated with a specific number. CPIOMs with the same 
number are interchangeable but may require software reconfiguration. 
The A380 avionics has 30 interchangeable LRMs and 22 programming functions, 
located in CPIOMs [4]. The ACDN consists of 16 switches (8 per network) and the 
corresponding AFDX cables. These switches connect the following aviation system 
components: 8 IOMs; 22 CPIOMs; 50 LRUs with AFDX interface. 
To reduce the number of connecting wires from the control panels in the cockpit to 
the system computers in the avionics compartment, the controller area network (CAN) bus 
is used in the A380 [6, 7]. The CAN bus is the standard vehicle bus designed to enable 
communication between microcontrollers and devices inside the vehicle without using the 
host computer. Although Airbus began to widely use the CAN bus for A380 to reduce the 
amount of wiring, the popular ARINC 429 bus is still used in this aircraft series to connect 
the radio control panels in the cockpit with the LRUs in the avionics compartments. Many 
LRUs of radio communication and navigation systems, including VHF/HF transceivers, 
ATC transponders, weather radar, ILS receivers, VOR and ADF receivers, are currently 
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manufactured only with ARINC 429 interfaces, while there are no LRUs of radio 
communication and navigation systems designed for interaction with the CAN bus [6]. 
Besides, many electronic engine control units also have ARINC 429 interfaces. The latter is 
because the ARINC 429 bus has a clear data structure suitable for aircraft systems. 
Therefore, electronic LRUs are connected to ADCN via CPIOMs or a common remote data 
concentrator (CRDC). The CRDCs collect, convert and exchange data between ADCN and 
LRUs that do not have AFDX interfaces and installed outside the avionics compartment. 
Therefore, the IMA architecture is more widespread than the FA architecture due to a 
reduction in weight, size, power consumption and operating costs. 
 
4.2. A technique for calculation of the probabilistic and time-related 
maintenance effectiveness indicators of digital avionics LRUs/LRMs 
A technique to calculate maintenance effectiveness indicators may be used for any 
LRUs that meet the ARINC 700 (FA architecture) specifications, as well as for LRUs and 
LRMs that meet the specifications of ARINC 651/653 (IMA architecture). The technique 
uses the analytical expressions derived in Chapter 2 for the case of exponential distribution 
of operating time to permanent and intermittent failure. Two versions of the technique for 
calculating maintenance effectiveness indicators are considered, differing in the duration of 
the operating time T. The first version corresponds to the finite operating time interval, i. e. 
𝑇 < ∞. In this case, the interval T may correspond to the warranty maintenance period or, 
for example, the duration of the outsourcing contract with the repair station. In the second 
case, 𝑇 = ∞, which usually corresponds to the duration of post-warranty maintenance or 
the operating time intervals much longer than the MTBUR of LRUs/LRMs. 
4.2.1. A technique for calculation of the probabilistic and time-related 
maintenance effectiveness indicators over a finite time interval. 
1. The following initial data should be known: the time interval T; the rate of 
permanent (λ) and intermittent (θ) failure of LRU/LRM; the average flight time (τ); the 
average duration of maintenance operations at the O-level (𝑡𝑀
𝑂−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the average time of 
waiting for a spare LRU/LRM from the airline warehouse in the situation “aircraft on 
ground” (𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒); the average scheduled stop time of the aircraft at the base airport (𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝); 
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the average time of shipping the failed LRU/LRM to the repair and back (𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔); the 
average time of the LRU/LRM repair due to intermittent (𝑡𝐼𝐹𝑅) and permanent failure (𝑡𝑃𝐹𝑅). 
2. Calculation of the LRU/LRM availability over a finite time interval: 
2.1. Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the operable state by 
formula (2.16): 
( )
( )λ θ
(λ+θ) λτ λτ (λ+θ)
1 θτ θτ (λ θ)τ
τ 1 τ 1
1 1 τ τ
1 λ 1 1
T
T TeE TS e e e e
e e e
− +
− − − −
− − − +
 
        
 
−
= − + − − − +
− − −
. 
2.2. Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the inoperable state 
by formula (2.17): 
( )λ θλτ
2 (λ θ)τ
1 1
τ
λ 1
Te e
E TS
e
− +−
− +
  
     
   
− −
= −
−
. 
2.3. Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the O-level 
maintenance by formula (2.7): 
3
O level
ME TS t
− 
  = . 
2.4. Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the state of waiting 
for a spare LRU/LRM from the airline warehouse by formula (2.8): 
( )4 O levelspare M stopE TS t t t−   = + − . 
2.5. Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the state of shipping 
to repair or from repair by formula (2.9): 
5 .shippingE TS t   =  
2.6. Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the state of repairing 
due to an intermittent failure by formula (2.18): 
( ) ( ) 
λτ λ (λ θ)τ (λ θ)
λτ θ λ
6 λτ (λ θ)τ
1 1
1 1
T T
T T
IFR
e e e e
E TS t e e e
e e
− − − + − +
− − −
− − +
  
     
  
− −
= − − + −
− −
. 
2.7. Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the state of repairing 
due to a permanent failure by formula (2.19): 
( ) 
(λ θ)
λτ (λ θ)
7 (λ θ)τ
1
1
1
T
T
PFR
e
E TS t e e
e
− +
− − +
− +
 
    
 
−
= − +
−
. 
2.8. Determination of the mean time between repairing the LRU/LRM using (2.1): 
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 
7
0
1
i
i
E T E TS
=
  = . 
2.9. Determination of the LRU/LRM availability over a finite time interval T by 
formula (2.20): 
 1 0A E TS E T  = . 
3. Determination of the MTBUR over a finite time interval using formula (2.23): 
  ( )
( )λ θ
(λ+θ) λτ λτ (λ+θ)
θτ θτ (λ θ)τ
λτ (λ θ)
(λ θ)τ
.
τ 1 τ 1
1 1 τ τ
1 λ 1 1
1 1
τ
λ 1
T
T T
T
T
e
E TBUR e e e e
e e e
e e
e
− +
− − − −
− − − +
− − +
− +
 
     
 
   
   
   
−
= − + − − − + +
− − −
− −
−
−
 
4. Calculation of the operational reliability function (ORF) on a finite time interval: 
4.1. Determination of the probability of repairing the LRU/LRM with an intermittent 
failure at time jτ (𝑗 = 1, 𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅; 𝑁 = 𝑇/𝜏 − 1) by formula (2.43): 
( ) ( )
( )1θτ ( ν 1)θτ ( ν)λτ λ
λ( ντ)
ν=0
ντ
τ 1
1
j
R j j T
IF T
P
P j e e e e
e
−
− − − − − − −
− −
 
 = − − −
. 
4.2. Determination of the probability of repairing the LRU/LRM with a permanent 
failure at time jτ by formula (2.44):  
( )
( )1 ( ν 1)θτ ( ν)λτ λ
λ( ντ)
ν=0
ντ
τ 1
1
j
R j j T
PF T
P
P j e e e
e
−
− − − − − −
− −
 
 = − − −
. 
4.3. Determination of the total probability of LRU/LRM repairing at time jτ by 
formula (2.33): 
( ) ( ) ( )R IF PFP j P j P j  = + . 
4.4. Determination of the ORF of LRU over the operating time interval (𝑘τ, 𝑡), 𝑘τ <
𝑡 ≤ (𝑘 + 1)τ by formula (2.42): 
( )
( ) ( )θτ λ( τ) λ
λ( τ)
0
,
1
k
R k j t j T
T j
j
P j
R k t e e e
e

 − − − − −
− −
=
 
 = − −
. 
4.2.2. A technique for calculation of the probabilistic and time-related 
maintenance effectiveness indicators over an infinite time interval. 
1. In the occasion of an infinite operating time interval (𝑇 = ∞), the initial data is 
the same as for the case of a finite time horizon, i. e. we assume that parameters λ, θ, τ, 
𝑡𝑀
𝑂−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 , 𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒 , 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝, 𝑡𝐼𝐹𝑅, 𝑡𝑃𝐹𝑅, and 𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 are known. 
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2. Calculation of the LRU/LRM availability on an infinite time interval: 
- Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the operable state by 
formula (2.48): 
( )λτ λτ1 θτ θτ (λ θ)τ
τ 1 τ 1
1 τ
1 λ 1 1
E TS e e
e e e
− −
− − − +
 
      
 
= + − − −
− − −
. 
- Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the inoperable state by 
formula (2.49): 
λτ
2 (λ θ)τ
1 1
τ
1 λ
e
E TS
e
−
− +
 
    
 
−
= −
−
. 
- Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the states 𝑆3, 𝑆4 and 𝑆5 
by formulas (2.7) - (2.9): 
( )3 4 5, .,O level O levelM spare M stop shippingE TS t E TS t t t E TS t− −          = = + − =  
- Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the state of repairing 
due to an intermittent failure by formula (2.50): 
( )
λτ (λ θ)τ
λτ
6 λτ (λ θ)τ
1
1 1IFR
e e
E TS t e
e e
− − +
−
− − +
 
    
 
= − −
− −
. 
- Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the state of repairing 
due to an intermittent failure by formula (2.51): 
λτ
7 (λ θ)τ
1
1PFR
e
E TS t
e
−
− +
 
    
 
−
=
−
. 
- Determination of the mean time between repairing the LRU/LRM using (2.1): 
 
7
0
1
i
i
E T E TS
=
  = . 
- Determination of the LRU/LRM availability over an infinite time interval T by 
formula (2.20): 
 1 0A E TS E T  = . 
3. Determination of the MTBUR over an infinite time interval using formula (2.53): 
  ( )
λτ
λτ λτ
θτ θτ (λ θ)τ (λ θ)τ
τ 1 τ 1 1 1
1 τ τ
1 λ 1 1 1 λ
e
E TBUR e e
e e e e
−
− −
− − − + − +
  
     
   
−
= + − − − + −
− − − −
. 
4. Calculation of the ORF on an infinite time interval: 
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- Determination of the probability of repairing the LRU/LRM with an intermittent 
failure at time jτ (j = 1, 2, ...) by formula (2.58): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
1
θτ
ν 0
τ 1 ντ exp ν 1 θ ν λ τ
j
IF RP j e P j j
−
−
=
  = − − − − + − . 
- Determination of the probability of repairing the LRU/LRM with a permanent 
failure at time jτ (j = 1, 2, ...) by formula (2.59): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
1
ν 0
τ 1 ντ exp ν 1 θ ν λ τ
j
PF RP j P j j
−
=
  = − − − − + − . 
- Determination of the total probability of LRU/LRM repairing at time jτ by formula 
(2.33): 
( ) ( ) ( )R IF PFP j P j P j  = + . 
- Determination of the ORF of LRU over the operating time interval (𝑘τ, 𝑡), 𝑘τ <
𝑡 ≤ (𝑘 + 1)τ by formula (2.57): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
0
, τ exp θτ λ τ
k
R
j
R k t P j k j t j
=
  = − − + − . 
4.3. A technique for calculation of the probabilistic and time-related 
maintenance effectiveness indicators of redundant digital avionics systems 
1. The initial data for the calculation include the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM 
in the operable state (𝐸[𝑇𝑆1]), inoperable state (𝐸[𝑇𝑆2]), in the state of waiting for a spare 
LRU/LRM from the airline warehouse (𝐸[𝑇𝑆4]), the steady-state value of LRU operational 
reliability function (𝑅(τ)∗), as well as the type of redundancy and the total number of 
LRUs/LRMs in the system (m). 
2. Calculation for the case of a parallel redundancy structure: 
- Determination of the availability and unavailability using formulas (2.66) and 
(2.68): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 41 1
m
A E TS E TS E TS E TS  = − − + + , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 41
m
A E TS E TS E TS E TS  = − + + . 
- Determination of the steady-state values of the ORF and the probability of system 
failure in flight using formulas (2.67) and (2.69): 
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( ) ( )* *1 1
m
mR R   = − − , 
( ) ( )* *1
m
mQ R   = − . 
3. Calculation for the case of a “k-out-of-m” redundancy structure: 
- Determination of the availability and unavailability using formula (2.70), as well 
as the complementary formula: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 4 1 2 4
1
i m i
m
i k
m
i
E TS E TS
A
E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS
−
=
    
    
        
= −
+ + + +
, 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 4 1 2 4
1 1
i m i
m
i k
m
i
E TS E TS
A
E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS
−
=
    
    
        
= − −
+ + + +
. 
- Determination of the steady-state values of the ORF and the probability of system 
failure in flight using formula (2.71), as well as the complementary formula: 
( ) ( ) ( )* * *1
m i m i
m
i k
m
R R R
i
  
−
=
 
        
 
= − , 
( ) ( ) ( )* * *1 1
m i m i
m
i k
m
Q R R
i
  
−
=
 
        
 
= − − . 
4. Calculation for the case of a parallel-series redundancy structure: 
- Determination of the availability and unavailability using formula (2.72), as well 
as the complementary formula: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1,
1 1, 2, 4,
1 1
m
l
i
i i i i
E TS
A
E TS E TS E TS=
  
= − − 
  
+ +
 , 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1,
1 1, 2, 4,
1
m
l
i
i i i i
E TS
A
E TS E TS E TS=
  
= − 
  
+ +
 . 
- Determination of the steady-state values of the ORF and the probability of system 
failure in flight using formula (2.73), as well as the complementary formula: 
( ) ( )* *
1
τ 1 1 τ
m
l
m i
i
R R
=
 
  
= − − , 
( ) ( )* *
1
τ 1 τ
m
l
m i
i
Q R
=
 
  
= − . 
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4.4. A technique for minimizing the costs of warranty maintenance of redundant 
digital avionics systems 
This technique uses the mathematical model of LRU/LRM operation over a finite 
time interval and the warranty maintenance model of redundant avionics systems considered 
in subsections 2.2 and 2.5, respectively. 
1. The following initial data should be known: the warranty period expressed in 
flight hours (TW); the number of aircraft with a supplier’s warranty (NW); the total number 
of LRUs/LRMs in the avionics system (m); the maintenance labour cost per hour (LC); the 
rate of permanent (λ) and intermittent (θ) failures of LRU/LRM; the average flight time (τ); 
the average duration of maintenance operations at the O-level (𝑡𝑀
𝑂−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the cost of a spare 
LRU/LRM (𝐶𝐿𝑅𝑈); the guaranteed LRU/LRM repair time (TRS); the guaranteed expedited 
delivery time of a spare LRU/LRM (TED); the average time of rechecking the dismantled 
LRU by ground test equipment at the I-level maintenance (𝑡𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the number of types of 
LRUs that can be rechecked by the test equipment at the I-level (𝐹𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the cost of the 
ground test equipment at the I-level maintenance (𝐶𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙). 
2. Determination of the steady-state values of the probabilities of repairing the 
LRU/LRM with an intermittent and permanent failures using formulas (2.45) and (2.46): 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )* θτ λτ λ λ θτ 1 1 1T T TIFP e e e e e− − − − −  = − − − − , 
( ) ( ) ( )* λτ λ λτ 1 1T TPFP e e e− − −= − − − . 
3. Determination of the steady-state value of the total probability of LRU/LRM 
repairing using formulas (2.33), (2.45) and (2.46): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
* * * θτ λτ λ λ θ
λτ λ λ
τ τ τ 1 1 1
1 1 .
T T T
R IF PF
T T
P P P e e e e e
e e e
− − − − −
− − −
 = =
 
+ − − − − +
− − −
 
4. Determination of the average number of unscheduled removals of LRUs/LRMs 
due to permanent and intermittent failures over the time interval (0, TW) by formula (2.64): 
( ) ( )* τ τR W W RTN T P= . 
5. Determination of the LRU/LRM unscheduled removal rate λi,i+1 by formula 
(A.2.1): 
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( )
( ) ( )
*
, 1 *
τ ,
τ τ , .
τ if 1, 1,
λ
1 if 2,
R
i i
R
q P i PS
q PS i P i PS PS q
+



= +
=
+ + − = + +
 
6. Determination of the mean LRU/LRM repair time by formula (A.2.3): 
 
, for the first WMO,
, for the second WMO.
RS
R I level
RS PF TE
T
E T
T P t −



=
+
 
7. Determination of the LRU/LRM repair rate μi+1, i by formula (A.2.2): 
 
1,
,
,
μ if 1, ,
μ
μ if 1, .
RS R
i i
ED ED
i i E T i PS
i i T i PS PS q
+



= =
=
= = + +
 
8. Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the state of repairing 
due to a permanent failure by formula (2.19): 
( ) 
(λ θ)
λτ (λ θ)
7 (λ θ)τ
1
1
1
T
T
PFR
e
E TS t e e
e
− +
− − +
− +
 
    
 
−
= − +
−
. 
9. Determination of the a posteriori probability that dismantled LRU/LRM has a 
permanent failure by formula (A.2.6): 
7PF PFRP E TS t  = . 
10. Determination of the failure flow parameter of a set 𝑚𝑁𝑊 of the same type 
LRUs/LRMs by formula (A.2.11): 
( )* τ
τ
W RmN P= . 
11. Determination of the average time of waiting for a spare LRU/LRM from the 
airline warehouse in the situation “aircraft on ground” by formula (A.2.9): 
( ) 1 1
1
,
q
spare PS i
i
t PS US iP− + +
=
=  . 
12. Determination of the optimal number of spare LRUs/LRMs by the criterion 
(2.77): 
( )4 , 0.
O level
spare M stopE TS t PS US t t
−     = + − →  
13. Determination of the WTEC1 using formula (2.74): 
1 ( ) ( ) .
O level
M R W LRU WWTEC m LC t N T PS US C N
−=   + +   
14.  Determination of the WTEC2 using formula (2.76): 
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( )2 ( ) ( )
I level
O level I level TE
M TE R W LRU WI level
W TE
N T
C
WTEC m LC t t PS US C N
N F
−
− −
−
=  + + + +

 
15.  Choice of the optimal WMO by criterion (2.78): 
( )min , 1,2opt iWTEC WTEC i= = . 
Let us consider an example of minimizing the costs of warranty maintenance of the 
A380 airborne inertial reference system (ADIRS). In 2012, the airline Emirates (UAE) 
received eight aircraft A380 [8]. Each aircraft has three air data inertial reference units 
(ADIRU) of HG2030BE (Honeywell) type that form the redundant ADIRS system. The 
appearance and main characteristics of the HG2030BE ADIRUs are shown in Fig. 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 shows the appearance and main characteristics of the HG2030BE unit. 
As shown in Fig. 4.4-4.6, the ADIRS provides air data (the airspeed, angle of attack 
and altitude) and inertial control information (the position and altitude) to the pilot’s 
displays, as well as to other aircraft systems such as engines, autopilot, flight control system 
and chassis. The ADIRS comprises three fault-tolerant ADIRUs located in the electronic 
rack of the aircraft. The third ADIRU is a standby unit that may be selected to provide data 
to the first or second pilot’s displays in the case of a partial or total failure of ADIRUs № 1 
or № 2. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Appearance and main characteristics of HG2030BE ADIRU [8] 
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Fig. 4.4. Information provided by the ADIRS to on-board computers [9] 
 
Fig. 4.5. ADIRUs № 1 and № 2 independently display information on the first or second 
pilot’s displays [9] 
 
 
Fig. 4.6. ADIRU № 3 is a standby unit [9] 
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As can be seen in Fig. 4.5 and 4.6, the ADIRS does not have crossover redundancy 
between ADIRU № 1 and ADIRU № 2, since ADIRU № 3 is the only alternative source of 
air and inertial data. Failure of air data stream from ADIRU № 1 or ADIRU № 2 will result 
in a loss of airspeed and altitude information on the corresponding display In any case, the 
information can only be restored by selecting ADIRU № 3. 
From the description of the principle of ADIRU № 1, ADIRU № 2 and ADIRU № 3 
connection to the on-board computers and the 1st and 2nd pilot’s displays, it follows that the 
following formula calculates the steady-state ORF of the ADIRS: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3 2 2
* * * * * *τ τ 3 τ 1 τ τ 1 τADIRS ADIRU ADIRU ADIRU ADIRU ADIRUP P P P P P              = + − + − , (4.1) 
where 𝑃𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑈
∗ (τ) is the steady-state value of the ADIRU operational reliability function. 
Similarly, the ADIRS availability is determined from 
 
 
     
 
     
 
     
 
     
 
     
3 2
1 1
1 2 4 1 2 4
2
1 1 1
1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4
3
1 1 .
ADIRS
E TS E TS
E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS
E TS E TS E TS
E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS E TS
A
   
   
+ + + +      
   
   
+ + + + + +      
= +
− + −

 (4.2) 
As in subsection 2.5.4, we will consider two alternative WMOs for ADIRUs. 
The main characteristics of HG2030BE ADIRU (Figure 4.3) show that MTBF = 
40,000 h and E[TBUR] = 23,500 h. According to the data given in [11], the approximate 
price of ADIRU is $ 50,000. According to [12], the average flight time (τ) of the A380 is 
8 h, and the average flying hours per year for a single A380 is approximately 5,000 h. Data 
on testing and setting up ADIRU in the laboratory are given in [13]. The rest of the initial 
data is taken from various instructions and technical descriptions and is given in Table. 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Initial data for warranty maintenance optimization 
Parameter name 
(unit) 
Symbol Parameter 
value 
1 2 3 
Warranty period expressed in flight hours (h) TW 5,000 
The average duration of maintenance operations at the O-
level for A380 (h) 
𝑡𝑀
𝑂−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
 1 
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1 2 3 
The average scheduled stop time of A380 at the base 
airport (h) 
𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 1.5 
Maintenance labour cost per hour ($/h) LC 15 
 
Cost of a spare ADIRU ($) CLRU 50,000 
Guaranteed ADIRU repair time by the manufacturer 
(days) 
TRS 15 
Guaranteed expedited delivery time of a spare ADIRU 
(days) 
TED 1 
ADIRU permanent failure rate (h-1) λ 2.5 × 10-5 
ADIRU intermittent failure rate (h-1) θ 1.76 × 10-5 
The average time of rechecking the ADIRU using test 
equipment located at the I-level maintenance (h) 
𝑡𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  2 
Number of LRUs types that can be rechecked by the test 
equipment located at I-level maintenance (pcs) 𝐹𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  1 
Cost of the test equipment located at I-level maintenance 
($) 
𝐶𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 20,000 
 
Table. 4.2 presents the results of the calculations. 
Table 4.2. The results of calculations for the 1st and 2nd warranty maintenance 
options 
Warranty 
maintenance 
option 
Optimal number 
of planned spare 
ADIRUs (PSi) 
Number of 
unplanned spare 
ADIRUs (USi) 
WTECi 
($) 
ADIRS 
unavailability 
(?̅?) 
i = 1 3 0 18,830 2 × 10-8 
i = 2 2 0 13,600 2 × 10-8 
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As can be seen in Table 4.2, the average maintenance costs per aircraft for the 2nd 
WMO are 28 % less than for the 1st option. Therefore, the 2nd WMO is preferable. 
4.5. A technique for minimizing the costs of post-warranty maintenance of 
redundant digital avionics systems 
This technique uses the mathematical model of LRU/LRM operation over an infinite 
time interval and the post-warranty maintenance model of redundant avionics systems 
considered in subsections 2.3 and 2.6. 
1. The initial data includes the same parameters as given in item 1 of Subsection 4.4, 
except TW and NW, as well as the following additional parameters: the post-warranty 
maintenance period (TPW); the number of aircraft that do not have the supplier’s warranty 
(NPW); the average cost of shipping the LRU / LRM for repairing  and back to the airline 
(𝐶𝑇𝑅); the average repair cost of LRU/LRM with intermittent failure (𝐶𝐼𝐹); the average 
repair cost of LRU/LRM with permanent failure (𝐶𝑃𝐹); the average repair cost of the SRU 
with permanent failure at the manufacturer (𝐶𝑃𝐹,𝑅); the average cost of shipping the SRU to 
the manufacturer and back to the airline (𝐶𝑇𝑅,𝑆𝑅𝑈); the cost of ATE used at the I-level 
maintenance (𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the number of LRU/LRM types that can be checked using ATE at 
the I-level maintenance (𝐹𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the cost of the j-th SRU (𝑗 = 1, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) (𝐶𝑗); the number of 
spare SRUs of the j-th type (𝑆𝑅𝑈𝑗); the number of different SRUs in the LRU/LRM (n); the 
required probability that all LRUs/LRMs will be provided by SRUs of the j-th type (𝑃(Η𝑗)); 
the permanent failure rate for the j-th type SRU (λ𝑗); the intermittent failure rate for the j-th 
type SRU (θ𝑗); the average repair time of the j-th type SRU at the manufacturer (𝑡𝑅𝑆,𝑗); the 
average cost of SRU repair with intermittent failure at the manufacturer (𝐶𝐼𝐹,𝑅); the average 
time to detect place of the intermittent failure in the dismantled LRU/LRM with depth to 
SRU using IFD (𝑡𝐼𝐹,𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the IFD cost (𝐶𝐼𝐹𝐷); the number of LRU/LRM types tested with 
IFD to detect intermittent failures (𝐹𝐼𝐹𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the average time to detect a permanent failure 
in the LRU/LRM with a depth to SRU and to replace the failed SRU at the I-level 
maintenance (𝑡𝑃𝐹,𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the average time to detect an intermittent failure in the LRU/LRM 
with a depth to SRU and to replace the failed SRU at the I-level maintenance (𝑡𝐼𝐹,𝐷
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the 
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average time to detect the place of a permanent failure in the SRU with a depth to one or 
more non-repairable electronic components and replace them at D-level maintenance 
(𝑡𝑃𝐹,𝐷
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the average time to detect the place of an intermittent failure in the SRU with a 
depth to one or more non-repairable electronic components and replace them at D-level 
maintenance (𝑡𝐼𝐹,𝐷
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the average cost of replaceable non-repairable electronic 
components used when repairing the SRU with a permanent failure at D-level maintenance 
(𝐶𝑃𝐹,𝑅
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the average cost of replaceable non-repairable electronic components used when 
repairing the SRU with an intermittent failure at D-level maintenance (𝐶𝐼𝐹,𝑅
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the cost 
of diagnostics and repair equipment used at D-level maintenance (𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑇
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the number of 
SRU types repaired at D-level maintenance (𝑍𝐷𝑅𝑇
𝐷−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙); the cost of a spare electronic 
component of the q-th type in the l-th SRU (𝐶𝑙,𝑞 , 𝑙 = 1, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑞 = 1, 𝑆𝑅𝑈𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅); the number of spare 
non-repairable electronic components of the q-th type in the l-th SRU (𝑋𝑙,𝑞). 
2. Determination of the steady-state value of the total probability of LRU/LRM 
repair using formula (2.61): 
( ) ( )* (λ+θ)τlim 1R R
j
P P j e  −
→
= = − . 
3. Determination of the LRU/LRM unscheduled removal rate λi,i+1 by formula 
(A.2.1): 
( )
( ) ( )
*
, 1 *
τ ,
τ τ , .
τ if 1, 1,
λ
1 if 2,
R
i i
R
q P i PS
q PS i P i PS PS q
+



= +
=
+ + − = + +
 
4. Determination of the average LRU/LRM repair time by formula (A.2.3): 
 
, for the first PWMO,
, for the second PWMO.
RS
R I level
RS PF TE
T
E T
T P t −



=
+
 
5. Determination of the LRU/LRM repair rate μi+1,i by formula (A.2.2): 
 
1,
,
,
μ if 1, ,
μ
μ if 1, .
RS R
i i
ED ED
i i E T i PS
i i T i PS PS q
+



= =
=
= = + +
 
6. Calculation the MTBUR by formula (2.53): 
  ( )
λτ
λτ λτ
θτ θτ (λ θ)τ (λ θ)τ
τ 1 1 1 1
1 τ τ
1 λ 1 1 1 λ
e
E TBUR e e
e e e e
 −− −
− − − + − +
  
     
   
−
= + − − − + −
− − − −
. 
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7. Determination of the mean time spent by the LRU/LRM in the state of repairing 
due to a permanent failure by formula (2.51): 
λτ
7 (λ θ)τ
1
1PFR
e
E TS t
e
−
− +
 
    
 
−
=
−
. 
8. Determination of the a posteriori probability that dismantled LRU/LRM has a 
permanent failure by formula (A.2.6): 
7PF PFRP E TS t  = . 
9. Determination of the failure flow parameter of a set 𝑚𝑁𝑊 of the same type 
LRUs/LRMs by formula (A.2.11): 
( )* τ
τ
PW RmN P = . 
10. Determination of the average time of waiting for a spare LRU/LRM from the 
airline warehouse in the situation “aircraft on ground” by formula (A.2.9): 
( ) 1 1
1
,
q
spare PS i
i
t PS US iP− + +
=
=  . 
11. Determination of the optimal number of spare LRUs/LRMs by the criterion 
(2.77): 
( )4 , 0.
O level
spare M stopE TS t PS US t t
−     = + − →  
12. Determination of the average total number of removals due to permanent and 
intermittent failures over time TPW by formula (2.64): 
( ) ( )*R PW PW RTN T P  = . 
13. Determination of the PWTEC1 using formula (2.79): 
( )1 ( )
O level
M TR IF IF PF PF R PW LRU PWPWTEC m LCt C C P C P N T C PS US N
−  = + + + + + . 
14. Determination of the PWTEC2 using formula (2.80): 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 ( )
.
O Level I level
TR PF PF M TE R PW
I level I level
TE TE LRU PW
PWTEC m C C P LC t t N T
C N F C PS US N
− −
− −
 
 
= + + + +
 + +
 
15. Determination of the PWTEC3 using formula (2.81): 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
3 , , ,
1
.
O level I level I level
M ATE PF R PF D PF TR SRU R PW
n
I level I level
ATE ATE LRU j j PW
j
LC LC C N TPWTEC m t t C t P
C N F C PS US C SRU N
− − −
− −
=
  +

 

= + + + +
 + + +
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16. Determination of the optimal number of spare SRUs of the j-th type for the 3rd 
PWMO by formula (2.82): 
( )
( )
( )
( ), ,
( 1)
λ
1 exp λ
1 !
j
j j RS j
j j j RS j
j
SRU
t
P t
SRU
+

−   −
+
. 
17. Determination of the PWTEC4 using formula (2.83): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
4 , , , , ,
1
.
O level I level I level I level
M ATE PF R PF D PF IF R IF D IF TR SRU R PW
n
I level I level I level
ATE PW ATE IFD PW IFD LRU j j PW
j
LC LC N TPWTEC m t t C t P C LC t P C
C N F C N F C PS US C SRU N
− − − −
− − −
=
  +

 

= + + + + +  +
 +  + + +
 
18. Determination of the optimal number of spare SRUs of the j-th type for the 4th 
PWMO by formula (2.84): 
( )
( )
,
,
( 1)
λ θ
1 exp λ θ
1 !
j
j j j RS j
j j j j RS j
j
SRU
t
P t
SRU
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
+
 +
−   − +
+
. 
19. Determination of the PWTEC5 using formula (2.96): 
( ) ( )
( )( )  ( )
( )
5 , , ,
, , ,
I level D level D levelO level I level
M ATE PFPF D PF D PF R
I levelI level D level D level I level
R ATE PW ATEIF D IF D IF R IF W
I level I level
IFD PW IFD DR
PWTEC m LC t t LC t t C P
LC t t C P N T C N F
C N F C
− − −− −
−− − −  −
 
 
 
− −



= + + + + +
+ +  +
 +
 
 
  +
 
( ) , ,
1 1 1
.
lSRUnn
D level D level
T DRT LRU j j l q l q PW
j l q
C XZ C PS US C SRU N− −
= = =

 

+ + + + 
 
20. Determination of the optimal number of spare SRUs of the j-th type for the 5th 
PWMO by formula (2.88): 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( 1)
, ,
, ,
λ θ
1 exp λ θ .
1 !
SRU
jD level D level
j j j PF D PF IF D IF D level D level
j j j j PF D PF IF D IF
j
P P
P P
t t
P t t
SRU
+
− − 
 
  − − 
 
 
 +
   +
 
 +
−   − +
+
. 
Let us consider an example of minimizing the cost of post-warranty maintenance for 
the ADIRS of the aircraft Airbus A380. By September 2017, the Emirates (UAE) airline 
received 97 A380 aircraft for operation [14]. Let us determine the average costs per one 
ADIRS of the A380 for various PWMOs by the developed technique. According to [14, 15], 
each ADIRU includes the following SRUs: an air data computer (ADC); a multi-mode 
receiver (MMR); 3 digital ring laser gyros; 3 quartz accelerometers; and a power supply 
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module. According to [17], the cost of three Honeywell (USA) ring laser gyroscopes is about 
$ 15,000. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.3 present the data required to calculate the average costs per aircraft 
for different PWMOs. 
Table 4.3. Initial data for post-warranty maintenance optimization 
Parameter name 
(unit) 
Symbol Parameter 
value 
1 2 3 
Post-warranty maintenance period, expressed in flight 
hours (h) 
TPW 50,000 
Number of the Airbus A380 aircraft without warranty 
of the supplier (pcs) 
NPW 97 
The average cost of LRU shipping to repair and back 
($) 
𝐶𝑇𝑅 300 
The average cost of repairing the LRU with an 
intermittent failure ($) 
𝐶𝐼𝐹 5,000 
The average cost of repairing the LRU with a 
permanent failure ($) 
𝐶𝑃𝐹 10,000 
The average cost of repairing the SRU with a 
permanent failure at the manufacturer ($) 
𝐶𝑃𝐹,𝑅 1,000 
The average cost of repairing the SRU with an 
intermittent failure at the manufacturer ($) 
𝐶𝐼𝐹,𝑅 1,500 
The average cost of shipping the SRU to the 
manufacturer and back ($) 
𝐶𝑇𝑅,𝑆𝑅𝑈 100 
Cost of ATE used at the I-level maintenance ($) 
𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  2,000,000 
Number of LRU types that can be tested by ATE at 
the I-level maintenance (pcs) 𝐹𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  120 
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1 2 3 
Number of different SRUs in the LRU under 
consideration (pcs) n 9 
Cost of the j-th SRU ($) 𝐶𝑗 5,000 
The required probability that all LRUs will be 
provided with SRUs of the j-th type 
𝑃(Η𝑗) 0.99 
Average repair time of the j-th type SRU at the 
manufacturer (days/h) 
𝑡𝑅𝑆,𝑗 15/195 
Average time to detect the location of an intermittent 
failure in the dismantled LRU with depth to SRU and 
replace the faulty SRU at I-level maintenance (h) 
𝑡𝐼𝐹,𝐷
𝐼−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  1 
Cost of IFD ($) 𝐶𝐼𝐹𝐷 100,000 
Number of LRU types tested by IFD (pcs) 𝐹𝐼𝐹𝐷
𝐼−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  120 
Average time to detect the location of a permanent 
failure in the dismantled LRU with depth to SRU and 
replace the failed SRU at I-level maintenance (h) 
𝑡𝑃𝐹,𝐷
𝐼−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  0.25 
Average time to detect a permanent failure in the SRU 
with depth to one or more non-repairable electronic 
components and replace them at D-level maintenance 
(h) 
𝑡𝑃𝐹,𝐷
𝐷−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  2 
Average time to detect an intermittent failure in the 
SRU with depth to one or more non-repairable 
electronic components and replace them at D-level 
maintenance (h) 
𝑡𝐼𝐹,𝐷
𝐷−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  3 
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1 2 3 
The average cost of replaced non-repairable 
components when repairing the SRU with a 
permanent failure at D-level maintenance ($) 
𝐶𝑃𝐹,𝑅
𝐷−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  200 
The average cost of replaced non-repairable 
components when repairing the SRU with an 
intermittent failure at D-level maintenance ($) 
𝐶𝐼𝐹,𝑅
𝐷−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  200 
Cost of diagnostics and repair equipment used at  
D-level maintenance ($) 
𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑇
𝐷−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  200,000 
Number of SRU types repaired at D-level 
maintenance ($) 
𝑍𝐷𝑅𝑇
𝐷−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  500 
Cost of spare electronic components in all SRUs of 
the LRU under consideration ($) 
∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑙,𝑞𝑋𝑙,𝑞
𝑆𝑅𝑈,𝑙
𝑞=1
9
𝑙=1
 
40,000 
 
Table 4.4 presents the results of calculations. 
Table 4.4. Calculation results for five different post-warranty maintenance options 
PWMO type 
(i) 
E[TBUR] 
(h) 
Optimal number 
of spare 
ADIRUs (PSi) 
PWTECi 
($) 
ADIRS 
unavailability 
(?̅?) 
i = 1 23,500 4 110,600 2 × 10-8 
i = 2 23,500 3 86,150 2 × 10-8 
i = 3 23,500 1 11,820 2 × 10-8 
i = 4 30,800 1 13,300 2 × 10-8 
i = 5 30,800 1 10,070 2 × 10-8 
 
Since the 4th and 5th PWMO reckon for the use of the IFD, the rate of intermittent 
failures in repaired LRUs should significantly reduce. For example, as described in [18], 
after repairing the AN/APG-68 on-board radars of F-16 using IFD, MTBUR increased by 
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more than three-fold. Therefore, in calculations we assumed that the intermittent failure rate 
is less by a factor of 3, i. e. θ = 0.6×10-5 h-1, for the 4th and 5th PWMO. 
Number of spare 𝑆𝑅𝑈𝑗 ( 𝑗 = 1,9̅̅ ̅̅ ) was calculated for 𝑃(Η𝑗) = 0.99 . Using 
inequalities (2.93) and (2.95), we obtain that for the 3rd and 4th post-warranty maintenance 
options 𝑆𝑅𝑈𝑗 = 2 (𝑗 = 1,9̅̅ ̅̅ ), and for the 5
th maintenance option 𝑆𝑅𝑈𝑗 = 1 (𝑗 = 1,9̅̅ ̅̅ ). 
Table 4.4 shows that the 5th PWMO, which uses IFD at I- and D-level of maintenance, 
has the lowest value of ADIRS maintenance costs, and, therefore, is the best. Indeed, 
PWTEC5 is 11 times less than PWTEC1 and over 8.5 times less than PWTEC2. Note also that 
the use of IFD at I-level maintenance only is inadvisable, since PWTEC4 > PWTEC3 by 
12.5 %. The calculations show that the 5th PWMO requires the least number of spare parts, 
namely one LRU and one SRU of each type. 
4.6. A technique of determining the optimal replacement thresholds for a known 
inspection schedule of a deteriorating system 
This technique uses the mathematical model of CBM for deteriorating equipment of 
vehicles discussed in subsection 3.2. 
4.6.1. Categories of instrumental measurements used in condition monitoring. A 
sufficiently long period of degradation usually precedes failures of deteriorating vehicles’ 
equipment, so the condition monitoring is necessary to prevent or detect failures. Monitoring 
of equipment condition is carried out by instrumental measurements of one or several 
degradation parameters. According [19], the following categories of instrumental 
measurements are distinguished for condition monitoring: 
1. Temperature measurements (e. g., thermography) help detect potential failures 
associated with temperature changes in equipment. 
2. Dynamic monitoring (e. g., spectrum analysis, and impact pulse analysis) involves 
measuring and analysing the energy radiated by mechanical equipment in the form of waves, 
such as vibration, pulses and acoustic effects. 
3. Oil analysis (e. g., ferrography, particle counter testing) is performed for various 
types of oils, such as lubricants, hydraulic or insulating oils. This type of monitoring can 
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indicate such problems as equipment degradation (e. g., due to wear), oil contamination, 
incorrect type of oil (e. g., improper amounts of additives) and deterioration of oil quality. 
4. Corrosion monitoring (e. g., coupon testing, corrosion testing) helps determine 
the corrosion degree, corrosion rate and corrosion condition (e. g., active or passive 
condition) of the material. 
5. Non-destructive testing includes tests (e. g., x-ray, ultrasound) that are non-
invasive for the equipment under test. 
6. Methods of electrical condition monitoring (e. g., high-potential testing or power 
signature analysis) include measuring changes in such system properties as resistance, 
conductivity, electrical strength, and potential. 
7. Equipment performance monitoring is a condition monitoring method that 
predicts problems by monitoring changes in such variables as pressure, flow rate, power 
consumption, and equipment capacity. 
4.6.2. General procedure for determining the optimal replacement thresholds. 
The procedure assumes that a single system state parameter describes the system 
degradation process. Determination of the optimal replacement thresholds is considered 
using the example of a stochastic degradation process described by equation (3.46), in which 
𝐴0 and 𝐴1 are independent random variables with a Gaussian distribution. 
1. The following initial data should be known: the mathematical expectation (𝑚0) 
and standard deviation (σ0) of the initial value of the system state parameter; the 
mathematical expectation (𝑚1) and standard deviation (σ1) of the degradation rate of the 
system state parameter; the standard deviation of the measurement error (σ𝑦); the system 
functional failure threshold (FF); the condition monitoring periodicity (τ); the average profit 
per unit time of system operation (𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡); the average cost of preventive replacement 
(repair) of the system (𝐶𝑝𝑟); the average cost of additional spare parts due to untimely 
preventive replacement (repair) of the system (𝐶𝑠𝑝); the average cost of corrective 
replacement (repair) of the system (𝐶𝑐𝑟); the average loss due to missed failure detection 
when checking the system suitability (𝐶𝑢𝑓), the minimum allowable value of the a posteriori 
probability of the system failure-free operation (𝑃𝐴). 
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2. Determination of the PDF of the system’s operating time to failure by the 
following formula [20]: 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
22 2 2 2
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
3 2 2 2 22 2 2
0 10 1
σ
σσ
σ σ
ω exp
2 σ2π σ
m t t FF m mt FF m mt
t
tt
 +  
 
++   
+ − − − −
= − . 
3. Determination of the conditional PDF the system’s operating time to failure 
provided that 𝐴0 = 𝑎0 by formula (3.80): 
( )
( ) ( )
22 2 2
1 1 1 0 1 0 1
0 2 23 3
11
ησ η σ η η
ω η exp
2σ η2 σ η
a
m FF a m FF a m

  
 
  
+ − − − −
= − . 
4. Determination of the conditional joint PDF of the errors in evaluating the 
operating time to failure using formula (3.69): 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
0
0 1 0 0
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2
1
η
1
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 
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   
5. Determination of the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made when 
checking the system suitability at time kτ (k = 1, 2, ...) by formulas (3.35)–(3.40): 
( ) ( ) ( )1 0 1 1
( 1)τ τ τ
, τ;( 1)τ ω ... ψ , k k
k k
P k k g g dg dg d
 
   
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 
 
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( 1) ( 1)τ τ
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k
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6. Solving the problem of finding the optimal replacement threshold at time kτ by 
the criterion of maximum net income (3.41): 
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or by the minimum Bayes risk criterion (3.42): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 3 5min , τ;( 1)τ , τ;( 1)τ , τ;( 1)τ
k
opt
k pr ufsp
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or by the criterion of minimum total error probability (3.43): 
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or by the criterion of a given a posteriori probability of failure-free operation (3.44) 
 1
opt
k kk k APF P t t P+   = . 
4.6.3. The procedure for determining the optimal replacement thresholds by the 
minimum total error probability criterion for a non-random initial value of the system 
state parameter. 
1. The following initial data should be known: the initial value of the system state 
parameter (𝑎0); the mathematical expectation (𝑚1) and standard deviation (σ1) of the system 
state parameter degradation rate; the standard deviation of the system state parameter 
measurement error (σ𝑦); the functional failure threshold of the system (FF); the periodicity 
of condition monitoring (τ). 
2. Determination of the PDF of the system’s operating time to failure by formula 
(3.80): 
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3. Determination of the conditional joint PDF of the errors in evaluating the 
operating time to failure using formula (3.70): 
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. 
4. Determination of the probabilities of “false alarm”, “missed detection 1” and 
“missed detection 2” at time kτ (k = 1, 2, ...) by formulas (3.75), (3.76) and (3.78): 
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5. Solving the problem of finding the optimal replacement threshold at time kτ by 
the minimum total error probability criterion (3.43): 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 3 5min , τ;( 1)τ , τ;( 1)τ , τ;( 1)τ
k
opt
k
PF
PF P k k P k k P k k       
     
  + +  + +  + . 
Let us consider an example of determining the optimal replacement thresholds for the 
output voltage of a radar transmitter power supply 𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡(𝑡). Following [21], the periodical 
inspection schedule of the output voltage supposes that τ = 50 h. According to [21], the radar 
transmitter is operable, if 𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡(𝑡) ≤ 25 kV, that is, FF = 25 kV. The initial data is as follows: 
𝑎0 = 19.645 kV, 𝑚1 = 0.01 kV/h, σ1 = 0.0043 kV/h, σ𝑦 = 0.1 kV, and 𝑚𝑦 = 0. 
We determine the optimal replacement thresholds 𝑃𝐹𝑘 for inspection times 𝑘𝜏 (𝑘 =
1,7̅̅ ̅̅ ). By the classification of instrumental measurements given in paragraph 3.6.1, this type 
of measurement refers to the equipment performance monitoring. 
Table 4.5 shows the optimal replacement thresholds for condition monitoring at times 
𝑘𝜏 (𝑘 = 1,7̅̅ ̅̅ ). 
Table 4.5. Optimal replacement thresholds 
𝑃𝐹1 𝑃𝐹2 𝑃𝐹3 𝑃𝐹4 𝑃𝐹5 𝑃𝐹6 𝑃𝐹7 
21.90 kV 23.22 kV 23.67 kV 23.90 kV 24.11 kV 24.22 kV 24.33 kV 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the dependence of the total error probability on the threshold 𝑃𝐹4. 
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Fig. 4.7. Dependence of the total error probability dependence on the threshold 𝑃𝐹4 for 𝑘 =
4 and 𝑃𝐹1 = 21.90 kV, 𝑃𝐹2 = 23.22 kV and 𝑃𝐹3 = 23.67 kV 
 
As can be seen in Fig. 4.7, the use of the optimal replacement threshold 𝑃𝐹4 reduces 
the total error probability by a factor of 10 compared with the case when 𝑃𝐹4 = 𝐹𝐹 = 25 kV. 
4.7. A technique for determining the optimal replacement threshold and 
periodicity of suitability checking when monitoring the system condition 
As in subsection 4.6.2, we assume that one state parameter describes the process of 
degradation of the system. Let us consider the determination of the optimal replacement 
threshold and optimal periodicity of suitability checking using a stochastic degradation 
model (3.46), in which the random variable 𝐴1 has a Gaussian distribution and 𝐴0 = 𝑎0. 
1. The following initial data should be known: the initial value of the system state 
parameter (𝑎0); the mathematical expectation (𝑚1) and standard deviation (σ1) of the system 
state parameter degradation rate; the standard deviation of the system state parameter 
measurement error (σ𝑦); the functional failure threshold of the system (FF); the scheduled 
CBM interval (T); the average duration of the system suitability checking (𝑡𝑆𝐶), preventive 
maintenance (𝑡𝑃𝑅) and corrective maintenance (𝑡𝐶𝑅). 
2. Determination of the PDF of the system’s operating time to failure by formula 
(3.80): 
( )
( ) ( )
22 2 2
1 1 1 0 1 0 1
2 23 3
11
ησ η σ η η
ω η exp
2σ η2 σ η
m FF a m FF a m

  
 
  
+ − − − −
= − . 
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3. Determination of the conditional joint PDF of the errors in evaluating the 
operating time to failure using formula (3.70): 
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 
. 
4. Determination of the conditional probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions 
made when checking the system suitability by formulas (3.88)–(3.93): 
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5. Determination of the mean time spent by the system in various states by formulas 
(3.104)–3.108): 
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6. Calculation of the system availability by formula (2.20): 
1 0A E TS E TS      = . 
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7. Solving the problem (3.131) to find the optimal inspection periodicity and 
replacement threshold: 
( ) ( ) max
,
, max ,optopt
PF
A PF A PF

 = . 
Let us consider an example of determining the optimal replacement threshold and 
periodicity of suitability checking for the output voltage of a radar transmitter power supply 
[21] with the following initial data: FF = 25 kV; 𝑇 = 1,000 h; 𝑡𝐶𝑅 = 10 h; 𝑡𝑆𝐶 = 𝑡𝑃𝑅 =
3 h;  𝑎0 = 19.645 kV; 𝑚1 = 0.01 kV/h; σ1 = 0.0043 kV/h; σ𝑦 = 0.1 kV; and 𝑚𝑦 = 0. 
Figure 4.8 shows the availability dependence on the number of inspections for two 
maintenance types. Curve 1 corresponds to CBM, which requires 10 suitability checks with 
a periodicity of 91 h over the 1,000 h interval to provide the availability value of 0.965, i. e. 
Mopt = 10, τopt ≈ 91 h, 𝑃𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 24 kV, and ( )max , 0.965.optoptA PF =  Curve 2 corresponds to 
maintenance strategy based on operability checking, i.e. corrective maintenance. For the 
corrective maintenance, the optimal solution has the following form: Mopt = 17, τopt ≈ 56 h 
and ( )max , 0.89.optA PF FF = =  Therefore, using the CBM increases availability and reduces 
the number of inspections. 
 
 
Fig. 4.8. Dependence of the system availability on the number of inspections over the 
interval of 1,000 h for 𝑃𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 24 kV < 𝐹𝐹 (dependence 1) and for 𝑃𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹 = 25 kV  
(dependence 2) 
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4.8. Checking the adequacy of mathematical models 
To check the adequacy of the mathematical models developed in chapters 2 and 3, we 
will simulate the corresponding maintenance processes using the Monte Carlo method [21] 
and compare the simulation results with the theoretical calculations. 
4.8.1. Simulation of the avionics LRU/LRM operation and maintenance. Let us 
simulate the operation of the ADIRU HG2030BE [8] used in the Airbus A380 aircraft and 
compare the simulated mean times 𝐸[𝑇𝑆1], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆2], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆6], and 𝐸[𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑅] with the 
calculated results by formulas (2.48) - (2.51) and (2.53). 
The simulation algorithm of avionics LRM/LRU operation and maintenance includes 
the following steps: 
Step 0. Set the initial data and the number of simulations NI. 
Step 1. Set 𝑖 = 0. 
Step 2. Set 𝑖 =  𝑖 + 1. 
Step 3. Generation of the i-th realization of the operating time to failure of the 
LRU/LRM with fixating the time to permanent or intermittent failure. 
Step 4. Statistical evaluation of 𝐸[𝑇𝑆1], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆2], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆6], and 𝐸[𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑅]. 
Step 5. If 𝑖 < 𝑁𝐼, then go to step 2. Otherwise, go to step 6. 
Step 6. The output of the simulation results. 
The simulation program is written in the Visual FoxPro 9.0 object-oriented language. 
The following initial data are indicated in the input interface of the program for the 
simulation of ADIRU operation and maintenance: 
National Aviation University, Department of Electronics, Ahmed Raza 
Pseudo-random non-integer number generator: built-in FOX 
Distribution law of time to failure: EXP 
A variant of generator start-up: without displacement 
(each time you run the test after logging in, the sequence of pseudo-random non-
integer numbers is repeated) 
Without decoding by cycles (because > 1,000) 
Simulation of LRM/LRU: ADIRU 
Operation and maintenance for aircraft: A380 
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Mean time between permanent failures (MTBPF) in flight hours: 40,000 
Mean time between intermittent failures (MTBIF) in flight hours: 56,818 
Average flight duration in hours: 8 
Average repair time due to permanent failure in hours: 1 
Average repair time due to intermittent failure in hours: 1 
 
Table 4.6 presents the simulation results and Fig. 4.9 shows the relative deviation of 
the simulated E[TBUR] from the theoretical value expressed in percentage. 
As can be seen in Table 4.6 and Fig. 4.10, the statistical estimates of the mean times 
[𝑇𝑆1], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆2], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆5], 𝐸[𝑇𝑆6], and 𝐸[𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑅] quickly converge to the theoretical values of 
these indicators, which proves the adequacy of the developed mathematical model to the 
real process of ADIRU operation and maintenance. 
 
Table 4.6. Simulation results of ADIRU operation and maintenance 
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Fig. 4.9. A graphical presentation of simulation results for MTBUR 
4.8.2. Simulation of condition-based maintenance of deteriorating vehicles’ 
equipment. Let us perform a simulation of CBM for the power supply voltage of a radar 
transmitter and compare the simulated probabilities 𝑃[Γ1(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1)], P[Γ6(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
with the calculated values of these probabilities by formulas (3.74) - (3.79). 
The algorithm for simulating the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made 
when checking the suitability of a system includes the following steps: 
Step 0. Set the initial data and the number of simulations NI. 
Step 1. Set 𝑖 =  0. 
Step 2. Set 𝑖 =  𝑖 + 1. 
Step 3. Generation of the 𝑖-th realization of a stochastic process of system 
degradation. 
Step 4. Statistical evaluation of the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions 
when checking the system suitability 𝑃[Γ1(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1)], P[Γ6(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 
Step 5. If 𝑖 < 𝑁𝐼, then go to step 2. Otherwise, go to step 6. 
Step 6. The output of the simulation results. 
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The program of simulation of probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made 
when checking the suitability of a system is written in the Visual FoxPro 9.0 object-oriented 
language. 
When simulating the CBM process of the radar transmitter power supply, the 
following initial data were recorded in the input interface of the program: 
- National Aviation University, Department of Electronics, Ahmed Raza 
- Pseudo-random non-integer number generator: built-in FOX 
- A variant of generator start-up: without displacement 
- Simulation of: power supply of radar transmitter 
- Distribution law of degradation speed coefficient: NORMAL 
- Distribution law of measurement error: NORMAL 
- The initial value of degradation parameter: 19.645 
- Mathematical expectation of degradation speed: 0.01 
- The standard deviation of degradation speed: 0.0043 
- Mathematical expectation of measurement error: 0 
- The standard deviation of measurement error: 0.5 
- Functional failure threshold: 25 
- Replacement threshold: 22.2 
- Inspection time tk: 300 
- Inspection time tk+1: 500 
- Number of simulation cycles: 10, 50, 100, 500, 1000, 5000, 10000 
 
Table 4.7 and Fig. 4.10 present the simulation results. As can be seen in Table. 4.7 
and Fig. 4.10, statistical estimates of the probabilities 𝑃[Γ1(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1)], P[Γ6(𝑡1, 𝑡𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 𝑡𝑘+1)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
quickly converge to the theoretical values of these indicators, which proves the adequacy of 
the developed CBM mathematical model. 
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Table 4.7. The simulation results of the probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions made 
when checking the suitability of the radar transmitter power supply 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.10. A graphical presentation of simulation results of the probability 𝑃(Γ1) 
 
4.9. Conclusions 
1. The analysis of modern avionics architectures shows that digital avionics uses the 
principle of federated (Boeing 757, Boeing 767, A318-A321, A330, and A340) or integrated 
modular architecture (Boeing 777 and 787, and A380). 
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2. Based on a comparative analysis, it has been shown that the IMA replaces a 
number of separate processors and LRUs used in the FA architecture, by a fewer number of 
centralized processors and LRMs (CPIOMs and IOMs), reducing the total number of LRUs, 
thus saving the weight and reducing maintenance costs in new commercial aircraft. 
3. The analysis of the IMA of the Airbus A380 shows that the LRUs of radio 
communication and navigation systems, including VHF/HF transceivers, ATC transponder, 
weather radar, ILS, VOR and ADF receivers, have only the ARINC 429 interface. 
Therefore, electronic LRUs use CPIOM or CRDC for connecting to the ADCN. 
4. A380 avionics comprises 30 LRMs (8 IOMs and 22 CPIOM modules), 50 LRUs 
with AFDX interface and about 30 LRUs with ARINC 429 interface. With a large number 
of LRMs and LRUs, a reduction in the maintenance cost of A380 avionics is possible due 
to the optimal combination of O, I and D maintenance levels and the use of modern 
diagnostic tools for detecting permanent and intermittent failures. 
5. The techniques for calculating the probabilistic and time-related indicators of the 
avionics LRUs/LRMs maintenance effectiveness on a finite and infinite time interval have 
been developed. The proposed procedures allow determining the availability, ORF, and 
MTBUR, considering the rates of permanent and intermittent failures. 
6. A technique for calculating the probabilistic indicators of maintenance 
effectiveness of redundant digital avionics systems for such structures as parallel, a majority, 
and parallel-series considering permanent and intermittent failures, has been developed. 
7. A technique for minimizing the warranty maintenance cost of the redundant 
digital avionics systems has been developed, demonstrating (through the example of the 
ADIRS system of the Airbus A380 aircraft) that in the case of the optimal option of warranty 
maintenance, the average maintenance cost per aircraft decreases by 28 %. 
8. A technique for minimizing the cost of post-warranty maintenance for redundant 
digital avionics systems has been developed, which allows choosing the optimal 
maintenance option after expiring the supplier's warranty. The technique has demonstrated 
(through the example of the ADIRS system of the Airbus A380 fleet of the Emirates Airline) 
that a three-level maintenance option with IFD at the I- and D-levels was optimal. Because 
it reduced the total expected maintenance cost by 1100 % compared to a one-level option, 
184 
 
by over 850 % compared to a two-level choice without IFD, by 15 % compared to a three-
level option without using IFD, and by 24 % compared to the three-level option with IFD 
only at the I-level. 
9. A technique for determining the optimal replacement thresholds when monitoring 
the condition of the degrading system at scheduled times has been developed, which allows 
reducing the total error probability by a factor of 10 compared with the case of using only 
the functional failure threshold. 
10.  A technique for joint optimization of replacement threshold and periodicity of 
suitability checking when monitoring the system condition has been developed. A real 
example of monitoring the output voltage of the radar transmitter power supply has shown 
that the joint optimization of the replacement threshold and inspection periodicity allows 
reducing the unavailability by 68% and the number of inspections by 41 %. 
11. Algorithms and simulation programs to test the adequacy of the proposed 
maintenance models of vehicles' equipment have been developed. It has been shown that 
the statistical estimates of the mean times spent by LRU/LRM in different states and the 
probabilities of correct and incorrect decisions, when checking system suitability, converge 
rapidly to the theoretical values of these indicators, which proves the adequacy of the 
developed mathematical models. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In the thesis, the actual scientific task of developing mathematical maintenance 
models of digital avionics and deteriorating equipment of vehicles has been solved. The 
developed mathematical models make it possible to substantially reduce the maintenance 
costs of digital avionics systems and degrading equipment of vehicles while ensuring the 
required regularity and safety of flights. The following key results of the thesis research 
have been obtained: 
1. The analysis of mathematical models of multilevel maintenance of digital 
avionics systems has been carried out. The need for developing mathematical maintenance 
models of continuously monitored redundant avionics systems, considering the alternating 
mode of their use, the continuous character of in-flight testing, the possibility of the 
appearance of both permanent and intermittent failures in-flight, and the possibility of 
organizing several levels of ground handling, has been justified. 
2. The analysis of modern trends and mathematical models of condition-based 
maintenance of vehicles’ equipment has been conducted. The necessity of developing CBM 
mathematical models of degrading vehicles’ equipment, considering the probabilities of 
correct and incorrect decisions when checking the system suitability, and joint optimization 
of inspection schedule and replacement thresholds for systems that affect and do not affect 
safety, have been justified. 
3. For the first time, mathematical models for evaluating the operational reliability 
of continuously monitored LRMs/LRUs and redundant avionics systems on finite and 
infinite time intervals, considering the effect of both permanent and intermittent failures, 
have been developed. Numerical analysis has shown that the MTBUR decreases by a factor 
of two with the intermittent failure rate increase from 10-5 to 10-4 h-1 and by a factor of 5 
with a rise from 10-4 to 10-3 h-1, while the average number of unscheduled removals and 
average cost of LRU/LRM repair increased sharply when the intermittent failure rate 
exceeded 10-4 h-1. 
4. For the first time, generalized relationships for calculating the average 
maintenance costs during the warranty and post-warranty periods of operation of redundant 
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avionics systems, considering the impact of both permanent and intermittent failures, have 
been developed. Numerical analysis has shown that the use of ATE at the I-level 
maintenance virtually eliminates the harmful effect of intermittent failures on the number of 
spare LRUs and average maintenance costs during the warranty period of operation. 
Besides, the three-level post-warranty maintenance system was optimal over a wide range 
of initial data because it provided a minimum number of spare LRUs and SRUs and 
minimum maintenance costs, which was 4.6 times less than for a one-level system, and more 
than 30% less than in any two-level maintenance system. 
5. For the first time, a mathematical model of CBM, based on condition monitoring 
at scheduled times, has been developed, which considers the probabilities of correct and 
incorrect decisions made when checking system suitability. Numerical analysis has shown 
that in the absence of a replacement threshold, the total error probability when checking 
system suitability practically does not decrease at a 10-fold increase in the accuracy of 
measuring the system state parameter. When the optimal replacement threshold introduced, 
the total error probability decreased by almost ten times with a 10-fold increase in the 
measurement accuracy due to the rejection of potentially unreliable systems. 
6. For the first time, the tasks of determining the optimal replacement threshold for 
each inspection time based on the criteria of the maximum net income, minimum Bayes 
risk, minimum total error probability, and given a posteriori probability of the system's 
failure-free operation in the forthcoming period have been formulated. Numerical analysis 
has shown that when using the criteria of the minimum total error probability and the given 
a posteriori probability of a system’s failure-free operation, the optimum value of the 
replacement threshold increases with the time of inspection, and the value of the anticipatory 
tolerance decreases accordingly. The total error probability decreases from 27% to 1% when 
using the optimal replacement threshold for each checking time. 
7. For the first time, general mathematical expressions for calculating effectiveness 
indicators of CBM based on suitability checking and the criteria for joint determination of 
optimum inspection schedule and replacement thresholds for systems that affect and do not 
affect safety have been developed. Numerical analysis has shown that the maintenance 
189 
 
based on suitability checking is more effective than the maintenance based on operability 
checking, as it ensures higher availability and ORF with significantly fewer inspections. 
8. A technique for minimizing the cost of warranty maintenance for redundant 
digital avionics systems has been developed, which allows choosing the optimal 
maintenance option during the warranty period of the supplier. For the ADIRS system of 
the Airbus A380 (Emirates Airline), it has been shown that using ground test equipment at 
the I-level maintenance reduces average maintenance costs per aircraft by 28 %. 
9. A technique for minimizing the cost of post-warranty maintenance for redundant 
digital avionics systems has been developed, which allows choosing the optimal 
maintenance option after expiring the supplier’s warranty. The technique has demonstrated 
(for the ADIRS system of the Airbus A380 fleet of the Emirates Airline) that a three-level 
maintenance option with IFD at the I- and D-levels was optimal. Because it reduced the total 
expected maintenance cost by 1100 % compared to a one-level option, by over 850 % 
compared to a two-level choice without IFD, by 15 % compared to a three-level option 
without IFD, and by 24 % compared to the three-level option with IFD only at the I-level. 
10. A technique for joint optimization of replacement threshold and periodicity of 
suitability checking, when monitoring the system condition, has been developed. Numerical 
analysis has shown that when monitoring the output voltage of the radar transmitter power 
supply the joint optimization of the replacement threshold and inspection periodicity allows 
reducing the unavailability by 68% and the number of inspections by 41 %. 
The results of the thesis can be used in the development and maintenance of federated 
and integrated modular avionics, as well as degrading equipment of vehicles. 
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Appendix 2: 
Modelling of warehouse management system of spare LRUs/LRMs 
To determine the delay in meeting the requirement for a spare LRU/LRM at the base 
airport, we use, as in [1], the continuous-time Markov chain to describe the operation of the 
warehouse of spare LRUs/LRMs. Let q be the number of identical LRUs / LRMs mounted 
on the aircraft boards that have a supplier warranty. It is evident that q = mN, where N is the 
number of aircraft with the supplier’s warranty and m is the number of identical 
LRUs/LRMs on the board of one plane. Figure A.2.1 shows the graph of the system 
consisting of q main and PS spare LRUs/LRMs (in the future referred to as “q, PS system”). 
 
 
Fig. A.2.1. State graph of “q, PS system” of spare LRUs/LRMs 
Fig. A.2.1 includes the following notation: 
X1 is the state of “q, PS system”, in which q main LRUs/LRMs mounted in aircraft 
are operable and PS spare LRUs/LRMs are in the exchange fund in the warehouse; 
X2 is the state of “q, PS system”, in which q main LRUs/LRMs mounted in aircraft 
are operable and PS - 1 spare LRUs/LRMs are in the exchange fund in the warehouse; 
………………………………………………………………………………....…… 
XPS is the state of “q, PS system”, in which q main LRUs/LRMs mounted in aircraft 
are operable, and one spare LRU/LRM is in the exchange fund in the warehouse; 
XPS+1 is the state of “q, PS system”, in which q main LRUs/LRMs mounted in aircraft 
are operable, and no spare LRUs/LRMs are in the warehouse; 
XPS+2 is the state of “q, PS system”, in which q – 1 main LRUs/LRMs mounted in 
aircraft are operable, and no spare LRUs/LRMs are in the warehouse; 
…………………………………………………………………………………….... 
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XPS+q+ 1 is the state of “q, PS system”, in which all the main LRUs/LRMs mounted in 
aircraft are in failed state, and no spare LRUs/LRMs are in the warehouse; 
λi, i+1 is the unscheduled LRU/LRM removal rate carrying the “q, PS system” from 
the i-th (𝑖 = 1, 𝑃𝑆 + 𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) into the (i + 1)-th state; 
μi+1,i is the LRU/LRM repair rate carrying the “q, PS system” from the (i + 1)-th to 
the i-th state. 
The unscheduled LRU/LRM removal rate λi, i+ 1 is determined as follows [2]: 
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The LRU repair rate μ i+1, i depends both on TRS and TED and is determined as [2]: 
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where 𝐸[𝑇𝑅] is the average repair time of the LRU/LRM. 
The LRU/LRM repair time, presented by formula (A.2.2), corresponds to the case of 
unlimited recovery, which is typical for warranty maintenance. 
The average repair time depends on WMO and is determined as follows [2]:
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where 𝑃𝑃𝐹 is the a posteriori probability that the removed LRU/LRM has a permanent 
failure. 
Since the removed LRU/LRM can have either a permanent or intermittent failure, 
then there are two a posteriori probability, the sum of which is equal to one: 
 1PF IFP P+ = , (A.2.4) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝐹 and 𝑃𝐼𝐹 are, respectively, the a posteriori probability that the removed 
LRU/LRM has a permanent or intermittent failure. 
Since the process of changing the LRU/LRM states is regenerative, the probability of 
LRU/LRM restoration is equal to one within the regeneration cycle. Consequently, 
 6IF IFR
P E TS t  = , (A.2.5) 
 7PF PFR
P E TS t  = . (A.2.6) 
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For example, from equations (2.50) and (2.51) follows that at 𝑇 = ∞ and the 
exponential distribution of time to permanent and intermittent failure: 
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It is easy to see that for relations (A.2.7) and (A.2.8) the equality (A.2.4) is valid. 
The average waiting time for a spare LRU/LRM from the warehouse at the base 
airport is determined by the following formula [1]: 
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where Λ is the average rate of requests to the warehouse for a spare LRU/LRM delivery; 𝑃𝑗 
(𝑗 = 𝑃𝑆 + 2, 𝑃𝑆 + 𝑞 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is the probability that the “q, PS system” being in the state 𝑋𝑗. 
Since LRUs/LRMs are repairable items, the average rate of requests to the warehouse 
for delivery of a spare LRU/LRM is essentially a failure flow parameter. Following [3], the 
failure flow parameter is the ratio of the mathematical expectation of the number of failures 
of the repairable item for a sufficiently small period of operation to the value of this period.  
If the airline has 𝑁 aircraft in operation, the failure flow parameter (in respect to both 
permanent and intermittent failures) of the 𝑚𝑁 identical LRUs/LRMs is given by 
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By substituting 𝑁𝑅(∆𝑡) from (2.64) into (A.2.10), we obtain 
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The following relation from (A.2.9): 
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is the mathematical expectation of the number of unplanned spare LRUs/LRMs delivered 
by the manufacturer in response to an emergency request from the aircraft buyer. 
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Appendix 3:  
The act of confirmation of using the results of the thesis work
 
